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Abstract 
 
It has been suggested that task-switching costs can be eliminated if participants 
memorise all stimulus-response mappings thereby avoiding task-switching altogether 
(Dreisbach, Goschke & Haider, 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008). This has been 
labelled the “Look-Up Table” (LUT) approach. It has also been suggested that the LUT 
approach could potentially explain why animals such as monkeys (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; 
Avdagic et al., 2013) and pigeons (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier, Lea & McLaren 2016) 
were able to perform task-switching without showing any task-switching costs (Dreisbach, 
et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Forrest, Monsell & Mclaren, 2014). In a series 
of eight experiments the following two questions were addressed: (1) Why do some 
participants show significant task-switching costs even when they do not switch between 
tasks (e.g., Forrest, Monsell & Mclaren, 2014)? (2) Can the LUT approach explain the 
absence of task-switching costs? In an attempt to answer both questions different sources of 
human task-switching costs are investigated in eight behavioural experiments.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of different task-switching paradigms and accounts 
to explain task-switching costs. Chapter 2 summarises previous attempts to remove human 
task-switching costs. Evidence for the absence of task-switching costs in animals is also 
introduced. Following up on previous studies that suggested the LUT approach can explain 
the absence of task-switching costs, I conducted two task-switching experiments using visual 
tasks (i.e., colour task and shape task) with bivalent stimuli in an attempt to re-examine the 
conclusions of previous LUT studies (i.e., Dreisbach, et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008; Forrest, Monsell & Mclaren, 2014). The results in Chapter 2 indicate that human 
participants cannot always eliminate task-switching costs and do not always apply the LUT 
approach when the task-switching strategy is controlled.  
Therefore, the experiments in Chapter 3 and 4 sought to ascertain the requirements 
for eliminating task-switching costs when using the LUT approach. The experiments in 
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Chapter 3 applied visual tasks where each task had a different stimulus-set. Experiments in 
Chapter 4 applied two classical mathematical tasks (i.e., big/small task, odd/even task) and 
used Chinese numbers as stimuli. The results of the experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest 
that human participants must be able to give the correct answer without processing task-
relevant features from the stimuli in order to eliminate task-switching costs. In the 
experiment of Chapter 5 the cue-stimulus-response mappings from Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
were rearranged so that switching between conventional tasks and rules became impossible. 
The results suggest that task-relevant features can trigger interferences thereby causing 
“task-switching costs” even when participants do not switch between tasks.  
In Chapter 7, I compare a modified interference account, introduced in Chapter 5, 
with the compound retrieval account (e.g., Logan & Schneider, 2010) and associative 
learning account (Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016) in order to explain why human 
participants show task-switching costs even when they do not switch between tasks. I 
conclude that the modified interference account provides an alternative explanation. It has 
been proposed that only humans are affected by strong and long-lasting interference from 
previous trials during task-switching. As a consequence, this interference may explain why 
human participants consistently show task-switching costs whereas monkeys and pigeons 
show no task-switching costs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Compared with the behaviour of other animals, human behaviour seems flexible and 
highly adaptable. Depending on the diverse environmental contexts in which we live, we can 
execute different tasks and switch between them. For example, people who are bilingual can 
switch between two languages effortlessly. Also, when using smartphones, we can easily 
switch between different applications such as text messaging and surfing the internet. 
Because it seems that humans can behave adaptively in almost all types of situations, the 
17th century philosopher René Descartes proposed that we had a unique and universal 
problem-solving “device” embedded in our minds (Descartes, 1637, 2008), which he called 
the “rational soul”. In essence, contemporary cognitive psychologists still accept Descartes' 
perspective, although the universal problem-solving device or rational soul has been 
relabelled the “executive control process” (O’Reilly, 2010). Even though humans have a 
high degree of cognitive flexibility, there is now nearly a century of studies which show the 
limitations of this flexibility, starting with Jersild's (1927) seminal work on task-switching 
effects. The present thesis intends to explore the sometimes elusive task-switching effect.  
Modern-day task-switching experiments have consistently demonstrated that 
switching to a new task involves longer reaction times and higher error rates than repeating 
the previous task. These effects are called “task-switching costs” (Monsell, 2003; 
Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Kiesel et al., 2010; Grange & Houghton, 2014). Behavioural 
task-switching experiments provide an important means with which to study  cognitive 
flexibility and control of goal-directed behaviour in humans (i.e., the task-set reconfiguration 
account; Roger & Monsell, 1995). Furthermore, previous studies have demonstrated how 
participants can be subject to passive interference from previous actions (i.e., the proactive 
interference account; Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994). Taking these studies a step further, it 
is worth examining to what extent task-switching costs also reflect task-cue encoding 
processes. 
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We know for sure that switching between tasks in terms of task rules triggers task-
switching costs, the present thesis was motivated by two more elusive but closely related 
phenomena: (1) Why do some participants show significant task-switching costs even when 
they do not switch between tasks (Forrest, Monsell & Mclaren, 2014)? (2) Why are animals, 
such as monkeys (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Avdagic, et al., 2013; but see also Caselli & 
Chelazzi, 2011) and pigeons (Meier, Lea & McLaren 2016; Castro & Wasserman, 2016), 
able to switch between tasks without showing any task-switching costs? To address both 
questions, I will investigate task-switching conditions in which human participants may be 
able to eliminate task-switching costs. I believe that by addressing these questions, I can 
provide novel interpretations of the underlying mechanisms that cause task-switching costs.  
This thesis may be viewed as a comparative study. The major goal is to investigate 
under what conditions human participants can mirror pigeons' and monkeys' task-switching 
behaviours: performing task-switching experiments without indicating any task-switching 
costs. In Chapter 2 I give more details about these animal studies (i.e., Stoet & Snyder, 2003; 
Avdagic et al., 2013; Meier et al., 2016; Castro & Wasserman, 2016) and address why 
differences between animals and humans are important. In Chapter 6 I discuss the 
implications of the between-species difference in task-switching experiments. In short, 
human task-switching cost is an exquisite measurement of executive control: human 
participants with stronger executive control tend to have smaller task-switching costs 
(Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Meiran, 2000; Braver, 2012; Zinke, Einert, Pfennig & Kliegel, 2012; Kray et al., 2012). 
These animal studies are critical because animals’ surprising performance in task-switching 
experiments do not agree with the previously postulated implications of executive control. 
The present thesis seeks to explain monkeys and pigeons’ outstanding performance on 
switch trials without assuming they have better executive controls than human participants. 
Before pursuing these questions I will review some important aspects of modern task-
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switching studies, including the development of different task-switching paradigms and their 
theoretical frameworks.  
1.1 From the mental shift paradigm to the modern task-switching paradigms 
 The study of ‘task-switching’ can be traced back to 1927. In his seminal article 
‘Mental Set and Shift’, Jersild (1927) started his argument with an interesting observation 
from daily life: People respond differently to the same stimulus depending on its context. 
For example, he suggested that in a mathematics class, a two-digit number 10 may serve as 
a stimulus for mental addition or multiplication but on the football field, the same number 
might serve as signals of certain tactical actions; for example, to pass the ball to player 
number 10. Jersild suggested that the reason for this is that we have different mental-sets 
and each mental-set gives the same stimulus a different meaning. Consequently, in order to 
make appropriate responses, people sometimes need to shift between mental-sets. It was 
reasoned that this kind of shift requires additional time and energy. The task-set 
reconfiguration account is very similar to Jersild’s argument; the reconfiguration account 
replaced the term “mental-set” by “task-set”. 
1.1.1 Separate Condition and Shift Condition 
 To examine the above assumption, Jersild (1927) developed a shift condition 
paradigm. Firstly, to set up a baseline, he asked the participants to perform two different 
tasks (Task A and Task B) separately (the separate condition). After that, he asked 
participants to perform two different tasks alternately (i.e., ABABABAB...; the shift 
condition). Finally, by comparing the performance difference between the shift condition 
and the separate condition, he was able to measure the shift cost. For example, in one 
experiment, he listed 100 two-digit numbers on a sheet of paper, using four columns, each 
containing 25 numbers. In the first column, the participants were required to sum the two 
digits together (additive task). In the second column, the participants were required to 
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multiply the two digits together (multiplicative tasks). The first two columns represented the 
separate condition. In the third and the fourth columns, the participants were asked to 
perform the additive task and the multiplicative task alternately. These represented the shift 
condition. Participants were asked to write their answers down on paper. The amount of time 
they spent on each column was recorded by an experimenter (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1. An example of the shift condition paradigm. Column 1 and Column 2 show 
separate conditions. Column 3 and Column 4 describe the shift condition. The numbers 
between parentheses are the answers that the participants were asked to provide. These 
numbers are for illustrative purposes only. Jersild (1927) did not include any information 
about the exact numbers he used. 
 
In this particular experiment, Jersild (1927) reported that the participants spent more 
time on the shift condition than on the separate condition, which reflects the mental-set 
shifting process. In a series of experiments, he also tested participants using other types of 
tasks, including other arithmetic tasks, semantic tasks, and visual tasks. Sometimes, two 
tasks shared the same stimulus-set. For example, in Figure 1.1, the two-digit number 12 (in 
bold) can be found in both the additive task and the multiplicative task. However, sometimes 
both tasks did not share the same stimulus-set. For example, when shifting between a 
naming-the-opposite task (i.e., if ‘white’ then report ‘black’) and a calculation task, 
obviously one can either name the opposite of a number mor calculate an English word. As 
a result, each task must have a different stimulus-set. Jersild found that if both tasks share 
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the same stimulus-set, then a shifting cost can be observed. Conversely, if both tasks do not 
share the same stimulus-set, there were no stable shifting costs.  
 Even 70 years later, task-switching studies report similar results: task-switching 
costs are larger when using bivalent stimuli compared to univalent stimuli (Allport, Styles, 
& Hsieh, 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Spector & Biederman, 1976). A bivalent stimulus can be used in both tasks whereas a 
univalent stimulus can be used in only one task. 
Although Jersild’s (1927) paradigm provided a methodology to explore how people 
switch or, to use his term, “shift” between tasks and although his results anticipated most of 
the results of modern task-switching studies, his mental shift paradigm has one major 
disadvantage: the mental-set shift process is confounded by memory load (Roger & Monsell, 
1995). The problem is that in the separate condition (the baseline), participants only need to 
remember one mental-set as they are only performing one task. In contrast, in the shift 
condition, participants have to remember two mental-sets. Hence, we do not know if it is the 
mental-set shifting or the additional memory load that creates the delay in the shift condition.  
In fact, from a modern perspective, Jersild’s shifting cost (1927) is confounded with 
the so-called “mixing cost” (MarÍ-Beffa and Kirkham, 2014) as part of the task-switching 
costs. The measurement in the original paradigm recorded how mixing of two tasks affected 
response times compared with response times for a single task. Jersild (1927) did not directly 
measure the cost of switching between tasks, although task-switching certainly contributed 
to the shifting costs he observed. 
1.1.2 The Alternating-runs Paradigm 
To separate task-switching effects from memory load, Rogers and Monsell (1995) 
developed an alternating-runs task-switching paradigm. The idea was that participants would 
repeatedly perform over several trials in one task (a run) and then switch and perform over 
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several trials in another task (the other run). For example, in their Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
the authors required participants to perform one task (say Task A) twice and then switch to 
a new task (say Task B). As a result, an AA-BB-AA-BB... trial-by-trial sequence was 
formed. In the even trials (i.e., Trial 2, Trial 4, Trial 6...), participants repeated the tasks of 
the previous trial. These were labelled “repeat trials”. In all trials with odd indices except for 
the first trial (i.e., Trial 3, Trial 5) participants had to switch to a new task. Those were 
labelled “switch trials”. The reason for excluding the first trial is that there was no previous 
trial to relate it; the first trial was neither a switch trial nor a repeat trial. The task-switching 
effect was measured by response time and error rate differences between switch and repeat 
trials. 
In Rogers and Monsell’s (1995) experiments, a 2-by-2 table was always  visible on 
the computer screen (see Figure 1.2). In Trial 1, the target stimulus showed up in the top-left 
position in the table. In every new trial, the target stimulus rotated in a clockwise direction 
to a new position within the table. In these experiments, a fixed AA-BB-AA-BB… sequence 
was applied. Therefore, the stimuli from the top two positions always belonged to Task A 
(letter task), and those from the bottom two positions always belonged to Task B (digits 
task). As a consequence, participants could identify the task in each trial based on the 
location of the stimulus. Furthermore, because of the fixed run-by-run sequence, participants 
could always predict the upcoming task in advance.  
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Figure 1.2. Illustration of Rogers and Monsell’s paradigm (1995). (a) Stimuli of both letter 
and digit tasks and their response key. (b) The bivalent condition. In each trial, a letter and 
a digit appear randomly. Therefore, each stimulus can be used in both tasks. The position of 
the target stimuli rotates clockwise. Following the AABB sequence, the top row == letter 
task and the bottom row == digits task. (c) The univalent condition. In each trial, the task-
relevant information (letter or number) appears with a neutral symbol. Each stimulus 




Variations of the alternating-runs paradigm were introduced by changing the 
alternating sequence. For example, the alternating-runs paradigm can have the sequence 
AAAABBBB (e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995, Experiment 6; Monsell, Sumner & Water, 
2003). Nevertheless, the general principle of the alternating-runs paradigm remains the 
same. It presents both the switch condition and the repeat condition in a single block of trials. 
Moreover, with a fixed sequence, participants can always predict the upcoming tasks in an 
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alternating-runs paradigm.   
1.1.3 The Task-cueing Paradigm 
Similarly to the alternating-run paradigm, the task-cueing paradigm presents both 
task-switch trials and task-repeat trials in the same experimental block. The difference is that 
the two tasks can alternate randomly. There is no fixed task sequence. In each trial, an 
explicit cue is presented to indicate the task. Participants do not know which task they will 
have to perform in the next trial until the task cue appears (e.g., Meiran, 1996; Sudevan & 
Taylor, 1987). Under the task-cueing paradigm, if trial n and trial n - 1 have the same task 
cue, then trial n is a repeat trial. If the two trials have different task cues, then trial n is a 
switch trial. All the experiments in the present thesis applied the task-cueing paradigm. It is 
also possible to switch between three different tasks (e.g., Mayr & Keele, 2000). However, 
this type of paradigm is used in studies investigating n - 2 task repetition costs.  
One advantage of the task-cueing paradigm is that it allows better control of task 
preparation. This is because the task-cueing paradigm can control two important intervals 
separately: firstly, the inter-trial interval (ITI) which denotes the interval between the 
response of trial n - 1 and the cue of trial n; secondly, the cue-stimulus interval (CSI), which 
denotes the interval between the cue and the target stimuli of the trial n. In a task-cueing 
experiment, each task can appear randomly in a trial. Hence, we can rest assured that the 
participants cannot start to prepare for the task until the task cue is displayed. Therefore, the 
ITI reflects the time that has elapsed since the participant performed the task in trial n - 1, 
and the CSI reflects the time that has elapsed since the task preparation process for trial n 
was started (Meiran, 1996; Meiran, Chorev & Sapir, 2000).  
In the alternating-runs paradigm, however, researchers can only measure the interval 
between the response in trial n - 1 and the stimulus in trial n (response-stimulus interval or 
RSI) to study the task preparation process. The RSI is not as accurate as the CSI. In the 
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alternating-runs paradigm, we do not know the precise moment at which the participants 
may start to prepare for the upcoming task, because participants can anticipate the task in 
the next trial. As a consequence, the RSI contains the task preparation process and the 
elapsed time since the response in the previous task. The RSI reflects a general preparation 
period whereas the CSI reflects a task-specific preparation period (Meiran et al., 2000). A 
task-cueing paradigm can have both CSI and RSI (see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3. Timeline of CSI, ITI and the RSI in a task-cueing paradigm. RSI = ITI + CSI. 
 
 
A problem with the task-cueing paradigm is that every time a task switch occurs, the 
cue will switch as well. Hence, the task-switching costs, which are caused by a different 
cognitive process than cue-switching (for a review, see Jost, De Baene, Koch, & Brass 2013) 
may be confounded by cue-switching costs. There are two possible solutions to  this 
problem. Firstly, by assigning two task cues for each task, it is possible to separate task-
switching costs from cue-switching costs (e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Stoet & Snyder, 
2004). This dual-cue task-switching paradigm is easier to understand within the context of 
compound retrieval theory (for a review, see Logan & Schneider, 2010), whichwill be 
introduced in later sections. The other way to separate cue-switching costs from task-
switching costs is to apply a voluntary task-switching paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2004b; 
for a recent review, see Arrington, Reiman, & Weaver, 2014). This paradigm avoids using 
any task cues in the first place. 
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1.1.4 The Voluntary Task-switching Paradigm 
In the voluntary task-switching paradigm, no cues are displayed during the 
experiment. The participants are free to choose which of the two tasks they want to perform. 
In some studies, they can also choose from four different tasks (e.g., Lien & Ruthruff, 2008). 
In order to determine in which task the participants actually performed in a trial, each task 
usually has a different response set. For example, according to some task rules, if a 
participant decides to perform Task A, they need to press the “D” or “F” key with their left 
hand. Alternatively, if the participant decides to perform Task B, the task rules prescribe that 
he or she needs to press the “J” or “K” key with their right hand. The voluntary task-
switching paradigm consistently produced task-switching costs (Arrington et al., 2014). 
 Besides eliminating the task cue, the voluntary task-switching paradigm also 
provides a method to test task-switching behaviour with more ecological validity. After all, 
being forced to switch between two tasks is less likely to occur during daily life than 
choosing to do so. However, there is also an important limitation: the task selection process 
tends to be more complex in voluntary task-switching. It is the participant, rather than the 
experimenter, who controls which task to perform in a given trial (Arrington et al., 2014). 
Arguably, the task-switching process may be confounded by this additional task selection 
process.  
1.1.5 Paradigm of Experiments 
So far, I have reviewed the three major paradigms that are typically used in modern 
task-switching studies: the alternating-runs paradigm, the task-cueing paradigm, and the 
voluntary task-switching paradigm. Each paradigm has its own unique features. 
Consequently, task-switching costs measured in different paradigms may not be comparable. 
For example, recent studies have consistently found that the alternating-runs paradigm and 
the task-cueing paradigm produce different amounts of task-switching costs (e.g., Altmann, 
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2007a, 2013; Shahar & Meiran, 2014). In the present thesis only the task-cueing paradigm 
is used, for two reasons. Firstly, in Chapter 3, I want to examine how different preparations 
can affect task-switching costs. For this, the task-cueing paradigm provides better control of 
the preparation period. Secondly, I would like to compare my results with animal studies 
that applied task-cueing paradigms (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2004; Caselli & Chelazzi, 
2011). 
1.2 Other Effects of the Task-switching Paradigm 
1.2.1 The Congruency Effect  
There are some “by-products” of the task-switching paradigm. These are effects that 
occur in addition to the task-switching costs that can be observed in typical task-switching 
paradigms. Firstly, in many task-switching experiments, the same task stimulus-set is used 
for both tasks because the stimuli are bivalent. For example, if the two tasks were a colour 
task (Black, White) and a shape task (Circle, Hexagon), then the left key could be used for 
a white stimulus and a circle and the right key for a black stimulus and a hexagon. In fact, 
these are the tasks and the response keys I use in Experiments 2.1and 2.2 of Chapter 2. 
Therefore, stimuli such as the white circle and the black hexagon, correspond to the same 
key in both the colour and the shape task:they are congruent stimuli. In contrast, the white 
hexagon and the black circle require different response keys in different tasks:they are 
incongruent stimuli. In a typical task-switching paradigm, participants usually react faster to 
congruent stimuli than they do to incongruent stimuli (e.g., Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Kessler & Meiran, 2010; Schneider, 2015). This 
effect is called the “congruency effect”. The delay in response times when participants 
respond to incongruent stimuli may reflect an additional competition that occurs between 
the two stimulus-response mappings for incongruent stimuli (Meiran & Kessler, 2008; 
Kessler & Meiran, 2010; Schneider, 2015). 
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1.2.2 The Mixing Cost 
The mixing cost reflects some additional cost that occurs when mixing two tasks in 
the same block rather than performing in different blocks with a single task  (for a recent 
review, see MarÍ-Beffa & Kirkham, 2014). In a typical study with mixing costs, participants 
perform in a series of single-task blocks (consisting of only one task) and a series of mixed 
blocks (consisting of two tasks). The mixing cost is measured by comparing the RT and 
error-rate between the trials from single blocks and the repeat trials from mixed blocks. The 
impaired performance in the repeat trials from the mixed blocks is the mixing cost. The 
mixed blocks can involve the alternating-runs procedure (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Kray & Lindenberger, 2000) or the task-cueing procedure (e.g., Rubin & Meiran, 2005; 
Koch, Prinz & Allport, 2005). However, each procedure might produce slightly different 
mixing costs (Shahar & Merian, 2015). Finally, task-switching costs and the mixing costs 
reflect different aspects of executive control. The task-switching cost reflects a participant’s 
ability to switch between different tasks. The mixing cost, on the other hand, reflects a 
participant’s ability to maintain different tasks in the memory load (Braver, Reynolds & 
Donaldson, 2003; Minear & Shah, 2008; Wylie & Allport, 2000). 
1.3 Explaining Task-switching Costs 
In the following sections, I review four accounts that can explain task-switching 
costs: the task-set reconfiguration account, the proactive interference account, the task-set 
inhibition account and the compound retrieval account. A relatively new account, the 
associative learning account (e.g. Forrest, et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016), will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. Vandierendonck et al. (2010) and Kiesel et al. (2010) provide comprehensive 
reviews of the task-set reconfiguration account and the task-interference account. Koch et 
al. (2010) provide reviews of the task-set inhibition account. Logan and Schneider (2010) 
reviewed the compound retrieval theory. In this chapter, I will focus on aspects of these three 
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theories that are relevant to the results of the experiments in later chapters.  
1.4 Task-set Reconfiguration Account 
The idea of the task-set reconfiguration process is straightforward; it simply assumes 
that each task has a task-set. As a consequence, every time participants switch to a new task, 
the previous task-set becomes irrelevant. Participants need to reconfigure their task-set to a 
new task before they can give the correct answer. However, when participants repeat an old 
task, the old task-set is still useful, and a reconfiguration process is not necessary. The task-
switching costs, according to this account, reflect the additional task-reconfiguration process 
that is only required in switch trials and is closely linked to executive control processes 
(Roger & Monsell, 1995; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; 
Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Braver, 2012). One way to 
test the reconfiguration theory is to examine whether or not the preparation effect can 
counteract the task-switching cost. For example, if participants can configure the new task-
set before the new trial starts, i.e., prepare in advance, then the task-switching costs should 
be reduced. If the preparation time is sufficiently long then the task-switching costs may be 
eliminated completely. This will be discussed in the following section.  
1.4.1 Preparation Effect and the Residual Task-switching Costs 
Previous studies have clearly demonstrated that with increasing preparation time 
task-switching costs tend to be reduced. This preparation effect can be observed for both the 
alternating-runs paradigm (e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995; Koch, 2003) and the task-cueing 
paradigm (e.g., Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck & Demanet, 2007, Longman, 
Lavric, Munteanu, & Monsell, 2014; Poboka, Karayanidis & Heathcote, 2014; Forrest et al., 
2014; Schneider, 2016, 2017). As mentioned before, the preparation period in an alternating-
runs paradigm can be measured by the RSI, whereas in a task-cueing paradigm, the 
preparation period is measured by the CSI.   
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As stated before, the task-set reconfiguration account predicts that task-switching 
costs can be eliminated if the preparation period is sufficiently long. However, one problem 
has been identified. In the follow-up studies to Roger and Monsell’s (1995) work it was 
consistently reported that once the RSI or CSI reached a certain length, a further increase in 
the preparation period did not reduce the task-switching costs. The remaining task-switching 
costs were called the “residual task-switching costs” (Allport, et al., 1994; De Jong, 2000; 
Meiran, 1996, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schneider, 2016, 2017; see Figure 1.4). In a 
number of studies, with CSIs exceeding 1000 ms, the residual task-switching costs remained 
significant (e.g., Longman et al., 2014; Meiran, 1996; Meiran et al., 2000).  
 
Figure 1.4. Schematic illustrations of residual task-switching costs as a function of 
preparation time as predicted by task-set reconfiguration and as observed. 
 
 
A simple task-set reconfiguration process cannot explain residual task-switching 
costs because they cannot be reduced even after prolonged preparation periods. There may 
be hidden factors that prevent participants from completing preparation of the upcoming task 
in advance. To explain the residual task-switching costs, two accounts have been developed 
that are based on the task-set reconfiguration process. 
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Two-stage Account  
The first account suggests that  the task-set reconfiguration process may have two 
stages. The first stage can be prepared in advance as soon as participants are informed about 
the task they will have to perform next. Thus, initially, increasing the preparation period can 
reduce task-switching costs. Nevertheless, the second stage cannot be prepared until 
participants have received information about the target stimulus. Hence, any residual task-
switching costs may reflect the second stage of task-set reconfiguration (Roger & Monsell, 
1995; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001).  
Failure-to-Engage Account  
Alternatively, the failure-to-engage account suggests that, although it is possible to 
completely configure the new task-set before target stimulus onset, this is very hard to 
achieve. In some switch trials, participants can prepare for the task in advance, but in others, 
participants fail to do so. A longer preparation period may increase the possibility of 
successful task-set reconfiguration in advance. However, participants will fail to do so in a 
certain number of switch trials. The residual task-switching costs reflect these failures (De 
Jong, 2000; Poboka et al., 2014). 
Removing Residual Task-switching Costs 
The two-stage account always predicts the existence of residual task-switching cost. 
This is due to the fact that the second stage of the reconfiguration cannot start until the 
stimulus appears, making residual task-switching costs inevitable. Conversely, the failure-
to-engage account allows participants to eliminate the residual task-switching costs 
completely if certain additional factors facilitate advance preparation and prevent failure-to-
engage. As a consequence, the two-stage account would be falsified if a study task-switching 
costs had been removed completely. Despite this clear hypothesis, studies that tried to reduce 
or remove residual switch costs had little success (e.g., Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; 
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Schneider, 2016, 2017).  
In only one studywas it claimed that entirely eliminating the residual task-switching 
costs is indeed possible (Verbruggen et al., 2007). To encourage participants to successfully 
prepare in advance for a task switch in all switch trials and to avoid failure-to-engage, 
Verbruggen et al. (2007) presented the cue at the onset of the CSI for only 96 ms before it 
disappeared in the remaining CSI. Interestingly, Verbruggen et al. (2007) found no residual 
task-switching costs at all. One explanation for this result is that participants were strongly 
motivated to fully prepare for a task switch during the short CSI because the cue was no 
longer available after the stimulus appeared. Therefore, a failure-to-engage was less likely 
to occur.  
Despite this, a recent study could not replicate their results (Schneider, 2016). In fact, 
in Experiment 4 of Schneider (2016), contrary to the original finding, the residual task-
switching costs actually became larger when the cue was only present briefly during the CSI 
than in the condition where the cue was fully present throughout a trial. At this point, the 
evidence is inconclusive and both the failure-to-engage account and the two-stage account 
provide possible explanations of task-switching costs.  
1.4.2 Task-Set 
The preparation effect provides strong evidence in support of the task-set 
reconfiguration account. In addition, including a few additional assumptions (e.g., failure-
to-engage or two stages), the reconfiguration account can also explain residual task-
switching costs. Nevertheless, one important question remains unanswered: what is a task-
set according to the reconfiguration account? In other words, what exactly do participants 
reconfigure in switch trials?  
The problem is that, for now, there is no unified definition of a task-set. Many early 
definitions remain unclear. For example, Rogers and Monsell (1995) suggested that it is the 
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set of cognitive operations required to effectively perform a task. Elsewhere, Mayr and Keele 
(2000) defined a task-set as a set of internal control settings. One problem is that such 
definitions or labels tend to lead us into a dead-end. For instance, what exactly is a “set of 
internal control settings” in the context of task switching? Knowing that a task-set is a set of 
internal control settings does not necessarily provide any more insight than knowing that a 
task-set can be reconfigured. Further meaningful elaborations are necessary.  
One approach to solving this problem is to assume that a task-set includes all the 
parameters or settings that are required for participants to achieve the task goal: to obtain the 
correct answer according to the task rules (Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Consistent with 
this view, within a computational model, Logan and Schneider (2010) define a task-set as a 
set of parameters that is necessary to programme a computational model in order to perform 
particular task-relevant actions. Hence, to clearly define a task-set, researchers may simply 
list all its parameters. For example, Schneider and Logan’s (2005) definition of a set of 
internal control settings is based on two parameters. One is a bias parameter that controls the 
strength of the tendency toward a response category and makes the computational model 
more likely to choose that category. The other is a criterion parameter that controls how 
strong the evidence should be before the model can decide to select a response key. This 
allows for a trade-off between speed and accuracy. Task-set reconfiguration can be defined 
as a change of these parameters. Instead of assuming a “metaphysical” task-set 
reconfiguration process, one can examine which parameters need to be adjusted in order to 
better support different models of the task-set reconfiguration process. 
A potential problem is that in different studies different parameters were proposed. 
For example, the notion of the task-set can be expressed by different parameters in 
mathematical models (e.g., Merian, 2000; Meiran, Kessler & Adi-Japha, 2008; Altmann, 
2008) and artificial neural network models (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Brown, Reynolds & 
Braver, 2007; Herd et al., 2014). In fact, some models even suggest that task-switching costs 
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may not reflect any cognitive control process like task-set reconfiguration (Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Forrest et al., 2014).  
However, the exact nature of the task-set is irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. I 
share the basic assumptions of previous studies: the task-set consists of all the parameters 
participants need before they can achieve the task goal──deduce the correct response based 
on the task rules (Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Logan & Schneider, 2010). In addition, the 
task-set reconfiguration process is a goal-oriented activity that requires executive control 
(Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; 
Meiran, 2000). However, these assumptions trigger the following question: what is a task? 
It is difficult to objectively define different tasks in a task-switching experiment. 
1.4.3 Tasks and Strategies 
A task is a highly subjective notion. For example, in the context of a task-switching 
paradigm, instead of assuming two conventional binary tasks (say, the digit task and the 
letter task), we can assume Task A is the congruent stimulus task and Task B is the 
incongruent stimulus task. It is also possible that participants perceive a cue and stimulus as 
a single compound stimulus and respond to a compound stimulus directly, without engaging 
in task-switching (e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Participants can, in fact, behave 
differently depending on the strategy they develop (Dreisbach, Goschke & Haider, 2006, 
2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009).  
For example, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) conducted task-switching experiments 
with a group of participants who did not receive an explicit task-switching instruction (the 
experimental group), and a group of participants who did receive the explicit task-rule based 
instruction (the control group). Participants in the experimental group had to remember all 
the stimulus-response mappings. In the control group, the task-rule based instructions 
required participants to perform a Consonant/Vowel Task and an Animal/Non-Animal Task. 
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In the Consonant/Vowel Task, the participants had to decide if a word started with a 
consonant or a vowel. In the Animal/Non-Animal Task the participants had to decide if a 
word was an animal or not. 
Based on an oral report after the experiment, Dreisbach and colleagues (2006, 2007) 
reported that the participants from the experimental group had memorised all the stimulus-
response mappings directly. In the following I call this strategy the “Look-up table” (LUT) 
approach. In a way participants had to perform only one task in each trial: remember the 
correct mapping and press the corresponding key accordingly. The participants from the 
control group, however, applied the conventional task-switching strategy. They had to 
perform two tasks: the Consonant/Vowel Task and the Animal/Non-Animal Task. The 
results showed that the participants from the experimental group had no task-switching costs, 
while the participants from the control group had significant task-switching costs.  
In addition, Dreisbach and Haider (2008) introduced three different instructions. 
They used eight words in their experiment: bug, polecat, leg, pendular (pendulum), sofa, 
Ulm (a city), anchor, and ice. Participants could apply different strategies based on the 
instruction they received. Firstly, participants could apply the task-switching 
strategy──switching between the Animal/Non-Animal Task (animal == left key; non-
animal == right key) and the Consonant/Vowel Task (consonant == left key; vowel == right 
key). Secondly, participants could memorise all the stimulus-response mappings and apply 
the LUT approach. The task then was to remember the stimulus-response mapping and to 
press the corresponding key. Thirdly, participants could also apply a Moving/Non-Moving 
strategy: if the word referred to something that could move (e.g., bug, polecat, leg, or 
pendular), pressing the left key; If the word referred to something that could not move (e.g., 
sofa, Ulm, anchor, or ice), pressing the right key. The task then was the Moving/Non-
Moving Task (see Figure 1.5). 
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Figure 1.5. Illustration of three different strategies as suggested by Dreisbach & Haider 
(2008). Participants' strategies depend on the task they applied. For the LUT strategy, the 
task is to remember the stimulus-response mapping. For the task-switching strategy, two 
tasks are Consonant/Vowel and Animal/Non-Animal tasks. The ink colour of each word is 
the task cue. For Moving/non-Moving strategy, there is a Moving/non-Moving task. For the 
Moving/non-Moving strategy and Look-up Table strategy, the colour was irrelevant. 
 
 
Dreisbach and Haider (2008) reported that participants who applied different 
strategies also had different response patterns. They only found task-switching costs among 
participants who had received the instruction to use the task-switching strategy. Moreover, 
those who received the instruction to use the LUT approach, showed an interaction between 
colour-switching and response-switching. More specifically, it was shown that in the 
response-repeat condition (trial n - 1 and trial n have the same response), responses in colour 
repeat trials (trial n - 1 and trial n have the same ink colour) were quicker than in colour 
switch trials (trial n - 1 and trial n have different ink colours). However, in the response-
switch condition (trial n - 1 and trial n have different responses), colour responses in the 
repeat trials were slower than in colour switch trials. Participants who received the 
instruction to use the Moving/non-Moving strategy indicated neither task-switching costs 
nor any interaction between stimulus colour and response repetition. When participants 
applied the Moving/non-Moving strategy or LUT approach, the ink colour was irrelevant. 
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Participants can therefore give the correct response irrespective of the ink colour. One 
explanation is that the Moving/non-Moving strategy may protect against irrelevant 
information (i.e., the ink colour) but the LUT approach cannot. As a consequence, when 
participants apply the Moving/non-Moving strategy, the interaction between colour-
switching effect and response-switching effect disappeared (for more details, see Dreisbach, 
2012).   
Dreisbach and colleagues’ studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008) showed that, during the task-switching experiments, all participants shared a common 
goal: to find the correct response in every trial. Nevertheless, there was no fixed strategy to 
achieve this goal──participants can apply different strategies. Furthermore, different 
strategies may influence and alter the task and task-sets. I conclude that the notion of a task 
is not just determined by the paradigm in a task-switching experiment, but is also the result 
of the strategies participants use to come up with correct responses.  
In Dreisbach and colleagues’ study (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2008, 2009), the participants’ strategies were induced by the instructions they 
received. Thus, Schneider and Logan (2014) suggested that the tasks should reflect the 
instructions provided by the experimenter. These are necessary for the participants to give 
correct responses. However, as we are about to see in the experiments of Chapter 2 and 4, 
participants are able to develop and apply novel strategies that are difficult to anticipate and 
are only revealed when the experimenter collects self-reports form the participants after the 
experiment. Ultimately, the tasks are the result of the participants’ personal understanding 
of a paradigm and experiment. In the present thesis, I assume that tasks reflect the 
idiosyncratic strategy a participant applies or develops in order to give correct responses (for 
more details on the ambiguity of task and task-set see Schneider and Logan, 2014). 
1.4.4 Task and Task-set Reconfiguration 
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Tasks are formed by the participants’ subjective understanding of a specific 
experimental paradigm. In a task-switching experiment, if a participant does not know 
anything about a task, then performing this task is impossible. For example, in Dreisbach et 
al. (2006, 2007), participants who applied the LUT approach did not perform the 
Consonant/Vowel Task and Animal/Non-Animal Task. They did not switch between tasks 
and therefore did not show task-switching costs. However, this was not because they did not 
know how to differentiate between consonants and vowels or how to distinguish between 
animals and non-animals. Instead, they were ignorant about the task rules and genuinely did 
not realise that these tasks existed. In fact, Dreisbach et al. (2007) demonstrated that, during 
the experiment, task-switching costs re-emerged as soon as the participants received the task-
switching instruction. They started to use the Consonant/Vowel and Animal/Non-Animal 
Task after they became aware of these tasks. 
 If a participant cannot perform a task (say, Task A) or a strategy, it is possible that 
he or she can still figure out the correct response in a trial by employing an alternative task 
(e.g., remember all the stimulus-response mapping). However, the participant cannot give 
the correct response based on the rules of Task A. Hence, configuring the task-set for Task 
A is not possible. Again, based on the idiosyncratic strategy a participant uses, he or she may 
configure the task-set for other tasks, but not for Task A. Therefore, without knowing Task 
A, participants can neither perform Task A nor configure the task-set for Task A. This is the 
assumption many researchers have put forward in previous studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 
2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009). Forrest et al. (2014) took a slightly different 
approach. They argued that, when feedback to responses is provided without an instruction 
based on tasks and task rules, participants must learn to perform the experiment through 
associative learning. Consequently, any higher-level cognitive control process like task-set 
reconfigurations is no longer necessary. Either way, it was suggested in these studies that 
without knowing the tasks, participants cannot execute the appropriate task-set 
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reconfiguration process. 
1.4.5 Previous Trials 
The task-set reconfiguration account essentially proposes a cognitive control process 
that allows participants to actively switch between tasks. Such a process creates an additional 
reconfiguration step in every switch trial, causing task-switching costs. The task interference 
account and task-set inhibition account provide a different explanation. These accounts 
suggest that the task-switching costs reflect an effect due to processing in the previous trial. 
This effect can be an interference or an inhibition. In the following sections, the proactive 
interference account and the task-set inhibition account will be introduced. 
1.5 Proactive Interference  
The proactive interference account was originally proposed by Allport and 
colleagues (1994). In a series of experiments, they found that participants consistently 
showed task-switching costs. Additionally, they reported that, even with an RSI of 1100 ms, 
switching costs remained significant. In other words, they found what Roger and Monsell 
(1995) referred to as residual task-switching costs. Allport (1994) also found an interesting 
asymmetry in switching-costs. It was more difficult for participants to switch from a hard to 
a relatively easy task. Surprisingly, when switching from an easy to a relatively hard task, 
participants actually had smaller task-switching costs. This has been labelled “asymmetric 
switching costs”.  
1.5.1 Asymmetric Switching Costs 
In Experiment 5 conducted by Allport et al. (1994), participants had to perform task-
switching in a classical Stroop Effect colour-word paradigm: switching between a word-
colour task and an ink-colour task. As is well known, the word-colour task is easier than the 
ink-colour task (for a review, see Macleod, 1991). Allport et al. (1994) found that, when 
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switching from the ink-colour task to the word-colour task, the task-switching costs were 
relatively large. Conversely, the task-switching costs were small when switching from the 
word-colour task to the ink-colour task. Similar effects have been observed in many related 
studies (Monsell, Yeung & Azuma, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003; Schneider & Anderson, 2010; 
Arbuthnott, 2008; Wong & Leboe, 2009; Barutchu et al, 2013; but also see Yeung & 
Monsell, 2003).  
Suppose that the current trial (trial n) is a switch trial. If the task-switching cost truly 
reflects a task-set reconfiguration process, then the magnitude of the switching costs would 
be mainly determined by the task-set in the current trial, because it is the task-set of the 
current trial that needs to be reconfigured. Therefore, an intuitive deduction would be that 
the more difficult the task is in the current trial, the bigger the task-switching cost. 
Interestingly, the asymmetric switching costs reported by Allport et al. (1994) suggested the 
opposite. Their results indicate that switching from a hard task to a relatively easy task causes 
stronger task-switching effects than the other way round. It appears that the task-set from 
the previous trial (trial n - 1) determines the largeness the task-switching costs. Moreover, 
Allport et al (1994) observed that task-switching costs remained significant even after a very 
long preparation period (RSI). They speculated whether the task-set reconfiguration process 
truly causes task-switching costs. 
Task-set Inertia  
In order to explain task-switching costs, Allport et al. (1994) suggested that the task-
switching cost is triggered by the interference of the previous trial. They termed this 
interference “task-set inertia”. Allport and Wylie (1999) further proposed that this 
interference is due to a continued priming of the previous task and a suppression of the 
current task. According to this explanation, the task-set inertia is small when trial n - 1 and 
trial n share the same task (trial n is a repeat trial) because the previous task-set is still 
relevant. Conversely, the task-set inertia is strong for two possible reasons when trial n - 1 
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and trial n have different tasks (trial n is a switch trial). Firstly, the task-set of trial n is 
suppressed as it is irrelevant for trial n - 1 (negative priming) and needs to be reactivated. 
Secondly, it is also possible that the task-set from trial n - 1 remained active, but is irrelevant 
for trial n. Therefore, it competes with the currently relevant task-set (competitor priming).  
Task-set inertia can also explain the asymmetric switching costs. The harder a task 
is in trial n - 1, the larger the task-switching cost in trial n due to a stronger task-set inertia 
in trial n - 1. In contrast, if the task in trial n - 1 is simple, the task-set inertia will be relatively 
small creating small task-switching costs. Furthermore, task-set inertia also provides an 
explanation for residual task-switching costs: since task-set inertia is an effect of passive 
priming that only fades away gradually, it cannot be eliminated by an 1100 ms RSI. The 
residual task-switching costs may simply reflect a long-lasting interference. Allport and 
colleagues demonstrated that task-set inertia could carry over and continually impact 
participants’ behaviour across several experimental blocks (Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie 
& Allport, 2000).   
1.5.2 What is Interference? 
Early studies held the view that proactive interference (i.e., task-set inertia) can be 
derived directly from the stimulus-response mappings of the previous trial (Allport et al., 
1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000). Later studies suggested that the interference might come from 
stimulus-task-set associations (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & 
Allport, 2006). In particular, they claimed that interference was formed between all the 
encoded components of the previous action-event, not only between the immediate stimulus 
and its response, but also in relation to the goal of the action, the task, and any task-specific 
processing operations. For example, it was found that interference can even occur when the 
stimulus is congruent (Waszak et al., 2003; Koch & Allport, 2006). Waszak and Hommel 
(2007) further reported that congruent and incongruent stimuli show the same interference 
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effects. Congruent stimuli always have by definition the same stimulus-response mapping 
in both tasks and only incongruent stimulus can be exposed to direct competition from 
stimulus-response mappings. As a consequence, stimulus-response mappings alone cannot 
completely explain interference; some interference must be attributed to the task context, 
such as task-sets. 
1.5.3 Decay of Task-sets 
By manipulating the ITI, a few studies have found evidence in support of proactive 
interference. In a task-cueing paradigm, Meiran et al. (2000) demonstrated that, as the ITI 
increased, the task-switching costs decreased. Since the CSI of 117 ms was fixed and short, 
they suggested that the task-preparation effect could not explain their results. They 
concluded that reduced task-switching costs reflected a decay of the task-set of the previous 
trial. This conclusion is consistent with predictions from the proactive interference account. 
Allport et al. (1994) suggested that interference during task-switching is caused by the 
previous performance in a different task, and thatthis interference decays over time. A 
number of studies have replicated the decay of task-sets (e.g., Meiran, Levine, et al. 2000; 
Koch & Allport, 2006; but also see Horoufchin, Philipp & Koch, 2011).  
1.5.4 Limitations 
The proactive interference account has certain limitations. Firstly, the asymmetric 
switching cost is subject to controversy (e.g., Monsell et al., 2000; Yeung & Monsell, 2003; 
Schneider & Anderson, 2010; Barutchu et al., 2013). In different studies contradicting 
observations were made on the phenomenon of asymmetric switching costs and different 
explanations were provided. For example, Yeung and Monsell (2003) demonstrated that 
asymmetries in switching costs can be decreased or even reversed by reducing the level of 
interference between tasks. In addition, Schneider and Anderson (2010) have proposed a 
‘sequential difficulty’ account. This account suggests that sequential changes in task 
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difficulty can reduce executive control and working memory resources. As a result, fewer 
resources are available to carry out an easier task that follows a difficult task, causing a 
longer recovery time and delays in response. In other words, it was suggested in this study 
that changes in task difficulty alone can trigger asymmetrical “switching” costs and that 
asymmetric switching costs might not be a product of task-switching. A recent study has 
also demonstrated that even when both tasks are equivalent in difficulty, asymmetric 
switching costs can be created by manipulating task-related symbols, e.g., assigning the 
same task cue to the opposite task (Barutchu et al., 2013). In these studies it was suggested 
that the asymmetric cost effect and task-switching effect are independent and can be 
manipulated separately.  
Secondly, the evidence for task-set decay is also inconclusive with inconsistent 
empirical data. In several studies researchers were unable to replicate the result that long 
ITIs reduce task-switching costs (Altmann, 2005; Horoufchin et al., 2011). Furthermore, in 
recent studies it was proposed that it was not the absolute time of the ITI which caused a 
decrease of task-switching costs. Instead, it was the ratio of the current ITI (interval between 
trial n - 1 and trial n) previous ITI (interval between trial n - 2 and trial n - 1) that seemed 
to cause a decrease in task-switching costs. Particularly, task-switching costs were only 
reduced for long current ITIs following short previous ITIs.  However, when the previous 
ITI was also long, task-switching costs were not reduced (e.g., Horoufchin et al., 2011; 
Grange, 2016). These results can be explained by an account of temporal distinctiveness of 
task-set retrieval (c.f. Horoufchin et al., 2011). 
1.6 Task-set Inhibition 
Although the proactive interference account can explain the effect of asymmetric 
task-switching costs and the effect of decay of task-sets better than the task reconfiguration 
account, it nevertheless still has certain limitations. Studies could not consistently reproduce 
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the effects. Moreover, there is room for alternative explanations. Also focusing on the impact 
of previous trials, the task-set inhibition account provides an alternative explanation of the 
task-switching effect.  
1.6.1 Switching Between Three Tasks 
 Mayr and Keele (2000) created a paradigm that required participants to switch 
between three different tasks. To achieve this, they asked participants in every trial to 
identify an “odd-one-out” object from a group of four objects. In each trial, there were three 
different ways (or three dimensions) in which one object could be different from the other 
three objects: it could have a different colour, a different orientation, or a different motion 
(e.g., one object was moved to the right a little while the others remained stationary). 
Therefore, the three tasks were a colour task, an orientation task, and a motion task. There 
was an explicit cue in every trial before the stimuli appeared. The researchers also 
manipulatedprobability to make sure trial n and trial n - 1 never shared the same task. There 
were no conventional repeat trials. Instead, they compared a current trial (trial n) with trial 
n - 2. If trial n and trial n - 2 shared the same task, trial n was an n - 2 task repeat trial. If 
trial n and trial n - 2 had different tasks, trial n was an n - 2 switch trial (see Figure 1.6). 
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Figure 1.6. Illustration of Mayr and Keele’s (2000) n - 2 task-switching paradigm that 
required participants to switch between three tasks. There is a stimulus in each of the four 
corners of the square. The four response keys correspond to four locations (e.g., the top right 
key should be pressed if the top right stimulus is the odd-one-out object). 
  
 
Surprisingly, Mayr and Keele (2000) observed that the participants' performance was 
worse in the n - 2 repeat trial than in the n - 2 switch trial. This effect is called the “n - 2 
repetition cost”. It was suggested that this cost might reflect an inhibitory control process 
(Gade, Schuch, Druey, & Koch, 2014; Koch et al., 2010). When Task A was performed in 
trial n - 2, in order to perform Task B in trial n - 1, Task-set A had to be inhibited. Thus, if 
participants had to perform Task A in trial n again (n - 2 repeat), they had to make an extra 
effort to overcome inhibition. In contrast, if participants had to perform Task C in trial n (n 
- 2 switch), participants could respond quickly because Task-set C had not been inhibited 
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recently. The n - 2 repetition cost provides strong evidence in support of the idea that the 
task from the previous trial can affect the response times of the current trial.  
Importantly, the task-set reconfiguration account cannot explain the n - 2 repetition 
cost because it would predict the opposite pattern. Since Task-set A has been reconfigured 
recently (in trial n - 2) and Task-set C has not, performing Task A again in trial n (i.e., n - 2 
repeat) should be relatively effortless compared with performing Task C in trial n (i.e., n - 2 
switch).  
1.6.2 Alternative Explanations of the n – 2 Repetition Costs 
Cue-encoding Process 
As explained in the previous section, the n - 2 repetition cost may reflect a task-set 
inhibition process. However, there are some alternative explanations as well. Firstly, in a 
typical n - 2 task-switching paradigm, the tasks are always indicated by specific task cues. 
Therefore, the n - 2 task repetition is confounded by an n - 2 cue repetition. It is possible that 
the so called “task inhibition” is, created by a task-cue inhibition. In other words, in n - 2 
repeat trials, participants need to make an extra effort to encode the task-cue, because it has 
been inhibited previously. Therefore, it is the cue-re-encoding process, rather than the task-
set inhibition that may produce the n - 2 repetition cost. 
The idea that task-cue encoding is responsible for most of the effects related to task-
switching will be revisited in later sections when I discuss Logan and colleagues' compound 
retrieval theory (for a review, see Logan & Schneider, 2010). However, based on the results 
of previous n - 2 repetition studies (e.g., Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Altmann, 2007b; Gade & 
Koch, 2008; Lien & Ruthruff, 2008), researchers concluded that the cue-encoding process is 
not a better explanation for the n - 2 repetition cost. The simplest way to separate the cue-
encoding process from the task-set inhibition is to assign two different cues to each task 
(e.g., Mayr and Kliegl, 2003; Altmann, 2007b; Gade & Koch, 2008). As a consequence, the 
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cue sometimes changes but the task remains the same (i.e., the n - 2 cue-switch trials).  
To measure the potential cue-encoding effect, researchers compared the difference 
between n - 2 cue-repeat trials with n - 2 cue-switch trials. To measure the task-set inhibition 
without confounding potential cue-encoding, researchers compared the n - 2 cue-switch 
trials with the n - 2 task-switching trials. By doing so, previous studies consistently reported 
a substantial effect of task-set inhibition but no clear effect of cue-encoding (Mayr and 
Kliegl, 2003; Altmann, 2007b; Gade & Koch, 2008). Conclusive evidence against a cue-
encoding account was provided by Lien and Ruthruff (2008). They tested the n - 2 repetition 
costs in a voluntary task-switching paradigm. Since no cues appeared in this voluntary task-
switching paradigm, there was no cue-encoding process. However, they still found n - 2 
repetition costs. A cue-encoding process can therefore not explain the n - 2 repetition cost. 
Episodic Retrieval Account 
Mayr (2002) suggested that an episodic retrieval account (Neill, 1997) can also 
explain the n - 2 repetition cost. This account suggests that when participants perform Task 
A in trial n - 2, an episodic trace of trial parameters (i.e., the cue, stimulus features, and the 
response key) is stored in memory. When the same task rule needs to be applied again in 
trial n, participants retrieve the most recent episodic trace.  
In a typical n - 2 repetition experiment (Mayr & Keele, 2000), stimuli varied 
randomly in three dimensions and the response key had four levels. As a result, the 
parameters of a trial would normally differ between both trial n - 2 and trial n, even when 
both trials require the same task. If the parameters of the current trial differ from the retrieved 
information (e.g., a different response is required), a cost occurs because of the mismatch 
between the memorised parameters from trial n - 2 and the current parameters for trial n. 
According to this account, the n - 2 task repetition cost is the results of mismatching rather 
than inhibition.  
One way to directly test this account is to observe whether or not the n - 2 repetition 
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cost still occurs once the parameters for trial n - 2 and trial n are precisely matched (i.e., the 
same cue, the same stimulus, and the same response). Mayr (2002) found that the difference 
between the matched condition and the unmatched condition was not statistically significant. 
However, a recent replication study suggested that after controlling the mismatch effect, the 
n - 2 repetition cost was significantly reduced (Grange, Kowalczyk & O'Loughlin, 2017). 
Thus, it is possible that both the task-set inhibition and mismatching of parameters 
contributed to n - 2 repetition costs. 
1.6.3 Task-switching Costs and n - 2 Repetition Costs  
There is sufficient evidence to support the idea that task-set inhibition occurs during 
task-switching. However, there is also evidence that the n - 2 repetition cost and the task-
switching cost may not reflect the same cognitive process. For example, Arbuthnott and 
Woodward (2002) reported that the strength of cue-task association can only affect the task-
switching cost but not the n - 2 repetition cost. Secondly, the preparation effect can largely 
impact the task-switching cost, but it had no significant impact on the n - 2 repetition cost in 
a number of studies (Mayr & Keele, 2000; Schuch & Koch, 2003; Gade & Koch, 2008). A 
preparation effect is only observed when the participants can prepare both the response and 
the task in advance (e.g., Koch et al., 2004) or when the paradigm requires participants to 
switch between three different languages (Philipp, Gade & Koch, 2007). 
1.7 Task-switching costs and Cue-switching costs 
In a typical task-switching study, researchers assume that participants follow the 
instructions, understand that there are two tasks and two task-sets, and realise that they need 
to switch between them. In other words, participants are supposed to apply a task-switching 
strategy. The task-set reconfiguration account, the proactive interference accounts and the 
inhibition account were developed based on these assumptions. However, there is also a 
theoretical account that suggests that even when participants receive clear task-switching 
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instructions, they may not follow the task-switching instruction and switch between tasks. 
Instead, they may form a cue-stimulus compound and retrieve the corresponding response 
of each compound directly from memory. This is named the “compound retrieval account” 
(Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Logan, Schneider & Bundesen, 2007; Arrington & Logan, 
2004a; Schneider & Logan, 2005, 2007; Logan & Schneider, 2006a, b; Logan & Schneider 
2010). This account suggests that, in a task-cueing paradigm, the task-switching cost is 
caused by the cue-encoding process rather than by the task-set reconfiguration.     
1.7.1 Dual-cue Paradigm and Cue-switching Costs 
Logan and Bundesen (2003; Experiments 1 and 2) manipulated the length of the cue-
stimulus interval (0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, and 900 ms) and observed how 
the RTs in repeat trials and the RTs in switch trials vary with CSI. They compared two 
models: firstly, an endogenous control model that includes a task-set reconfiguration 
process; secondly, a cue encoding benefit model that includes no task-set reconfiguration 
process. The second model appeared to provide the best account of the data suggesting that 
the task-switching costs do not reflect any task-set reconfiguration process at all.  
Moreover, Logan and Bundesen (2003) also realised that a typical task-cueing 
paradigm only assigns one cue for each task. This means that every time a task switches, the 
cue will switch as well. The cue-switching and the task-switching might confound each 
other. The researchers therefore questioned whether task-set reconfiguration as many 
previous studies have suggested (e.g., Roger & Monsell, 1995; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 
Meiran, 1996) or cue-switching produces the task-switching cost. 
Logan and Bundesen (2003) tested this hypothesis in their Experiments 3, 4 and 5. 
They assigned two different cues to each task. Thus, cues were mapped at a ratio of 2:1 to 
tasks. In the following I call this paradigm the “dual-cue paradigm”. In the Magnitude Task 
(decide if a number is bigger than five or smaller than five), there were two cues: a name 
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cue of thetext Magnitude; and a mapping cue of the text high – low. For the parity task, the 
two cues were the text Parity (name cue) and the text odd – even (the mapping cue). By 
assigning these cues, they could separate task-switching from cue-switching (see Figure 1.7). 
Their results indicated strong cue-switching costs, while the task-switching costs were very 
small. In addition to this, their results were consistently fit best by a model that assumes 
“switching costs” were the result of cue-switching and not the product of an endogenous 
control process.  
 
Figure 1.7. (a) In a dual-cue paradigm, each task has two possible cues. (b) Cue repeat 
condition: trial n - 1 and trial n have the same cue. Cue switch condition: trial n - 1 and trial 
n have different cues, but both cues represent the same task. Task switch condition: trial n - 
1 and trial n have different cues, and each cue represents a different task. (c) In order to 
measure the cue-switching cost, compare the cue switch condition with the cue repeat 
condition. In order to measure the task-switching cost, compare the task switch condition 
with cue switch condition. 
 
 
Based on these results, Logan and Bundesen (2003) proposed that, in a task-
switching paradigm, people do not always apply task-switching strategy; rather, in a given 
trial, people encode both the task cue and the target and form a combination──a compound 
cue of response retrieval. Therefore, every time the task cue switches, participants need to 
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encode the cue again. It is this additional cue-encoding process that may cause the delay in 
switch trials and triggers the task-switching cost in the task-cueing paradigm rather than the 
task-set reconfiguration process.  
1.7.2 Episodic or Semantic Compound Retrieval 
Arrington and Logan (2004a) further addressed two different compound retrieval 
strategies: episodic compound retrieval and semantic compound retrieval. They proposed 
that participants can remember each cue-stimulus combination and retrieve each response 
directly when the number of stimuli is small. For example, Logan and Bundesen (2003) only 
used four cues and eight numbers in their experiments. When the cue Magnitude and the 
number 8 appeared in a given trial, participants formed a compound: Magnitude 8. The 
participants then would activate their memory and retrieve the correct response associated 
with this compound (i.e., press the right key on the keyboard). This has been called “episodic 
compound retrieval”. 
The problem with an episodic compound retrieval strategy is that it requires prior 
knowledge of all compound-response mappings. It cannot explain why people can give the 
correct answer as soon as they have received the task rule instructions and without having 
seen the cue-stimulus combination before. In order to solve this issue, Arrington and Logan 
(2004a) proposed a semantic compound retrieval strategy. If, for example, in a trial, a novel 
number 88 appears after the cue odd–even then the response of the compound Parity 88 is 
not available to the participants because the number 88 has never been presented before. In 
this case, the participants may process the combination at the semantic level and retrieve the 
associated response for the compound: Parity + Even (88 = even number at a semantic level) 
and then retrieve the associated response from memory (i.e., press the left key on the 
keyboard). 
To examine the semantic compound retrieval strategy, Arrington and Logan (2004a) 
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applied a dual-cue task-switching paradigm with 640 target stimuli that were never repeated 
during the experiment. Therefore, the participants were unable to remember the response of 
each cue-stimulus compound episodically. Arrington and Logan reasoned that if they 
replicated the results of Logan and Bundesen (2003; large cue-switching cost but very small 
task-switching cost), their hypothesis about semantic compound retrieval would be 
confirmed. Indeed, their results suggested that the task-switching costs were very small, but 
the cue-switching costs were large and statistically significant. 
1.7.3 Task Cue Priming 
In later studies, Logan and colleagues further proposed that different cues assigned 
to the same task may prime each other associatively or semantically, so that performance in 
task repetitions can be faster than in task alternations (Schneider & Logan, 2005; Logan & 
Schneider, 2006). This idea is very similar to the associative learning account proposed by 
Forrest et al. (2014), that I will address in Chapter 7.  
1.7.4 Disadvantages of the Compound Retrieval Account 
One obvious problem with the above findings is that the cue-switching cost triggered 
by a compound memory retrieval process cannot completely explain the delay in switch 
trials. Early studies consistently indicated that although the cue-switching costs were large, 
there were always some small task-switching costs as well (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; 
Monsell & Mizon 2006). In fact, Logan and colleagues themselves noticed the remaining 
task-switching costs (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Arrington & Logan 2004a). Furthermore, 
in a series of experiments, Monsell and Mizon (2006) showed that the cue-switching costs 
were not always bigger than the task-switching costs. Sometimes the cue-switching cost 
were small and the task-switching costs were substantial (see their Experiments 2 and 3). 
Monsell and Mizon suggested that the cue type significantly affected results. For example, 
in their Experiment 2, the task cues were locational: the same circle appearing in four 
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different locations represented four different cues. Also in their Experiment 3, the cues were 
all visual whereas Logan and colleagues only used written text cues (e.g., Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Arrington & Logan, 2004).   
Task-switching Rates and Task-switching Cost 
As Monsell and Mizon (2006) suggested, the probability of cue switching and task-
switching plays an important role in a dual-cue paradigm. In the original study by Logan and 
Bundesen (2003), 25% were cue-repeating trials, 25% were cue-switching trials (but with 
task repeat), and 50% were task-switching trials. In other words, the probability of task-
switching was .5, (p (task-switching) = .5) and the probability of task-switching given a cue-
switch was .67 (p (task-switching | cue-switching) = .67). The results of Logan and Bundesen 
(2003) indicated large cue-switching costs but the task-switching costs were very small.  
In their Experiment 6, Monsell and Mizon (2006) replicated the experiment of Logan 
and Bundesen (2003). The only difference was that they intentionally manipulated the 
probabilities: there were 25% cue-repeating trials, 50% cue switching trials, and 25% task-
switching trials (p (task-switching) = 0.25 and p (task-switching | cue-switching) = .33). 
Monsell and Mizon found statistically significant task-switching as well as cue-switching 
costs. 
Monsell and Mizon (2006) therefore proposed that, when the probability of task-
switching is high, task-switching trials are favoured, as participants assume task-switching 
as a default. The problem is that by anticipating task-switching trials a delay occurs when a 
task-repeating trial comes up because the participant has prepared for the wrong task. As a 
consequence, the benefits of task-repeating are reduced, hence the task-switching cost. In 
agreement with Monsell and Mizon (2006), later studies consistently reported that 
experiments with a higher task-switching rate would have smaller task-switching costs than 
experiments with a lower task-switching rate (Bonnin, Gaonac'h & Bouquet, 2011; Duthoo, 
De Baene, Wühr, & Notebaert, 2012; but see Logan et al. 2007 for an alternative 
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interpretation of the relationship between the task-switching rate and the task-switching 
cost).  
Paired Trials 
Altmann (2006) re-examined the idea of cue-switching cost and compound retrieval 
theory by taking a different approach. He organised pairs of trials so that the cue only 
appeared before the first trial and disappeared after the first trial response. In the second trial, 
only the target stimuli appeared  
Since the cue did not appear in the second trial of each pair and the cue encoding 
should be completed during the first trial, no cue-switching cost and no task-switching cost 
were expected in the second trial according to the compound retrieval account. However, 
Altmann (2006) found significant task-switching costs, but no cue-switching cost, in the 
second trials. This result suggested that there must be more processes involved in task-
switching than just a compound retrieval process. The author further suggested that the cue-
switching cost can only explain a subset of the variance associated with the task-switching 
cost.. 
1.7.5 Cue-switching costs and the Compound Retrieval Account 
I agree with the idea that a pure task-set reconfiguration account does not completely 
explain the task-switching cost in the paradigm with a single and explicit cue. However, their 
argument that the compound retrieval process alone produces the task-switching cost may 
have been too optimistic, because the remaining task switching cost after controlling the cue-
switching effect (Monsell & Mizon, 2006) and the results of Altmann (2006) cannot be 
explained by a compound retrieval process alone.    
In fact, many dual-cue task-switching studies have indicated that the cue-switching 
costs come from active control processes, but not from the perceptual priming of the task 
cues as Logan and colleagues originally proposed (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Grange & 
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Houghton, 2009; Horoufchin et al., 2011; Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). In other words, the 
task-switching costs and the cue-switching costs may reflect two independent cognitive 
processes. For example, a study found that the preparation effect and the practice effect 
impact only the cue-switching cost but not the task-switching cost (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). 
Furthermore, ITI and CSI variation also had a differential effect on the cue-switching cost 
and the task-switching cost (Horoufchin, et al., 2011; Schmitz & Voss, 2012; for a review, 
see Jost et al., 2013).  
1.8 Summary of Chapter 1 and Preview of Chapter 2 
I have introduced paradigms of task-switching studies and visited four major 
accounts of task-switching: the task-set reconfiguration account, proactive interference 
account, task-set inhibition account and compound retrieval account. Each of these accounts 
provides to some degree a valid explanation of task-switching costs, but some researchers 
have suggested that integrating positions can better explain the task-switching effect (e.g., 
Meiran 2000; Koch & Allport 2006; Altmann, 2008). For example, Meiran (2000) proposed 
that switch costs have three components. Firstly, there is a waiting component which is 
related to proactive interference. Secondly, there is a preparatory component which is related 
to the task-set reconfiguration process. Thirdly, there is a residual component which may 
cause the residual switching cost. Various computational models have implemented both 
proactive interference and task-set reconfiguration to model task-switching costs (e.g., 
Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Brown, Reynolds & Braver, 2007). Moreover, recent studies have 
even suggested that all three accounts may play a role in task-switching experiments and 
jointly contribute to task-switching costs (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). In other words, the 
task-switching cost in the task-cueing paradigm may reflect a heterogeneous cognitive effect 
triggered by multiple factors such as the task-set reconfiguration process, the interference, 
and the cue-encoding process.  
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In the present thesis, I try to explain task-switching costs that arise when participants 
do not apply a task-switching strategy and therefore do not switch between two tasks. A 
major theme of this thesis is the investigation of whether it is possible to observe the same 
absence of task-switching costs in humans that other researchers have observed in monkeys 
(Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Avdagic, et al., 2013) and pigeons (Meier, Lea & McLaren 2016; 
Castro & Wasserman, 2016). In Chapter 2, I will introduce studies that have shown that 
animals can switch between tasks without showing any switching costs (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 
2003; Avdagic et al., 2013; Meier et al., 2016; Castro & Wasserman, 2016) whereas for 
human participants, it is extremely hard to eliminate task-switching costs. 
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Chapter 2: The Look-up Table Approach and Bivalent Visual Stimuli  
2.1 How to Reduce the Task-switching Costs? 
Over the past two decades, a substantial amount of research has focused on task-
switching and almost all studies have reported task-switching costs for bivalent stimuli. 
These robust results have triggered a search for possibilities of reducing or eliminating task-
switching costs. Indeed, successfully decreasing task-switching costs may help researchers 
to draw conclusions about the origin of the task-switching process (e.g., Logan & Bundesen 
2003; Verbruggen, et al., 2007). 
2.1.1 Practice Effect 
One of the most straightforward methods applied to reduce task-switching costs is 
practice. In fact, Jerslid (1927) already discussed the effect of practice as early as 1927. He 
concluded that the initial difference between switch conditions and repeat conditions can be 
reduced by practice because practice effect is larger in switch conditions compared to 
separate conditions. Similar practice effects have been confirmed in more recent studies. For 
example, Rogers and Monsell (1995) reported that, over two days of practice, participants' 
average task-switching costs were reduced from 262 ms to 186 ms. However, other 
researchers pointed out that, despite long and extensive practice, a certain amount of 
significant task-switching costs remain (e.g., Strobach, Liepelt, Schubert & Kiesel, 2011; 
Stoet & Snyder, 2007). 
2.1.2 Preparation Effect 
Research has consistently demonstrated that allowing participants to have a longer 
preparation time can reduce task-switching costs (e.g., Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Koch, 2003; 
Schneider & Logan, 2007; Longman et al., 2014; Meiran, 1996; Meiran et al., 2000). 
However, it was noted in these studies that even after long preparation times (over 1000 ms 
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in some studies; e.g., Longman et al., 2014; Meiran, 1996; Meiran et al., 2000), there are 
still some small but significant task-switching costs, which haves been termed the “residual-
switching cost”. In one study, it was pointed out that the residual-switching cost can be 
eliminated if the experiment only presents the cue during the CSI and makes it disappear in 
the remaining CSI (Verbruggen et al., 2007). Nevertheless, a recent replication manipulation 
of cue status (disappeared or not) did not consistently eliminate residual-switching cost 
(Schneider, 2016).  
In a very recent study, Schneider (2017) attempted to eliminate the residual-
switching cost by increasing the phasic alertness──a segment of attention that reveals rapid 
but brief changes in sensitivity to external stimulation (Posner, 1978, 2008; Posner & Boies, 
1971). However, the results suggested that, though increasing the phasic alertness might 
reduce the overall RT, it still cannot eliminate the residual-switching cost. To completely 
eliminate the residual-switching cost by advance preparation is hard.  
2.1.3 Working Memory 
Liefooghe, Barrouillet, Vandierendonck and Camos, (2008) provided a 
comprehensive review regarding the working-memory account of task-switching costs. In 
short, the task-set reconfiguration account implies that working memory must be a factor 
that relates to the task-set reconfiguration process, and it should also help participants to 
maintain the task-set once configured (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rubinstein, Meyer & 
Evans, 2001). A close relationship between task-switching cost and working memory was 
demonstrated by Leifooghe et al. (2008). The results of their study suggested that switching 
between tasks may reduce the working memory load. However, the working memory load 
would not impact the size of the task-switching cost. The asymmetric relationship between 
working memory and task-switching cost can be explained by the time-based resource 
sharing theory (see Barrouillet, Bernardin & Camos, 2004; Leifooghe et al., 2008). 
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Nevertheless, under some special conditions, manipulating working memory can 
reduce task-switching costs (Schneider & Logan 2006; Schneider & Logan, 2015). For 
example, in a task-switching experiment with two tasks (Task A and Task B), the order of 
tasks can form a fixed sequence (e.g., AABABB). It was suggested that if the same sequence 
repeatedly occurred (e.g., AABABB, AABABB….), the first trial of the sequence would 
indicate no task-switching costs, because participants can chunk the sequence in their 
working memory (Schneider & Logan, 2006). Moreover, if the participants make further 
sub-chunks inside the sequence, their “chunk point” would also indicate no task-switching 
costs (Schneider & Login, 2015). For example using the six-trial sequence AABBAB, 
participants may use a 2-2-2 formation. They would therefore form three sub-chunks (AA, 
BB, AB) in working memory. As a result, the first trial of each chunk (those are the first, 
third and fifth trials of the sequence) would carry no task-switching costs.  
2.1.4 Other Methods 
Physical Exercise 
It is believed that physical exercise can increase participants’ executive control; 
therefore, reduce task-switching costs (Barenberg, Berse & Dutke, 2015; Kamijo & Takeda, 
2010). For example, Barenberg et al. (2015) asked participants in the experimental group to 
attend an acute and intense bicycle exercise session before participating in the task-switching 
experiment. Each participant was required to cycle at a speed of 70 revolutions per minute 
for 10-14 mins. Conversely, the participants in the control group were instructed to watch a 
cartoon episode and to relax before participating in the task-switching experiment. Their 
results suggested the experimental group had less task-switching costs than the control group 
(but their task-switching costs were still significant).  
Incorrect Prediction 
Two recent studies have suggested that making incorrect predictions about the 
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upcoming task can reduce task-switching costs (Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2015, 2016). In these 
study, participants were required to predict the task type of the next trial before they saw the 
task cue (i.e., during the ITI). The results showed that participants who had an incorrect 
expectation of the upcoming task had reduced task-switching costs. 
 In their experiments (Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2015, 2016), participants experienced 
two different sources of conflict in switch trials. The first source was prompted by the task-
set reconfiguration process. During the task-set reconfiguration, there is a conflict between 
the irrelevant task-set activated in the previous trial and the relevant task-set  needed to be 
performed in the current trial. This source of conflict is inherent to all task-switching 
experiments (c.f.Vandierendonck et al., 2010; Kiesel et al., 2010).The second source of 
conflict was prompted by the requirement for participants to predict the upcoming task-set. 
A wrong prediction would cause conflict between the representations of the predicted task-
set and the actually relevant task-set. Kleinsorge and Scheil (2015, 2016) argued that adding 
the second source of conflict to the first would increase the amount of controlled process 
applied to the establishment of the actually relevant task-set. This is because application of 
the actually relevant task-set is the resolution of both types of conflict. Specifically, to solve 
the conflict of task-set reconfiguration, participants need to apply the relevant task-set. To 
solve the conflict of wrong prediction, participants also need to apply the relevant task-set. 
Therefore, if participants make a wrong prediction in a switch trial, the amount of cognitive 
control is somehow doubled, which would cause a reduction of switch costs.  
2.1.5 Summary 
There are many interesting manipulations that can reduce task-switching costs. 
Nevertheless, participants can only eliminate the cost completely under very specific 
experimental conditions (e.g., Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2015, 2016; Schneider & Login 2006; 
Schneider & Login, 2015) and some of these results cannot be replicated (e.g., Verbruggen 
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et al., 2007). Indeed, as I introduced in Chapter 1, task-switching costs may reflect additional 
cognitive processing when participants deal with switch trials──either caused by 
interference or inhibition from previous trials, or the demand to reconfigure the new task-set 
of switch trials. If this assumption is accurate, then, as long as participants have to switch 
between tasks, completely removing the cost of switching would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible. 
2.2 Animal Studies 
Surprisingly, animal studies have indicated that rhesus monkeys can somehow 
switch between tasks without any indication of task-switching costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003). 
In this study, two rhesus monkeys were trained to switch between different tasks. For the 
first monkey, Task A was to judge the colour of squares (either red or green). Task B required 
the monkey to determine whether the square was brighter inside or outside. To avoid a task-
specific effect, the second monkey needed to switch between a colour task and an orientation 
task. The orientation task required the monkey to judge whether the target figure was 
horizontal or vertical. This study used a task-cueing procedure. The screen would display a 
yellow or black background to indicate different tasks. The monkeys showed a 0.2 ms non-
significant difference between switch trials and repeated trials. Similarly, in a recent study 
in which monkeys had to perform a brightness task and a radius task (Avdagic et al., 2013), 
monkeys were trained to determine the brightness of a circle, or the size of a circle. In line 
with Stoet & Snyder (2003), the result of this study indicated that monkeys are somehow 
unaffected by task-switching (but see Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011).  
Furthermore, two recent studies have suggested that pigeons can switch between 
tasks without any indication of task-switching costs (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier et 
al., 2016). Both pigeon studies included visual tasks. Meier et al. (2016) trained pigeons to 
switch between a spatial frequency task and an orientation task. The spatial frequency task 
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required the pigeons to judge the spatial frequency for a stimulus (high or low frequency). 
The orientation task required the pigeons to judge whether the stimulus was horizontal or 
vertical.  
Castro and Wasserman (2016) trained pigeons to switch between a “numerosity” task 
and a “variability” task. In the numerosity task, pigeons had to discriminate whether a 
stimulus contained few (6) items or many (16) items. In the variability task, pigeons had to 
discriminate whether a stimulus contained low-variability or high-variability arrays. The 
low-variability arrays contained items that were all the same as one another. The high-
variability arrays contained items that were all different from one another. 
These animal studies are critical, because animals’ surprising performances in task-
switching experiments do not agree with the previously postulated implications of executive 
control. For human participants, the task-switching cost is an exquisite measurement of 
executive control (Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Braver, 2012; Zinke, Einert, Pfennig & Kliegel, 2012; Kray 
et al., 2012). For example, studies have consistently documented that ADHD is characterised 
by executive control deficits (Barkley, 1997; Barkley and Lombroso, 2000; Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996; Sergeant, Geurts & Oosterlaan, 2002). Conversly, in task-switching studies 
atypical participants who have ADHD tend to have larger task-switching costs than typical 
participants (Cepeda, Cepeda & Kramer, 2000; Kramer, Cepeda & Cepeda, 2001; 
Rasmussen & Gillberg, 2001; Kray et al., 2012). Similar evidence was provided by 
comparsion of task-switching costs among different age groups (e.g., Meiran, Gotler & 
Perlman, 2001; Kray, Li & Lindenberger 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). These studies pointed 
out that young adults had the smallest task-switching costs, because they have the best 
executive control abilities (but also see Wasylyshyn et al., 2011).  
2.2.1 Potential Strategy Differences between Humans and Animals 
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How can we explain monkeys’ and pigeons’ outstanding performances on switch 
trials without assuming they have better executive controls than human participants? Stoet 
and Snyder (2003) proposed two possible interpretations. Firstly, they suggested that, before 
the experiment, the monkeys in their study had extensive training that helped them to 
eliminate task-switching costs. However, a follow-up study discarded this assumption by 
showing that, even after a huge amount of training under the same experimental design, 
human participants still could not match the performance of the monkeys (Stoet & Snyder, 
2007). Secondly, Stoet and Snyder (2003, 2007 and 2009) proposed that humans and 
monkeys have different cognitive processing and that distinct task-switching behaviours 
reflect differences between the two species. I will further discuss this argument in Chapter 
6. 
Later studies have suspected one more possibility: that instead of applying task-
switching strateies, monkeys and pigeons could somehow remember all the cue-stimulus 
combinations and the responses corresponding to those combinations. Therefore, animals 
responded to the cue-stimulus combination directly. There were no task-switching costs, 
because the animals performed the experiment without switching between tasks (e.g., 
Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 2008; Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 
2016). However, see also Avdagic et al. (2013) for a different interpretation of monkey task-
switching performance. Dreisbach and colleagues called this particular method the 
“stimulus-response mapping approach” (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008, 2009), and Forrest et al. (2014) called this method the “cue-stimulus-response 
approach”. In the pigeon study, it is called the “associative learning approach” (Meier et al., 
2016). However, these all reflect the same idea: participants (humans or animals) can figure 
out a correct response directly based on the stimulus they perceive, without applying any 
rules-based processes like task-switching strategy. I call this method the “Look-up Table” 
(LUT) approach. 
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Studies with human participants demonstrated that, by inducing participants to apply 
the LUT approach without telling them to switch between tasks, participants’ task-switching 
costs disappeared (Dreisbach, et al, 2006, 2007) or were at least reduced (Forrest, Monsell, 
& McLaren, 2014). In Forrest et al.’s (2014) study, sometimes the task-switching costs were 
not significant [F (1, 15) = 3.39, p = .086, η2G=.00372; see their Experiment 2] after inducing 
participants to use a LUT approach. At least, regarding a statistical effect, they managed to 
eliminate task-switching costs.  
  In short, previous human studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Forrest et al., 2014) 
showed that participants could perform task-switching without even realising that there were 
two different tasks, and therefore there was no delay in switching trials. Based on this 
observation, researchers proposed that the difference between humans and monkeys may 
reflect differences in cognitive processing. Nevertheless, different strategies rather than a 
difference between the species, seem to be responsible.   
2.2.2 Disadvantages of the LUT Approach 
The LUT approach, however, faces several challenges. Firstly, Dreisbach et al. 
(2006, 2007) and Forrest et al. (2014) conducted LUT studies using entirely different tasks 
compared with animal studies. Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) required participants to switch 
between two linguistic tasks: the Consonant/Vowel Task and the Animal/Non-Animal Task. 
The Consonant/Vowel Task required participants to decide whether a word started with a 
consonant or a vowel. The Animal/Non-Animal Task required participants to decide whether 
or not the word represented an animal. Furthermore, Forrest et al. (2014) applied two 
mathematical tasks: an odd/even task (whether a number is an odd number or an even 
number) and a low-high task (whether a number is a small number [< 5] or a big number 
[>5]). Conversely, visual tasks were used in the monkey studies (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; 
Avdagic et al., 2013) and pigeon studies (Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier et al., 2016). 
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Because we do not know whether humans can replicate a similar task-switching pattern to 
monkeys and pigeons on the visual tasks, the previous results were in conclusive.  
Secondly, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) used univalent stimuli. Each univalent 
stimulus only provides information for only one task. Conversely, all monkey studies and 
pigeon studies used bivalent stimuli. Each bivalent stimulus provides information for more 
than one task (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Avdagic et al., 2013; Castro & Wasserman, 2016; 
Meier et al., 2016). The diversity of bivalent stimuli and univalent stimuli will be fully 
explained in Chapter 3. However, in short, previous studies have demonstrated that when 
the stimuli were univalent, the task-switching costs were smaller than if the stimuli were 
bivalent (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Wylie & 
Allport, 2000). Although Forrest et al. (2014) used bivalent stimuli, their result is not 
consistent. As mentioned before, the task-switching costs approached significance (p = .086) 
in their Experiment 2. Moreover, the task-switching costs remained significant in their 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 3.  
2.3 Goals and Hypotheses 
The present study sought to investigate the LUT approach. Firstly, I tested Dreisbach 
et al.’s (2006, 2007) and Forrest et al.’s (2014) results using two visual tasks. Secondly, this 
study re-examined whether the same results would consistently emerge when using bivalent 
stimuli. In short, the main question was whether human participants could assimilate the 
performance of monkeys and pigeons by employing a similar strategy (i.e., the LUT 
approach). Thirdly, since Dreisbach and colleagues (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Dreisbach 
& Haider., 2008, 2009) and Forrest et al. (2014) demonstrated that human participants could 
apply different strategies when dealing with task-switching experiments, the present study,  
investigated whether there are other possible strategies that can help participants to reduce, 
or even to eliminate, task-switching costs. The advantages and disadvantages of each 
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potential strategy are discussed. 
2.4 Experiment 2.1 
The intention of Experiment 2.1 was to explore whether human participants could 
apply the LUT approach and eliminate the task-switching costs in a bivalent task-switching 
experiment with two visual tasks. Thus, one of the key points of this experiment is to instruct 
the participants to perform both tasks without mentioning the task-switching strategy. To 
achieve this, the researcher provided an LUT to help them remember the correct response 
for all possible situations. I predicted that, without an explicit understanding of task rules, 
participants would apply the LUT approach as previous studies had suggested (Dreisbach et 
al., 2006, 2007; Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016). In addition, without an explicit 
understanding of task rules, participants would indicate no task-switching costs.  
Moreover, this experiment sought to investigate the different strategies participants 
might apply. Given the fact that switching between tasks has the obvious 
disadvantage──task-switching costs, it is interesting to ask whether task switching may 
benefit participants in other aspects. Therefore, this experiment compared task-switching 
strategies with other potential strategies. I predicted that participants who applied different 
strategies (e.g., task-switching strategy and the LUT approach) would behave differently 
during the experiment in terms of reaction time and error rate.  
Finally, because I applied bivalent stimuli in Experiment 2.1, I also examined the 
congruency effect. For a typical bivalent stimuli task-switching experiment, half the stimuli 
are congruent (i.e., the stimuli were associated with the same response key for both tasks) 
and half the stimuli are incongruent (i.e., the stimuli were associated with different keys in 
different tasks). Previous studies have suggested that participants (both animals and humans) 
tend to have longer RTs and higher error rates on incongruent trials than congruent trials 
(e.g., Forrest et al., 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011; Meier et al., 2016; 
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Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Kessler & Meiran, 2010; Schneider, 2015).  
I made three predictions in Experiment 2.1. Firstly, I predicted that, without an 
explicit understanding of the task rule, participants would apply the LUT approach and show 
no task-switching costs. Secondly, I predicted that participants who applied different 
strategies would behave differently during the experiment, in terms of reaction time and error 
rate. Finally, it was predicted that participants from both the experimental and the control 




A total of 40 adult students (female = 26) from the University of Glasgow 
participated in Experiment 2.1. They were 20-37 years of age (mean age = 24.7, SD = 3.86). 
Each participant received £3 for their participation.  
Stimuli and Apparatus  
There were four target stimuli: a black circle, a white circle, a black hexagon and 
white hexagon. The size of all figures was 60 × 60 pixels or 16.93 mm × 16.93 mm. There 
were two task cues (which were also 16.93 mm × 16.93 mm; see Figure 2.1). Stimuli were 
presented centrally on a BenQ computer monitor (24 inches). A Black Box Toolkit response 
pad was used to record participants' responses. Participants also used keys on a QWERTY 
keyboard to start the experiment or to start a new block. The viewing distance was about 50 
- 70 cm. All experiments in the present thesis were actualised by Psytoolkit Linux version 
(http://www.psytoolkit.org). 
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Figure 2.1. The four target stimuli and two task cues of Experiment 2.1. For the colour task, 
if the colour was white, participants should press a left key; and if the stimulus was black, 
participants should press a right key. For the shape task, if the stimulus was a circle, 
participants should press a left key; and if the stimulus was a hexagon, participants should 
press a right key. Participants can also obtain the correct response by memorising the 
association between Cue-Stimulus combination and response key directly. 
 
 
Tasks and Timeline 
Participants performed two tasks: the colour task and the shape task. For the colour 
tasks, participants had to determine whether the colour of a stimulus was black or white. If 
the colour was white, participants should press the left key. If the stimulus was black, 
participants should press the right key. For the shape task, participants had to determine 
whether the shape of a stimulus was a circle or hexagon.  If the stimulus was a circle, 
participants should press the left key. If the stimulus was a hexagon, participants should press 
the right key (see Figure 2.1). The experiment used a composite task-cueing design. In each 
trial the task cue and task stimulus appeared and disappeared simultaneously, and there was 
no interval between cue and stimulus onset. This setting has two advantages: firstly, without 
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a cue-stimulus interval (CSI), there was no time for preparation. This makes it easy to detect 
task-switching costs, because the task-switching costs will be much larger. Secondly, the 
task cue did not disappear, and participants did not need to put the cue into their working 
memory. As a result, they could easily compare the cue and task stimulus, or identify cue 
and stimulus as a combination. This induces participants to apply novel strategies. For 
instance, this composite design should certainly facilitate the LUT approach because the idea 
is to treat each cue-stimulus combination as one compound stimulus. During the experiment, 
one of the eight combinations showed up at the centre of the screen on each trial. The inter-
trial interval (ITI) was 300 ms (see Figure 2.2).  
Feedback 
On each trial, participants had five seconds to make a response. If their response was 
correct, the next trial would started after a 300 ms ITI (see Figure 2.2). If participants did 
not make a response or made a wrong response, a mistake message or a timeout message 
was displayed for five seconds (Figure 2.2a). A long feedback for mistake and timeout would 
encourage a correct response. After the feedback, the next trial began.    
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Figure 2.2. The timeline of Experiment 2.1. (a) Demonstrates the consequences of mistake 
and timeout. The feedback information onset is for 5000ms. (b) After a correct response, the 




Experiment 2.1 took place in a quiet and darkened room. Participants were randomly 
assigned to two groups: an experimental group (N = 20) and a control group (N = 20).  
Experimental group 
At the beginning of this experiment, participants received written instructions. On a 
sheet of paper, all eight possible cue-stimuli combinations (2 cues × 4 target stimuli) were 
printed on the left and right-hand sides of the paper. Participants were instructed that the four 
combinations on the left-hand side corresponded to pressing the left key, and the four 
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combinations on the right-hand side corresponded to pressing the right key (See Figure 2.3). 
They had one minute to remember the combinations and the corresponding keys.  
 
Figure 2.3. The response mappings in the written instructions. Four cue-stimulus 
combinations were displayed on the left-hand side and four combinations on the right-hand 
side, corresponding to pressing the left and light keys respectively. 
 
 
Before the experiment, participants completed two 20-trial training blocks that were 
designed to help them remember the cue-stimulus combinations and the corresponding 
response keys. After the two training blocks, participants completed two experimental blocks 
of 100 trials. Participants were asked to press the corresponding key as quickly and 
accurately as possible. They were allowed to take a rest after they had finished the first block 
and start the second block when they were ready. Finally, after participants finished the 
experimental blocks, they were required to report  their  strategy during the experiment. They 
also confirmed whether they realised that there were two tasks (the colour task and the shape 
task) or not. 
Control group 
The experiment conditions were almost identical with those of the experiment group. 
The only difference was in the instructions the participants received. A task-switching 
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instruction was provided, which explained the task rules, target stimuli, and task cues for 
making a correct response. Participants in the control group also performed the same two 
training and experiment sections. After the experiment, they also had to report the strategy 
they had applied.   
2.4.2 Results 
Experiment 2.1 had three predictions. Firstly, it was predicted that participants in the 
experimental group would all apply the LUT approach, and it was predicted that they would 
not show any task-switching costs. Conversely, participants in the control group would show 
significant task-switching costs. Secondly, it was predicted that participants in the 
experimental group and participants in the control group would behave differently regarding 
RTs and error rates because of their strategy differences. Thirdly, it was predicted that 
participants from both the experimental and control groups would have longer RTs and 
higher error rates in incongruent trials than in congruent trials. 
Before the final data analysis, I took several factors into account. Firstly, any trial 
following an incorrect trial would be excluded. If participants made a mistake on trial n - 1 
it is possible that they did not apply the task rule or even did not perceive the stimulus at all. 
Therefore, trial n may have no meaningful reference; it is neither a switch trial nor a repeat 
trial. Secondly, any trial fully repeating the previous trial would be excluded. In other words, 
if trial n - 1 and trial n have the same cue-stimuli combination, trial n would be 
removed,ecause on trial n participants can simply execute the previous response without any 
meaningful cognitive process. Again, it is neither a switch trial nor a repeat trial. Unless 
mentioned otherwise, the same process applied to all the experiments in this dissertation. All 
results in the present thesis were analysed with the default statistical functions in the R 
programming language. 
Experimental Group and Control Group 
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Table 2.1 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Participant Group 
  Experimental Group   Control Group  
Trial /Group RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Repeat Congruent 1166 (345) 5.48% (7.1) 1288 (294) 2.01% (3.8) 
Repeat Incongruent 1292 (370) 20.2% (9.2) 1376 (314) 7.96% (13) 
Switch Congruent 1300 (405) 7.12% (7.8) 1528 (335) 3.32% (4.5) 
Switch Incongruent 1428 (484) 17.6% (9.8) 1582 (369) 7.97% (11) 
 
Repeat 1218 (339) 12.7% (7.1) 1331 (298) 4.87% (7.8) 
Switch 1362 (435) 12.3% (7.5) 1558 (345) 5.72% (11) 
 
Congruent 1239 (372) 6.44% (7.2) 1424 (300) 2.78% (3.8) 
Incongruent 1368 (422) 18.7% (8.9) 1497 (330) 7.83% (12) 
 
Total 1298 (390) 12.5% (7.1) 1461 (311) 5.43% (7.6) 
 
The descriptive data of each condition is listed in Table 2.1 and illustrated in Figure 
2.5. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted to analyse the RT difference 
between and within conditions. Two within-subjects factors were: the trial transition (repeat, 
switch) and the congruency effect (congruent, incongruent). The between-subjects factor 
was the participant group (experimental group, control group). The two within-subjects 
factors, the trial transition [F (1, 38) = 39.201, p =.0001, η2p = .51] and the congruency effect 
[F (1, 38) = 22.439, p = .0001, η2p = .37] were significant. The between-subjects factor of 
participant group was not significant [F (1, 38) = 1.786, p = .189]. There was no significant 
interaction.  
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An equivalent ANOVA with the same design was conducted on the error rates. The 
within-subjects factor of congruency effect [F (1, 38) = 41.872, p = .0001, η2p = .52] and 
between-subjects factor of participant group [F (1, 38) = 10.21, p =.00281, η2p = .16] were 
significant. However, the within-subjects factor of trial transition was not significant [F (1, 
38) = .103, p =.749]. The interaction between congruency effect and participants group [F 
(1, 38) = 7.404, p=.0097, η2 = .52] was significant. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the 
Bonferroni correction suggested that the congruency effect was statistically significant in the 
experimental group (p = .0001), but was not significant in the control group (p = .058). This 
was because, in the experimental group, the incongruent trials had a very high mean error 
rate (18.74%; see Figure 2.5). The interaction between congruency effect and trial transition 
was slightly significant, F (1, 38) = 4.6, p = .038, η2p =.06. The congruency effect was  lager 
in repeat conditions (mean [incongruent trial] - mean [congruent trial] = 10.2 %) than in switch 
conditions (6.9 %). Nevertheless, post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction suggested that the congruency effect remained significant in both the repeat (p 
=.0001) and the switch conditions (p = .0037). There were no other significant interactions 
(p >. 05).  
Oral Reports and Strategies 
All participants orally reported their strategies after the experiment. In the control group, 
all participants orally reported that they were using the task-switching strategy. In the 
experimental group, I picked up four strategies. Firstly, six participants had figured out and 
applied the task-switching strategy. Furthermore, with the exceptions of these six 
participants the remaining 14 (20 - 6 = 14) participants reported that they did not realise there 
was a colour task and a shape task, and none of them had figured out that they could switch 
between these two tasks. 
Secondly, a novel strategy some participants reported was to remember only two task 
cue combinations: the shape cue + black circle is to the left and the shape cue + white 
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hexagon is to the right. The other six combinations were simple, because all white figures 
correspond to the left key, and all black figures correspond to the right key. I called this 
method the “black and white” (BW) strategy (N = 9; see Figure 2.4). Thirdly, similarly to 
the second strategy, some participants decided to remember only the colour cue + white 
hexagon and colour cue + black circle. For the other six combinations, the circle was to the 
left and hexagon was to the right. I called this the “circle and hexagon” (CH) strategy (N = 
4; see Figure 2.4). Finally, one participant remembered four combination on the left side (N 
= 1). No participant in the experimental group used the LUT approach.  
 
Figure 2.4. For the BW strategy, three white stimuli correspond to the left key. Additionally, 
three black stimuli correspond to the right key. Only two exceptions need to be remembered. 
For these two exceptions, the colour rule is revised: black = left; white = right. Similarly, in 
the CH Strategy, three circles correspond to the left key, while three hexagons correspond to 
the right key. Only two exceptions need to be remember. For these two exceptions, the shape 
rule is revised: hexagon = left; circle = right. Using these two strategies, participants can 
perform the experiment without even realising there are two tasks (colour and shape).  
 
 
The Non-switching Strategies 
To analyse participants' performances, two  2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs with mixed design 
were conducted. This time, to compare performance between the task-switching strategy and 
other non-switching strategies, I excluded the six participants who employed the task-
switching strategy in the experimental group. The factorial design was identical to the 
previous ANOVAs. The two within-subjects factors were the trial transition (repeat, switch) 
and congruency (congruent, incongruent). The between-subjects factor was the participant 
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group (experimental group, control group). Descriptive statistics for experimental control 
after removing the six participants are listed in Table 2.2 and illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Table 2.2 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition of Non-Switch Participants 
Trial Condition RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Repeat Congruent 1176 (352) 6.82% (8.0) 
Repeat Incongruent 1294 (312) 23.5% (7.5) 
Switch Congruent 1285 (443) 8.57% (8.7) 
Switch Incongruent 1390 (467) 20.4% (9.2) 
 
Repeat 1226 (321) 14.26 % (7.4) 
Switch 1336  (467) 15.17% (6.5) 
 
Congruent 1238 (391) 7.85 % (8.1) 
Incongruent 1342 (293) 21.79% (7.5) 
 
Total 1286 (389) 14.72% (6.7) 
 
The results of the RT ANOVA indicated that the two within-subjects factors were 
significant: trial transition [F (1, 32) = 29.09, p = .0001, η2p = .48] and congruency [F (1, 
32) = 17.47, p = .0002, η2p = .35]. The between-subjects factor of participants’ groups was 
not significant [F (1, 32) = 1.791, p = .19]. There was no significant interaction (p > .05). 
The results of the error rate ANOVA indicated that the within-subjects factor of 
congruency [F (1, 32) = 34.102, p = .0001, η2p = .51] and the between-subjects factor of 
participants’ groups [F (1, 32) = 14.71, p = .00281, η2p = .31] were significant. However, the 
within-subjects factor of trial transition was not significant [F (1, 32) = .101, p = .753]. The 
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interaction between congruency effect and participants groups [F (1, 32) = 8.737, p = .00581, 
η2p = .32] was significant. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction 
suggested that the congruent effect was  significant in the experimental group (p = .0001), 
but not in the control group (p = .058). This is because in the experimental group, the 
incongruent trials have a very high mean error rate (21.79%). There were no other 
meaningful interactions (p >. 05; see Figure 2.5). 
 
Figure 2.5. (a) The line graph displays the RT (top) and Error Rate (bottom) of each 
condition (switch, repeat; congruent [Con], incongruent [Inc]; Experimental group, Control 
group). The blue lines demonstrate the RT and Error Rate of the experimental group after 
removing the participants who applied the task-switching strategy. The error bar indicates 
±1 SEM. (b) The violin plots demonstrate RT distributions from the repeat and the switch 
conditions. A jittered dot represents the average RT for a participant under that trial 
condition. The black horizontal bar and the box around it represent the mean and the 95% 
CI of the mean in each condition, respectively. The sesponses slower or quicker than 95% 
are represented by dots above and below the error bars. (c) Similar violin plots demonstrate 
RT distributions from the congruent and the incongruent conditions. 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
There were three major findings from Experiment 2.1. Firstly, no participants in the 
experimental group used the LUT approach (N = 0). In Forrest et al.’s (2014) study, some 
participants reported that they had understood the task rules and some had not. No further 
discussion was given, because Forrest et al. (2014) believed that post-hoc oral reports were 
unreliable: “the ability to articulate a propositional rule does not mean that performance is 
being driven by it” (p 1021). Thus, they assumed that there were only two strategies: the 
task-switching strategy and the LUT approach, and participants who did not understand the 
task rules applied the second strategy. Similarly, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) did not report 
any other strategy besides the task-switching strategy and the LUT approach. In the present 
experiment, however, when participants did not figure out the task rules, instead of applying 
the LUT approach, they assigned the eight cue-stimulus combinations to different groups 
and remembered them with different novel strategies. As I demonstrated in the results 
section, I picked up two meaningful novel strategies from the oral reports: the BW strategy 
and the CH strategy. Moreover, unlike Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) and Forrest et al. (2014), 
in this experiment participants who did not apply the task-switching strategy somehow still 
showed highly significant task-switching costs. Self-reports after the experiment suggested 
that these participants never realised that there were two different tasks. This is contrary to 
my previous prediction. 
Secondly, regarding the strategy difference, the results of Experiment 2.1 suggested 
that participants in the experimental group who received LUT instruction had higher error 
rates than participants in the control group who received regular task-switching instructions. 
In particular, participants in the experimental group tended to have much higher error rates 
on incongruent trials (Mean = 18.7%) than participants in the control group (Mean = 7.83%). 
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However, notice that their error rates were still better than pure random guessing. This 
pattern remained significant after I removed  participants who applied task-switching 
strategies. In short, I found that participants who applied the task-switching strategy had 
lower error rates than participants who applied novel strategies. One disadvantage of 
Experiment 2.1 is that the strategies I identified in the experimental group are all based on  
self-reports, which may not reflect the real strategies participants used. The existence of 
these newly identified strategies needs further confirmation in further experiments. 
Thirdly, in line with my previous prediction, there were significant congruence 
effects in both the experimental and control groups.  In the absence of task rules, humans 
(Forrest et al., 2014), monkeys (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011) and 
pigeons (Meier et al., 2016) consistently showed congruency effects. The results of 
Experiment 2.1 agree with these studies. 
2.5 Experiment 2.2 
In contrast to Dreisbach et al., (2006, 2007) and Forrest et al. (2014), Experiment 2.1 
found some unexpected task-switching costs when the participants reported that they were 
using novel strategies. Particularly, it is suggested that even when participants never realise 
there is a colour task and a shape task, and never know that they have to switch between two 
tasks, the task-switching costs remain significant. However, because Experiment 2.1 picked 
up participants’ strategy only based on their oral reports, it is reasonable to suspect that these 
verbal reports cannot reflect the actual strategies they used, and they may still have used the 
standard task-switching strategy without realising it. Thus, the primary purpose of this 
experiment was to detect any behavioural differences between participants who were using 
novel strategies and participants who were using the task-switching strategy, and prove that 
different strategies do indeed exist. 
Experiment 2.2 focuses on the BW strategy, because it is the most popular novel 
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strategy in Experiment 2.1 and because the second-most popular strategy,  the CH strategy, 
is very similar. One of the important features of the BW strategy is that participants who 
have applied this strategy can only react to the colour rule but not the shape rule. Instead, 
when a shape task trial showed up, they had to either merge it into the colour task or 
remember the exceptions. This strategy worked fine when there were only eight cue-stimulus 
combinations, but I hypothesised that if a novel shape-task stimulus suddenly showed up, 
the BW strategy would not provide the correct answer. However, as long as the novel shape-
task stimulus follows the task rules, participants using the task-switching strategy can figure 
out the correct response based on their strategy. At the same time, because both strategies 
include a colour rule, both strategies can deal with a novel colour-task stimulus correctly 
(see Figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6. There are three novel stimuli. Figures (a) and (b) are novel shape task stimuli. If 
a participant used the BW strategy, I predicted that the participant would not find the correct 
response to (a) and (b), because the participant could apply only the colour task rule (white 
== left; black == right), and not the shape rule. Figure (c), on the other hand, is a novel colour 
task stimulus, and it follows the colour task rule (it is mainly white; so press left). Therefore, 
both the task-switching strategy and the BW strategy can provide the correct response. 
 
 
 To sum up, I made three predictions in Experiment 2.2. Firstly, I intended to replicate 
the results of Experiment 2.1. Therefore, I predicted that, without an explicit understanding 
of the task rule, participants would still indicate significant task-switching costs and 
congruency effects. Secondly, Experiment 2.1 has provided initiatory evidence to indicate 
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that those novel strategies might cause higher error rates than the task-switching strategy. 
Therefore, I also predicted that novel strategies would cause higher error rates than the task-
switching strategy. Thirdly, I predicted that, if the BW strategy did indeed exist, when I 
suddenly introduced novel shape-task stimuli, participants who believed that they were using 
such a strategy should have higher error rates than participants who were using the task-




 A total of 26 adult students from the University of Glasgow participated in 
Experiment 2.2, aged between 20 - 30 (mean age = 23.5, SD = 2.27, female = 20). Each 
participant received £3 pounds for their participation.  
Stimuli Apparatus, Tasks and Timeline 
 This experiment included two parts. For the first part, the stimuli and apparatus and 
tasks were identical with Experiment 2.1. However, the second part included 20 novel 
stimuli: 10 for the shape task and 10 for the colour task (see Figure 2.7). The task rules were 
identical for both the first and the second part. 
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Figure 2.7. There are 20 novel stimuli (cue-stimulus combinations) from the second part 
of the Experiment 2.2. The ten figures in the top row belong to the colour task, and the then 
figures in the bottom row belong to the shape task. 
 
 
 In line with Experiment 2.1, Experiment 2.2 also used a composite task-cueing 
design. In each trial, the task cue and task stimulus appeared up and disappeared together, 
and there was no cue-stimulus interval. The ITI was 300 ms. The only difference is that, in 
the first part of this experiment, participants only had 2.5 seconds to make a response. Based 
on the RT results of Experiment 2.1, I found that a 5 second reaction time window is not 
necessary. Participants can make a decision within 2.5 seconds. In the second part of the 
experiment, participants still had 5 seconds to make a response. I gave participants some 
extra time in the second part of the experiment, because they were dealing with novel stimuli. 
Feedback 
 The feedback in the first part of the experiment was almost identical with Experiment 
2.1. If a participant could not make any response within 2.5 seconds, a timeout sign would 
show up and stay on the screen for 3 seconds. If the participant made a wrong response, a 
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mistake sign would appear and remain on the screen for 3 seconds.  
Procedure 
 Experiment 2.2 took place in a quiet and darkened psychology lab at the University 
of Glasgow. Participants were randomly assigned into two groups: the experimental group 
(N= 13) and the control group (N = 13). 
Experimental group 
 At the beginning of this experiment, participants received paper-based instructions. 
On paper, all eight possible cue-stimuli combinations (2 cues × 4 target stimuli) were printed 
on either the left side or the right side. Participants were instructed that the four combinations 
on the left side corresponded to the left key, and the four combinations on the right side 
corresponded to the right key. Also, for the purpose of this experiment, the position of these 
eight combinations was specially arranged. Thus, it was also a direct illustration of the BW 
strategy. Participants just needed to remember two exception combinations and the 
remaining six combinations followed the simple colour rule (see Figure 2.8). The 
instructions induced participants to apply the BW strategy. They had one minute to 
remember these combinations and their corresponding keys. The instruction also informed 
participants that the experiment had two parts, and that, in the second part, all the stimuli 
would be novel. Each participant needed to finish the second part based on the strategy they 
used in the first part (i.e., the BW strategy). 
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Figure 2.8. For participants in the experimental group, all eight combinations were listed in 
the paper instructions. This special arrangement is for the illustration of the BW strategy. 
 
 
 Firstly, participants needed to complete two 20-trial training blocks designed to help 
them remember the corresponding keys for all the combinations (the same as Experiment 
2.1). After two training blocks, the participants needed to complete the first part of the 
experiment: four 75-trial experiment blocks. They were allowed to take a rest after each 
block and start the next block when they were ready. After that, they needed to complete the 
second part of the experiment: a 20-trial experiment block including ten colour task novel 
stimuli and ten shape task novel stimuli. The stimuli showed up randomly, but each stimulus 
only showed up once. After each participant finished the experiment, they were required to 
orally report whether they had used any strategy besides the BW strategy and to confirm 
whether they realised that there were two tasks (the colour task and the shape task) or not. 
Control group 
 The experiment for the control group was almost identical with the experimental 
group. The only difference was the instructions they received. A task-switching instruction 
was provided, that explained the task rules, target stimuli, and task cues for making a correct 
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response.. The instruction for the control group also mentioned that, in the second part of the 
experiment, all the stimuli would be novel. Each participant had to finish the second part 
based on the strategy they used in the first part (i.e., the task-switching strategy). 
2.5.2 Results 
 Firstly, for the first part of the experiment, it was predicted that participants in both 
the experimental and the control groups would have significant task-switching costs and 
congruency effects. Secondly, it was predicted that the experimental group would have 
higher error rates than the control group. Thirdly, for the second part of the experiment it 
was predicted that the experimental group would have higher error rates than the control 
group on the novel shape-task stimuli, but not on the novel colour-task stimuli. The 
descriptive data is listed in Table 2.3 and illustrated in Figure 2.9. 
Experimental Group and Control Group 
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Table 2.3 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Participant Group 
  Experimental Group   Control Group  
Trial/Group RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Repeat Congruent 948 (170) 6.71% (5.1) 911 (182) 2.50% (2.6) 
Repeat Incongruent 1045 (188) 12.8% (5.9) 955 (208) 8.11% (5.8) 
Switch Congruent 1056 (156) 9.41% (7.5) 1029 (188) 3.89% (3.9) 
Switch Incongruent 1080 (167) 16.4% (8.5) 1072 (192) 10.4% (8.0) 
 
Repeat 996 (163) 9.88% (4.5) 932 (192) 5.40% (4.1) 
Switch 1069 (153) 12.78% (7.3) 1074 (169) 7.14% (5.3) 
 
Congruent 1011 (158) 5.69% (6.2) 977 (165) 3.30% (3.1) 
Incongruent 1062 (173) 13.5% (6.5) 1018 (188) 9.35% (5.9) 
 
Total 1035 (154) 11.5% (.057) 996 (174) 6.35% (.042) 
 
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted to analyse the RT difference 
between and within conditions. Two within-subjects factors were the trial transition (repeat, 
switch) and the congruency effect (congruent, incongruent). The between-subjects factor 
was the participant group (experimental group, control group). Two within-subject factors 
were significant: the trial transition [F (1, 24) = 42.22, p = .0001, η2p = .63] and the 
congruency effect [F (1, 24) = 8.32, p = .00812, η2p = .26]. The between-subject factor of 
participant group was nonsignificant [F (1, 24) = 0.384, p = .541].There were no significant 
interactions (p > .05).  
 An equivalent 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted to analyse the 
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error rate difference between and within conditions. Two within-subjects factors were 
significant: the trial transition [F (1, 24) = 7.845, p = .00991, η2p = .23] and the congruency 
effect [F (1, 24) = 47.00, p =.0001, η2p = .66]. The between subject factor of participant 
group was also significant [F (1, 24) = 6.71, p = .016, η2p = .25]. There were no significant 
interactions (p > .05; see Figure 2.9).  
 
Figure 2.9. (a) The line graph displays the RT (top) and Error Rate (bottom) of each 
condition (switch, repeat; congruent [Con], incongruent [Inc]; Experimental group, Control 
group). The error bar indicates ±1 SEM. (b) The violin plots demonstrate RT distributions 
from the repeat and the switch conditions. The jittered dots inside each bean represent the 
average RTs of each participant. The black horizontal bar and the box around it represent 
the mean and the 95% CI of the mean in each condition, respectively. The responses slower 
or quicker than 95% are represented by dots above and below the error bars. (c) Similar 




Novel Stimuli  
To examine the error rate between experimental and control groups under the novel 
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stimuli circumstance, a 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted. The within-
subjects factor was the task type (colour, shape), and the between-subjects factor was the 
participant group (control, experimental). See Table 2.4 and Figure 2.10 for the mean error 
rate of each condition).  
Table 2.4  
Mean (SD) of Error Rates for Tach task and Participant Group 
Group/Task 
 
Colour Task  
 
Shape Task  
 
Total  
Error Rate % (SD) % (SD) % (SD) 
Experiment Group 13.7 (15.5) 42.1 (13.1) 27.6 (8.1) 
Control Group 3.07 (6.3) 7.69 (9.2) 5.38 (5.2) 
  
The within-subjects factor of task types [F (1, 24) = 19.55, p = .0002, η2p = .45] and 
the between-subjects factor of participant group were significant [F (1, 24) = 73.7, p = .0001, 
η2p =.75]. The interaction between these two factors was also significant [F (1, 24) = 10.13, 
p =.004, η2p = .29].   
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction suggested that the 
experimental group had a significantly higher mean error rate than the control group in the 
shape task (p = .0001). However, in the colour task, the two participant groups had no 
significant differences (p = .14; see Figure 2.10).  
Moreover, in the control group, the mean error rate on the shape task was not 
significantly better than chance [χ2 (1, N = 130) = 3.39, p = .065]. However, the mean error 
rate on the colour task was better than chance [χ2 (1, N = 130) = 66.5, p = .0001]. 
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Figure 2.10. The line graph displays the Error Rate of novel colour and shape stimuli in 




In line with the prior predictions, the results showed that participants in both the 
experimental and the control groups had significant task-switching costs and congruency 
effects. Moreover, the experimental group had a higher error rate than the control group. 
Finally, participants from the experimental group had higher error rates than the control 
group on the novel shape-task trials. However, participants from both groups had similar 
error rates on the novel colour-task trials.  
In fact, on average, participants from the experimental group could not even perform 
significantly better than the chance level in those novel shape-task trials. This observation 
leads to two highly possible deductions. Firstly, they did not understand the shape rule. 
Furthermore, for them, applying the task-switching strategy was impossible. The error rate 
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results of the novel stimuli trials also confirm that the novel BW strategy I picked up from 
Experiment 2.1 truly exists. I had not tested the CH strategy. However, both novel strategies 
share a similar principle: the remembering of only two exceptions, while the remaining six 
cue-stimulus combinations follow a simple rule. I suggest that the CH strategy was also 
employed but this is something that needs to be tested in future experiments. In agreement 
with Experiment 2.1 the present experiment confirms that even when participants did not 
realise that they had to switch between two tasks,  task-switching costs remained significant.  
The control group had a lower mean error rate than the experimental group. Forrest 
et al. (2014) reported a similar error-rate pattern. In their study, participants who were using 
the task-switching strategy had lower error rates than participants who had not realised the 
task-switching strategy. The difference is that Forrest et al. (2014) did not discussed any 
specific novel strategies that the participants applied during the experiment. This is because 
they believed that the oral report was not completely reliable. They assumed their 
participants applied the LUT approach. The present experiment compares task-switching 
strategy with a particular novel strategy (i.e., the BW strategy).  
2.6 General Discussion 
Previous studies have proposed that it is possible for human subjects to apply the 
LUT approach and eliminate task-switching costs (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007) or at least 
reduce them to a nonsignificant level (Forrest et al., 2014; see their Experiment 2). The 
results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, however, reject this explanation on two different 
accounts. Firstly, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, participants used strategies that were different 
from the task-switching strategy, but not a single participant used the LUT approach. Of 
course, at this point, we cannot fully conclude that it is impossible for human participants to 
apply the LUT approach in visual tasks. However, it is safe to suggest that the LUT approach 
is at least not the prioritised strategy for us. I will further discuss the LUT approach in the 
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next chapter.   
Secondly, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, amongst those participants who were using 
novel strategies such as the BW strategy, task-switching costs were still highly significant. 
Importantly, in line with Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) and Forrest et al. (2014), the oral 
reports from Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 also suggested that participants who were using novel 
strategies never realised that they were switching between tasks. Furthermore, in Experiment 
2.2, the error rate results of the novel stimuli block further indicate that applying the task-
switching strategy is very unlikely for participants in the experimental group.  
2.6.1 Strategies and Functions in Task-switching Experiments 
Since the results of Experiment 2.2 provided clear evidence that the novel strategy I 
found in Experiment 2.1 was more than a subjective oral report, I can be certain that the 
comparison between novel strategy and task-switching strategy is valid. In line with the 
findings of Forrest et al. (2014),  I found that in comparison to other strategies, the task-
switching strategy allows participants to react more accurately and allows participants to 
response to novel stimuli better than chance. Therefore, the task-switching strategy is better 
than other strategies when participants are presented with bivalent stimuli in a task-cueing 
paradigm.  
However, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) drew a different conclusion. Using univalent 
stimuli, they found that participants who were using the LUT approach performed as 
accurate as participants who were using the task-switching strategy. In their study, they 
found no evidence that the task-switching strategy was better than the LUT approach. In 
contrast, they found that the reaction time was slightly quicker if participants used the LUT 
approach. Does the stimulus type (univalent or bivalent) cause this difference? I will address 
this question in the next Chapter.  
2.6.2 Animal Task-switching 
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Previous animal studies have suggested that monkeys and pigeons can perform the 
task-switching experiment without showing any significant task-switching costs (Stoet & 
Snyder, 2003; Avdagic, et al., 2013; Castro & Wasserman, 2016; Meier et al., 2016). One 
possible explanation is that, because they never received any oral or paper based task-
switching instructions, the animals applied unique strategies that differ from the human task-
switching strategy. Those strategies helped them to eliminate task-switching costs, because 
they did not need to switch between tasks. Additionally one potential alternative strategy is 
the LUT approach (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016).  
However, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 challenges this explanation. My results showed 
that firstly although other novel strategies exist, they cannot help human participants to 
eliminate the task-switching costs. Moreover, no participant applied the LUT approach 
despite it being simple and straightforward. Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) and Forrest et al. 
(2014) used linguistic tasks and mathematical tasks. In contrast, the present study applied 
two visual tasks which were close to the previous monkey studies. My experiments are more 
similar to previous animal studies (i.e., Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Avdagic, et al., 2013; Castro 
& Wasserman, 2016; Meier et al., 2016). Therefore, the results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
can make a more valuable comparison between the task-switching costs of humans and 
animals. I suggest that novel strategy (the LUT approach in particular) is not a perfect 
explanation for animal behaviours in task-switching experiments. In Chapter 6, the present 
dissertation will continue to explore how animals can eliminate task-switching costs. 
2.6.3Unexpected Task-switching Costs 
Why do participants indicate task-switching costs without realising that they have to 
switch between tasks? In Chapter 1, I have introduced modern studies which have suggested 
that it is the process of task-set reconfiguration or the proactive interference effect (or both) 
which lead to task-switching costs. Based on these information, the present study raises two 
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possible hypotheses. 
Switching and Task-sets 
Firstly, it is possible that even if participants are unaware that the tasks are based on 
the task-switching strategy, they still identify two different novel tasks. Take the BW 
strategy as an example (see Figure 2.4). The intention of this strategy is to remember the 
response for only two cue-stimulus combinations (the exceptions), while the other six 
combinations can be quickly determined by their colour. Since all combinations belong to 
the colour task, they can still be determined by the colour rule (i.e., white = left; black = 
right). Perhaps the participants still treat those combination as the colour task, with or 
without realising it. Importantly, both exceptional combinations belong to the shape task. 
Thus, once the participants perceive a shape cue, they have to decide whether the 
combination is one of the exceptions first. If it is,, then they should retrieve the correct 
response from memory, or apply a “reversed” colour rule (black = left; white = right). If the 
combination is not an exception, then they would apply the “normal” colour rule (white = 
left; black = right; see Figure 2.4). In short, although the participants never realised that there 
is a colour task, and  never performed a shape task, the strategy they used nevertheless treats 
the four cue-stimulus combinations with the colour cue and the other four cue-stimulus 
combinations with the shape cue as two different tasks. As a result, the novel strategy can 
trigger a novel task-set reconfiguration process and create switching costs. A similar 
argument can explain the CH strategy as well.  
Switching and Interference 
Secondly, I hypothesise that it is possible that, when participants applied a novel 
strategy, the conventional task-set reconfiguration process based on task-switching strategy 
was eliminated. However, I hypothesise that the proactive interference still exists after we 
rule out the task-set reconfiguration process. Furthermore, the task-switching costs are 
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inescapable as long as the proactive interference exists. In other words, I hypothesise that 
the proactive interference and task-switching can be two independent events. Therefore, after 
controlling the task-switching strategy, it is the interference from the previous trial, not the 
switching between tasks that causes the switching cost.   
 Allport et al., (1994) have already suggested that the interference is a result of the 
direct competition between the stimulus-response mapping from the previous trial (n - 1) 
and the current trial (n). In spite of this, in their experiments, such competition coexisted 
with the notion of task-sets, because their participants received a task-rule based instruction. 
In a task-switching experiment, we are not sure whether the stimulus alone, without actual 
switching between tasks, would trigger the interference. The following Chapters intend to 
examine this very question. 
2.6.4 A Preview of the Following Chapters 
 
I sought to explain the task-switching costs when participants do not apply the task 
switching strategy. In the following Chapters (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) I will 
test two potential explanations from the above section. There are other possible explanations 
based on the compound retrieval account (for a review see Logan & Schneider 2010) and 
the associative learning account (e.g., Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016). Those 
explanations will be discussed in Chapter 7. I also suspect that the disagreement between the 
present chapter and previous studies (i.e., Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Forrest et al., 2014) 
was caused by the difference between bivalent and univalent stimuli or/and the difference 
between semantic and perceptual tasks. I will examine these assumptions in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Bivalent Stimuli and Task-switching Costs 
The present study continues to explore task-switching effects: the costs when humans 
alternate between tasks. Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) suggested that participants are able to 
apply a “Look-up Table” (LUT) approach by remembering all the stimulus-response 
mappings without realising the existence of two competing tasks. As a consequence, they 
performed a task-switching experiment without any task-switching costs because they never 
switched between tasks. It was suggested that the LUT approach might also explain animals’ 
outstanding performances in task-switching experiments. Though Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
were intended to replicate Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007), the results, however, indicate two 
strong disagreements.  
Firstly, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, no participant applied the LUT approach. Instead, 
participants developed novel rule-based strategies. Secondly, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
suggested that even without applying the task-switching strategy, participants still 
demonstrated significant task-switching costs. One possibility is that different stimulus types 
caused the disagreements between Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and previous studies: 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 included bivalent stimuli, whereas Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) 
used univalent stimuli. The present study first focused on the difference between the bivalent 
stimuli and the univalent stimuli. There is also a difference between task types: Experiments 
2.1 and 2.2 applied visual tasks, whereas previous studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007) used 
semantic tasks. The difference between task types was addressed in section 3.6.3.  
Although Forrest et al. (2014)  in a recent study demonstrated that eliminating task-
switching costs in an experiment with bivalent stimuli is possible, their results were 
inconclusive for two reasons. Firstly, the RT difference between switching trials and 
repeating trials was almost significant (F (1, 15) = 3.39, p = .086, η2G=.00372; see their 
Experiment 2). Secondly, Forrest et al. (2014) successfully removed the task-switching costs 
in their Experiment 2. However, in Experiments 1 and 3, they reported significant task-
 
        88 
switching costs when participants believed they were using the LUT approach.  
The present study sought to explore whether univalent stimuli are truly the minimum 
requirement for eliminating task-switching costs by using the LUT approach. In other words, 
I tested under which conditions we could replicate the result from the previous study——
eliminating task-switching costs by ruling out the task-switching strategy and remembering 
all the stimulus-response mappings (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007).  
3.1 Univalent Stimuli and Bivalent Stimuli 
In a task-switching experiment, bivalent stimuli are stimuli that provide information 
for more than one tasks. Conversely, univalent stimuli are stimuli that provide information 
for only one task. All stimuli in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 were bivalent. For example, a black 
circle conveys colour information for the colour task (black) and also shape information for 
the shape task (circle). However, imagine if a black character triplet were presented in a 
colour task trial during Experiments 2.1 or 2.2 (e.g., “£££”). This would be a univalent 
stimulus because, it  provides colour information (the triplet is written in black), but no shape 
information. 
Moreover, Meiran (2014) suggested that it is important not to confuse 
univalent/bivalent stimuli with “dimensions”. It is possible to design univalent 
multidimensional stimuli. For example, it is possible to present univalent coloured shapes 
(say a red triangle) in experiments involving shape and colour tasks like Experiments 2.1 
and 2.2. However, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, the shape task included only a circle and a 
hexagon, and a triangle was not among the shapes in this shape task. Therefore, in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 if a red triangle was onset, it would still be a univalent stimulus. In 
fact, previous literature has suggested that, while bivalent stimuli delay participants’ reaction 
times, the presence of irrelevant target dimensions does not increase switching challenges 
(Meiran et al., 2012; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). All stimuli in the present chapter are authentic 
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bivalent stimuli.   
The stimuli in Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) are somewhat ambiguous. In their study, 
the two tasks were Vowel/Consonant discrimination (decide whether the first letter is a 
vowel or a consonant), and Animal/Non-animal discrimination (decide whether a word 
means an animal or non-animal). Some might argue that those stimuli were bivalent, because 
it is possible for an animal word to start with a vowel; so, for example, the word “owl” can 
be included in both tasks. However, the problem is that, when the animal word “owl” appears 
in an Animal/Non-animal task trial, it is the semantic representation of the bird, which 
conveys no syllabic information. When the same word “owl” onsets in a Vowel/Consonant 
task trial, it is merely a syllable, which conveys no animal information. In other words, we 
cannot determine whether an animal (say “owl”) is a vowel “owl” or a consonant “owl”, or 
decide whether a vowel (say “c”) is an animal “c” or non-animal “c”. In contrast, in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 because, both tasks were visual tasks (colour task, shape task), 
participants were able to decide whether a black figure was a circle, and/or whether a 
hexagon was white. For the sake of simplicity, I therefore follow previous suggestions 
(Forrest et al. 2014; Meier et al., 2016) that the stimuli in Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) are 
univalent.   
3.1.1 Stimulus-set and Stimulus-response Mapping 
The other factor that may be confounded with bivalent-univalent difference is the 
number of stimulus-sets. For univalent stimuli, because each stimulus can only convey the 
information of one task, each task needs to have a unique stimulus-set. In other words, a 
univalent stimulus can only show up in one task. Thus, a univalent stimulus  can only lead 
to one correct response and  has only one stimulus - response mapping. For example, in the 
colour task, one might have a black triplet “$$$” as a stimulus, but it cannot show up in a 
shape task trial, as it has no overt geometric form. Its response is unique during the 
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experiment.  
However, a bivalent stimulus can be included in two tasks. As a result, two tasks can 
share the same stimulus-set. For example, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, the colour task and 
the shape task shared the same stimulus-set, which included four stimuli: a black circle, a 
white circle, a black hexagon and a white hexagon. Furthermore, sometimes one bivalent 
stimulus can lead to different responses in different tasks (i.e., the incongruent stimulus). 
For instance, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 a black circle is “black” in the colour task, and the 
correct response for it is the right key.  It is also a “circle” in the shape task, and the correct 
response is the left key. The same black circle can lead to distinct responses according to the 
tasks. Hence, it has two stimulus-response mappings.  
In short, a task-switching study using univalent stimuli must have two stimulus-sets, 
because each task will have one unique stimulus-set; whilst using bivalent stimuli can (but 
not obligatorily) include only one stimulus-set, which means both tasks share the same 
stimulus-set. Moreover, univalent stimuli can have only one stimulus-response mapping, but 
bivalent stimuli may potentially have two stimulus-response mappings.  
Conventional bivalent task-switching studies usually include only one stimulus-set. 
Therefore, the incongruent stimuli would have two stimulus-response mappings and the 
congruent stimuli would have only one stimulus-response mapping. This set-up also allows 
us to examine the congruency effect in the task-switching paradigm. Incongruent stimuli 
tend to cause a longer reaction time and a higher error rate than congruent stimuli (e.g., 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran & Kessler, 2008; Kessler & 
Meiran, 2010; Schneider, 2015). Although very unusual, it is still possible to include two 
bivalent stimulus-sets in a task-switching study.  
To sum up, the difference between univalent and bivalent stimuli is the information: 
univalent stimuli have information of one task, bivalent stimuli have information of two 
tasks. However, the number of stimulus-sets may be confounded with the difference between 
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univalent and bivalent stimuli because bivalent task-switching experiments usually employ 
a shared stimulus-set.  
3.1.2 Bivalent Stimuli and the Task-switching Effect 
Apart from task-switching costs, the bivalent effect itself is also an interesting cognitive 
effect. Participants tend to react more slowly on bivalent stimuli than to univalent stimuli. 
In fact, performances on univalent stimuli become worse when a few bivalent stimuli very 
infrequently show up amongst them, which is called the “bivalent effect” (Woodward, 
Meier, Tipper, & Graf, 2003; Meier, Woodward, Rey-Mermet & Grafm 2009; Metzak, 
Meier, Graf & Woodward, 2013).  
The present study, however, focused on how bivalent stimuli make an impact upon task-
switching cost. Previous studies have demonstrated that when the stimuli were univalent, the 
task-switching costs were small (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Jersild, 1927; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995; Wylie & Allport, 2000). However, if the stimuli were bivalent, the task 
switching costs were relatively large. Both the task-reconfiguration account (e.g., Monsell, 
Yeung & Azume, 2000; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Roger & Monsell, 1995) and the proactive 
interference task account (Allport and Wylie 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Allport et al., 
1994; Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006) can explain 
the difference between bivalent task-switching effect  and univalent task-switching effect.  
Task-set Reconfiguration 
Woodward et al. (2003) proposed an interesting difference between univalent and 
bivalent stimuli. Theoretically, in a task-switching experiment with univalent stimuli, 
participants only need two pairs of IF-THEN arguments to figure out the correct response. 
For example, (1) if colour == white then press left, if colour == black then press right; (2) if 
shape == circle then press left,  if shape == hexagon then press right. However, when a 
bivalent stimulus such as a black circle shows up, participants do not know which pair of 
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arguments is needed, to solve this problem; participants need an additional pair of IF-THEN 
arguments. For example, if cue == colour then applies the first pair of arguments and if cue 
== shape, then applies the second pair of arguments. According to the task-reconfiguration 
perspective, the additional pair of IF-THEN arguments in bivalent stimuli makes the task-
set more complicated than the task-set for univalent stimuli. Therefore, during task-
switching, bivalent stimuli require more cognitive resources and causes more processing 
time for task-reconfiguration.   
Proactive Interference 
Proactive interference account can also explain the difference between univalent and 
bivalent stimuli. Firstly, according to previous studies, using bivalent stimuli, proactive 
interference might have two sources. 1) It is possible that proactive interference derives 
directly from the competition of stimulus-response mappings of the previous trial (Allport 
et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 2000). 2) The interference may also come from stimulus-task-
set associations in the immediately preceding trial (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 
2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). However, univalent stimulus always has the same stimulus-
response mapping, and this stimulus-response mapping never has any direct competition. 
Hence, it is possible that, for univalent stimuli, the interference can only derive from 
stimulus-task-set associations. Consequently, the task-switching costs from univalent stimuli 
are smaller than the costs from bivalent stimuli. 
Feature-Response Mapping 
Also based on the proactive interference account, Woodward et al. (2003) proposed that 
a univalent stimulus elicits only one feature-response mapping that is unique to that stimulus, 
whereas, with bivalent stimuli, each elicits two feature-response mappings that may overlap 
the mapping of another stimulus. When working with bivalent stimuli, the task performed 
on trial n - 1 requires activating one mapping (e.g., the one for naming the colour) while at 
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the same time inhibiting or suppressing another mapping (e.g., the one for making shape 
decisions). If the inhibited or negatively primed mapping is relevant on trial n, however, 
additional time is required to reactivate it, and this results in a switching cost. Woodward et 
al. (2003) suggested that such a negative priming notion is the core of the proactive 
interference account. Additionally for univalent stimuli, this type of negative priming is less 
likely to occur. Consequently, the bivalent stimuli produce larger task-switching costs. It is 
not a novelty to suggest that a feature-response mapping may impact participants' reaction 
times. Hommel (1998), for example, has already indicated that, if the feature-response 
mappings between trial n - 1 and the trial n are mismatching, the reaction time of the current 
trial can be delayed.  
3.2 Goals and Hypotheses 
The present study explored whether univalent stimuli are truly the minimum 
requirement for bypassing task-switching costs with the LUT approach. In fact, the 
difference between univalent stimuli and bivalent stimuli is an important aspect of task-
switching studies. Thus, the result of the present study helps us to draw further conclusions 
about the mechanism of task-switching. In particular, at the end of Chapter 2, I hypothesised 
that task-switching costs may have at least two independent origins: task-set reconfiguration 
and proactive interference. In addition, task-switching costs are inescapable as long as the 
interference exists. In the present study, I sought to test those hypotheses.  
3.3 Experiment 3.1 
In the present experiment, I sought to test whether and under which condition the LUT 
approach can successfully eliminate task-switching costs. In other words, I investigated the 
minimum requirement to eliminate task-switching costs. Biased on the divergence between 
the previous studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007) and Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, I proposed 
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two potential factors that might stop participants from bypassing the task-switching costs. 
The first factor is the stimulus type (univalent or bivalent). The second factor is the number 
of stimulus-sets: a task switching experiment might include two separate stimulus-sets or 
one shared stimulus-set. This is sometimes confounded with the first factor (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. All task-switching studies with univalent stimuli must have two separate 
stimulus-sets (one set for each task). Studies with bivalent stimuli, however, can use one 
stimulus-set which is shared by two tasks. Nevertheless, it is still possible for studies with 
bivalent stimuli to include two stimulus-sets. Thus, studies with univalent stimuli is one sub-
aggregate of studies with separate stimuli-sets. 
 
 
 As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the univalent stimuli is a sub-aggregate of the separate 
stimulus-sets. To ascertain the minimum requirement to bypass task-switching costs, we 
 
        95 
need to test the entire aggregate first. The present experiment, therefore, examined whether 
the number of stimulus-sets could impact task-switching costs when participants were using 
the LUT approach. In particular, I applied the same pair of visual tasks from Experiments 
2.1 and 2.2: the colour task (whether a stimulus is mainly black or white) and the shape task 
(whether a stimulus is mainly a circle or a hexagon), and I induced participants to apply the 
LUT approach. However, this time, the experiment included two separate bivalent stimulus-
sets. In other words, each task had a unique bivalent stimulus-set and, for each stimulus, 
there was only one stimulus-response mapping. I predicted that, in the present experiment, 
if participants applied the LUT approach, they would not indicate significant task-switching 
costs.  
 The results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that the task-switching strategy allows 
participants to react more accurately than other strategies. In addition, the results of 
Dreisbach and colleagues’ (2006, 2007) studies show that participants who applied the task-
switching strategy responded slower than participants who applied the LUT approach. These 
results imply that participants who apply different strategies may have different response 
patterns. Thus, in Experiment 3.1, I sought to explore the functional differences between 
different strategies.   
To sum up, experiment 3.1 had two predictions. Firstly, I predicted that, if 
participants applied the LUT approach in the present experiment, they would not indicate 
any significant task-switching costs. Secondly, I predicted that either participants' overall 





Students from the University of Glasgow participated in this experiment (N = 15, female 
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= 11; mean age = 24, SD = 3.7, range = 21-37). Each student received £3 for their 
participation.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 
 All stimuli were presented centrally on a BenQ computer monitor (24 inches). A 
Black Box Toolkit response pad was used to record participants' responses. Participants also 
used a QWERTY keyboard to go through the instructions and to start the experiment. There 
were eight target stimuli: each task had four stimuli, and all stimuli were bivalent (see Figure 
3.2).  The size of all stimuli was 16.93 mm × 16.93 mm. There were two task cues (sized 
33.86mm × 33.86 mm; see Figure 3.2). In order to reduce eye strain, the screen background 
was light green (RGB: 200, 255, 200). 
 Notice that, in this experiment, the colour task stimuli were only displayed in a colour 
trial and the shape task stimuli were only displayed in a shape trial. However, the two 
stimulus-sets were interchangeable. Because the stimuli were bivalent, the colour task 
stimuli could theoretically show up on a shape task trial, and vice versa. Participants could 
always obtain the correct response by following the task rules correctly. 
 
Figure 3.2. Stimuli, Cue and task rules of Experiment 3.1 are summarized here. (a) The four 
colour stimuli are only presented in the colour task, and the four shape stimuli are only 
presented in the shape task. (b) The LUT shows eight stimulus-response mappings. Four 
stimuli correspond to a left key, and four to a right key response. One can obtain the correct 
answer either by applying the task rules or remembering the LUT. (c) An example of a cue-
 




Task and Timeline  
In this experiment, participants learned to perform two tasks: the colour task and the 
shape task. For the colour tasks, participants needed to determine whether the colour of a 
stimulus was mainly black or mainly white (white == press the left key; black == press the 
right key). For the shape task, participants needed to determine whether the shape of a 
stimulus was mainly a circle or mainly a hexagon (circle == press the left key; hexagon == 
press the right key; see Figure 3.2). The present experiment used a composite design. On 
each trial, the task cue and task stimulus appeared and disappeared together in the centre of 
the screen as a cue-stimulus combination (e.g., see Figure 3.2c). Once the stimulus was 
visible, a response had to be made within 2.5 seconds, or a timeout occurred. The cue-
stimulus combination would disappear immediately after a response was made; otherwise, 
it would stay on the screen for 2.5 seconds (maximum reaction time). The inter-trial interval 
(ITI) was 300 ms.  
Feedback 
On each trial, if a correct response was made, the next trial would start automatically 
after the inter-trial interval. If an incorrect response was made, the text message "Mistake" 
would show up and stay on the screen for 3 seconds before disappearing. After that, the next 
trial would start immediately. If no response was made within 2.5 seconds, the text message 
"Timeout" would be displayed and stay on the screen for 3 seconds before disappearing. 
After that, the next trial would start immediately.   
Different Stages 
 In this experiment, I tried to compare the functional difference between different 
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strategies in a within-subjects design. Therefore, it included three experiment stages and 
each stage had a different instruction to induce participants to apply different strategies.  
Stage 1 (training stage) 
 In this stage, participants were instructed that there were eight figures (the target 
stimuli). The instructions stated that the four figures on the left side of the screen 
corresponded to left key, and the four figures on the right side corresponded to the right key 
(see Figure 3.2b). Participants had to remember the figures and their corresponding keys. 
When the experiment started, on each trial, one of the target stimuli would randomly show 
up in the centre of the screen. In Stage 1, participants needed to finish a 64-trial training 
block (Figure 3.3a). 
Notice that, in Stage 1, the task cues did not show up. Stimuli in this experiment all 
have a unique stimulus-response mapping. Thus, a cue was not necessary, because the 
participant should be applying the LUT approach. The data from Stage 1 was not included 
in the analysis.  
Stage 2 
 In this stage, participants were instructed that every time a figure was shown, an 
“interference frame” would be shown at the same time. Importantly, the instruction stated 
that these interference frames were completely meaningless, and had nothing to do with 
providing a correct response. However, these interference frames were the task cues. 
Therefore, the design in Stage2 was the same as in a typical task-cueing experiment. The 
only difference was that the participants did not receive any rule-based instructions. 
Participants had to complete two 100 - trial blocks (see Figure 3.3b).  
Stage 3 
Just as in Stage2, in the Stage3, the target stimulus and the task cue were displayed 
together. This time, however, each participant was instructed that the "interference frames" 
were actually task cues. Also, the task rules were introduced and explained. As a 
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consequence, participants could either use a task-switching or an LUT approach. Participants 
completed two 100 - trial blocks (Figure 3.3b). 
 
Figure 3.3. The timelines of each stage. (a) The timeline of training stage (Stage 1), the 
stimuli disappears once a response has been made. A wrong response triggers feedback. If 
no response has been made within 2.5 seconds, a timeout feedback onsets. (b) The timelines 
of Stage 2 and Stage 3 are almost identical with the training stage (Stage 1). However, on 




The participants were asked to sign the consent form and sit in front of the computer 
screen (viewing distance around 40-60 cm). Before they started, they needed to read a 
general instruction about Experiment 3.1 on the screen. After that, they needed to complete 
the three experiment stages in order. An instruction showed up on the screen before each 
stage. After reading the instruction, participants needed to press the QWERTY keyboard to 
start the stage. After they had accomplished all three stages, they needed to orally report the 
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strategy they had applied during the experiment. After that, they received £ 3.   
3.3.2 Results 
On the one hand, it was predicted that participants in Stage 2 would not indicate 
significant task-switching costs, but participants in Stage 3 would indicate significant task-
switching costs. On the other hand, it was predicted that participants’ reaction times or error 
rates would reflect a significant difference between Stage 2 and Stage 3. The summary of 
behavioural data for each condition is listed in Table 3.1 and illustrated in Figure 3.4. Stage 
1 is a training stage, which was not included in the data analysis.   
Table 3.1 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Stage 
Conditions RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Stage2 Repeat 539 (63) 2.42% (3.6) 
Stage2 Switch 550 (69) 2.50% (3.3) 
Stage3 Repeat 725 (225) 2.23% (2.7) 
Stage3 Switch 839 (275) 3.48% (3.5) 
 
Repeat 632 (188) 2.33% (3.4) 
Switch 695 (246) 3.00% (3.1) 
 
Stage2 545 (66) 2.48% (3.3) 
Stage3 792 (252) 2.97% (2.9) 
 
Stage 2 and Stage 3  
A 2 × 2 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to compare the mean 
RTs within conditions. The two factors were the trial transition (switch, repeat) and the 
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instruction (Stage 2: look-up table instruction; Stage 3: rule-based instruction). The factor of 
trial transition [F (1, 14) = 19.78, p = .0006, η²p = .59] and the factor of instruction [F (1, 14) 
= 19.52, p = .0006, η²p = .58] were both significant.  
 The interaction between trial transition and instruction was significant [F (1, 14) = 
16.45, p = .0012, η²p = .54].  Post-hoc pairwise comparisons  with the Bonferroni correction 
suggested that the trial transition effect of 113 ms was significant in Stage 3 (p = .0041). 
However, the trial transition effect of 11 ms in Stage 2 was not significant (p = .256). 
 A corresponding 2 × 2 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to 
compare the mean error rates within conditions. The two factors were the trial transition 
(switch, repeat) and the instruction (Stage 2: look-up table instruction; Stage 3: rule-based 
instruction). There were no statistically significant results although the factor of instruction 
was approaching significant [F (1, 14) = 4.06, p =.064]. The factor of trial transition [F (1, 
14) = .48, p = .497] and the interaction between trial transition and instruction [F (1, 14) = 
2.25, p = .156] were far from significant. 
 
Figure 3.4. (a) The line graph shows mean RTs (top) and Error Rates (bottom) for each trial 
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condition (switch, repeat) and stage (Stage 2: look-up table instruction; Stage 3: rule-based 
instruction). The error bar indicates ±1 SEM. Data from Stage 1 (training stage) is not 
included. (b) The violin plots show the RT distributions in the repeat and switch conditions. 
The jittered dots inside each bean represent the average RTs of each participant. The black 
horizontal bar and the box around it represent the mean and 95% CI of the mean in each 
condition, respectively. The responses slower or quicker than 95% are represented by dots 




In an attempt to replicate the results of previous studies (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 
2007), in this experiment, participants were instructed to apply both the LUT approach 
(Stage 2) and the task-switching strategy (Stage 3). The results suggest that, after receiving 
the rule-based instruction, the participants produced significantly more task-switching costs 
in Stage 3 than in Stage 2 (113 ms vs 11 ms). In line with the previous study, the task-
switching costs were non-significant in Stage 2, when the task rules had not yet been 
introduced.  
Dreisbach and colleagues (2006, 2007) indicated that, even when participants 
mastered the LUT approach and were able to practice the experiment without any task-
switching costs, the task-switching costs returned immediately after they received the rule-
based instruction. Similarly, in the present experiment, after participants received rule-based 
task instructions in Stage 3, the task-switching costs reappeared. Participants preferred the 
task-switching strategy.  
The functional differences between Stage 2 and Stage 3 are also interesting. In 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, participants performed more accurately with a task-rule based 
strategy than with novel strategies, and the RT difference between strategies was not 
significant. In the present experiment, however, compared with the LUT approach, 
participants reacted significantly more slowly after they received the task-switching 
instruction (Stage 3), and this time the difference in error rate was negligible. A similar 
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pattern of results was also reported by Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007). This experiment 
confirms their results. However, please note that in the present experiment, the error rate 
difference between Stage 2 and Stage 3 was approaching the significant level (p = .064). 
3.4 Experiment 3.2 
So far, the results have shown that an LUT approach can eliminate task-switching 
costs as long as each task has an independent stimulus-set. Moreover, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 
2007) and Experiment 3.1 have demonstrated that the LUT approach can be better than the 
task-switching strategy because it allows participants to react more quickly. It may be argued 
that, by applying task rules or the task-switching strategy, participants can respond to a 
stimulus immediately, irrespective of how many stimuli are used. The LUT approach 
requires participants to remember the stimulus and to establish response mapping. If the 
number of stimuli is increased (e.g., 100 stimuli for each task), or if novel stimuli are used 
(e.g., see Experiment 2.2) then such a strategy would become impractical. Nevertheless, 
based on the evidence we have so far, it may be concluded that, if a task-switching 
experiment only includes a few stimuli, and each task has a separate stimulus-set then the 
LUT approach is more suitable than the task-switching strategy, because it reduces reaction 
times.  
However, drawing this conclusion may be too premature. One problem is that many 
previous studies on the LUT approach have applied a composite design where, on each trial, 
cue and stimulus onset coincide (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2006，2007; Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008; Experiment 3.1). In such a design, participants cannot prepare the task in advance. 
Therefore, the task-switching strategy may not reach its full potential. However, when each 
task has an independent stimulus-set and participants apply the LUT approach, the cue 
becomes irrelevant. As a result, whether or not the cue and stimulus are displayed together 
is not important for the LUT approach. I hypothesised that the composite design is not 
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conducive  for the task-switching strategy. Therefore, I sought to re-examine the advantages 
of the LUT approach over the task-switching strategy in a task-switching experiment with a 
cue-stimulus interval (CSI) in which the cue is displayed before the stimulus so that the 
participant has the opportunity to prepare the task in advance.  
To sum up, experiment 3.2 had three predictions. First, I hypothesised that, in the 
condition with CSI, the task-switching strategy and the LUT approach should perform 
equally well. Secondly, based on the results of Experiment 3.1, I hypothesised that, in the 
composite condition, the LUT approach should perform better than the rule-based strategy 
in terms of reaction time. Thirdly, I predicted that task-switching costs should be significant 
when participants applied the task-switching strategy, but that when participants applied the 
LUT approach, they would not indicate any task-switching costs. 
3.4.1 Method 
Participants 
Students from the University of Glasgow volunteered to participate in this experiment 
(N = 21, female = 13; mean age = 25.2, SD = 2.9, age range = 21-30 years).  
Apparatus and Stimuli  
The apparatus and stimuli remained the same as in Experiment 3.1. The only 
difference was that in Stage 3, the two task cues were displayed simultaneously, forming an 
uninformative or No-cue signal (see Figure 3.5c). Although the present experiment also had 
three stages, their timelines were slightly different from each other (Figure. 3.5). 
Procedure 
 The procedure for Experiment 3.2 was equivalent to the procedure of Experiment 
3.1: there was a general instruction at the beginning of the experiment, and there were further 
instructions at the beginning of each stage. All participants completed the three stages in the 
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same temporal order (Stage 1, followed by Stage 2, followed by Stage 3).   
Stage 1 (the composite condition) 
 Participants received a task-switching instruction. They were informed of task rules, 
the task cues and they were informed that they needed to switch between tasks. After a 20-
trial training block, they completed two experimental blocks with composite stimuli, in 
which the cue and the stimulus appeared and disappeared simultaneously. This time each 
experimental block had 75 trials.  
Stage 2 (the CSI condition) 
In Stage 2, participants performed in the CSI condition. The task rules and stimuli 
were equivalent to Stage 1, with the only difference being there was a 500 ms interval 
between the onset of the cue and the stimulus. On any given trial, the task cue appeared at 
the centre of the screen 500 ms before the stimulus onset. After a short instruction, 
participants completed two  75-trials blocks.  
 Stage 3 (the No-cue condition) 
In Stage 3, participants were instructed that switching between tasks would be 
unnecessary and that they should deduce the correct answer by applying stimulus-response 
mapping directly. In Stage 3, a No-cue signal appeared and stayed on the screen for 500 ms. 
Without a task cue, participants should not be able to apply the task-switching strategy (see 
Figure 3.5c). After 500 ms, the target stimulus was displayed at the centre of the screen. 
After receiving a short instruction, participants completed two experimental blocks, each 
block have 75 trials.   
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Figure 3.5. (a) The timeline of Stage 1 for a composite condition. (b) The timeline of Stage 
2 for a 500 ms CSI condition (c) The timeline of Stage 3 for a No-cue signal onset 500 ms 
before the stimulus onset. 
  
 
In summary, participants were first asked to perform in two task-switching rule based 
stages (Stage 1 and Stage 2). After that, participants received instructions about the LUT 
approach and then. They then performed using a LUT approach in Stage 3.  
3.4.2 Results 
I made three predictions for the present experiment. Firstly, in the composite 
condition, the LUT approach should perform better than the rule-based strategy. Hence the 
difference between Stage 1 and Stage 3 should be significant. Secondly, in the condition 
with CSI, the task rule-based strategy (task-switching strategy), and the LUT approach 
should perform equally well. Thus there should be no difference between Stage 2 and Stage 
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3. Thirdly, participants would show task-switching costs in Stage 1 and Stage 2 (the task-
switching stages), but not in Stage 3 (the LUT stage). The mean (SD) RTs and ERs for each 
condition are listed in Table 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.6. In Stage 3, the task cue was 
not informative, but each task had a unique stimulus-set. Thus, if the stimulus in trial n - 1 
and the stimulus in trial n were from the same stimulus-set, trial n was categorised as a 
repeat trial, and otherwise as a switch trial.  
Table 3.2 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Stage 
Condition RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Stage1 Repeat 923 (227) 2.86% (4.3) 
Stage1 Switch  1063 (279) 4.88% (5.2) 
Stage2 Repeat 588 (131) 3.57% (4.3) 
Stage2 Switch 629 (107) 4.21% (5.6) 
Stage3 Repeat 633 (122) 3.90% (3.6) 
Stage3 Switch 651 (134) 5.11% (3.0) 
 
Repeat 715 (218) 3.45% (4.1) 
Switch 781 (279) 4.73% (4.7) 
 
Stage1 1003 (250) 4.16% (4.8) 
Stage2 612 (123) 3.91% (4.7) 
Stage3 645 (128) 4.73% (3.1) 
 
Task-switching and Stages 
A 2 × 3 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to compare the mean RTs 
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within conditions. The two factors were the trial transition (switch, repeat) and the stage 
(Stage 1, Stage 2, and Stage 3). The two factors, the trial transition [F (1, 20) = 32.38, p 
= .0001, η²p=.62] and the stage [F (2, 40) = 58.36, p = .0001, η²p=.74) were both statistically 
significant. For the stage, the results of post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction suggested that the difference between Stage 1 and Stage 2 (p =.0001) and the 
difference between Stage 1 and Stage 3 (p = .0001) were both significant. However, there 
was no significant difference between Stage 2 and Stage 3 (p = .89). 
The interaction between trial transition and stage was significant. F (2, 40) = 13.37, p 
= .0001, η²p = .40. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Holm-Bonferroni correction were 
conducted to examine the trial transition in each stage. The Bonferroni correction can be too 
conservative when comparing more than five different conditions. The Holm-Bonferroni 
correction can largely increase the statistical power (Holm, 1979). 
The result of the post-hoc test suggested that the trial transition effect of 140 ms was 
significant in Stage 1 (p = .0001). Although the difference between switch trial and repeat 
trial was reduced to 41 ms in Stage 2, it remained statistically significant (p = .048). However 
in Stage 3, the trial transition effect of 18 ms was no longer statistically significant (p = .37). 
In other words, the task-switching costs disappeared in Stage 3. The p-values of the pairwise 
comparisons are listed in Table 3.3.  
A 2 × 3 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted on the error rates. The 
factor of trial transition was significant [F (1, 20) = 11.53, p =.0028, η²p = .36]. The factor 
of stage was not statistically significant [F (2, 40) = .256, p =.776]. The interaction between 
trial transition and stage was not significant [F (2, 40) = .849, p =. 435]. A further paired t-
test suggested that the difference between switch trials and repeat trials was not statistically 
significant in Stage 3, t (21) = 1.88, p = .075 (see Figure 3.6). 
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Table 3.3.  
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Figure 3.6. (a) The line graphs illustrate the mean RTs (top) and mean ERs (bottom) in each 
condition (switch, repeat; Stage 1, Stage 2, Stage 3). The error bars denote ±1 SEM. (b) The 
violin plots illustrate the RT distributions in the repeat and switch conditions for each stage. 
The jittered dots inside each bean represent the average RTs of each participant. The black 
horizontal bar and the box around it represent the mean and 95% CI of the mean in each 
condition, respectively. The responses slower or quicker than 95% are represented by dots 
above and below the error bars. 
 




The results of Experiment 3.2 confirm the preceding prediction. I found that 
participants show significant task-switching costs in Stage 1 and Stage 2 (the task-switching 
stages), but not in Stage 3 (the LUT stage). In Stage 3, there was no significant task-
switching cost. Since there was no task cue, participants were less likely to apply the task-
switching strategy in Stage 3, and the LUT approach was the default strategy. However, 
please remember that, in Stage 3, the task-switching costs in terms of error rates approached 
significance (p = .075). One initial hypothesis is that, even when participants applied the 
LUT approach, it was still possible for them to receive interference from task-relevant 
features (see the general discussion section). 
In addition, I found that, in a composite design (Stage 1), the task-switching strategy 
lead to slower RTs than the LUT approach. In fact, in the composite condition, even the 
repeat trials were slower than the switch trials in the LUT approach condition (see Table 
3.3). However, in Stage 2, when there was a sufficiently long preparation period (500 ms 
CSI), the task switching strategy was as fast as the LUT approach. In line with previous 
studies (e.g., Schneider & Logan, 2007; Verbruggen et al., 2007; Forrest et al., 2014; 
Schneider, 2016), the present experiment also indicates a relationship between preparation 
period and task-switching costs. With sufficient preparation, the RT task-switching costs 
were reduced from 140 ms to 41 ms as indicated by the results in Stage1 and Stage 2.  
 The results of Experiment 3.2 suggest that, if participants have sufficient CSI, then 
participants can perform as well with the task-switching strategy as with the LUT approach. 
However, the present study only had a fixed CSI of 500 ms. In a future replication study 
with different CSIs, one will be able to determine exactly how much preparation time is 
 
        111 
required for the task-switching strategy to match the LUT approach. This may help to 
determine how long it takes to apply task rules and/or to reconfigure the task-set.  
3.5 Experiment 3.3 
Participants in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 applied two different strategies: the task-
switching strategy and the LUT approach. The results of Stage 3 in Experiment 3.1 suggested 
that, when the task cue was available, participants tended to apply the task-switching 
strategy. In contrast, the results of Stage 3 in Experiment 3.2 suggested that when the task 
cue was unavailable, participants tended to apply the LUT approach. These preferences 
between strategies I found in Experiment 3.1 and 3.2 provide an opportunity to observe 
participants’ behaviour patterns when they switch between different strategies/approaches. 
One previous study pointed out that switching between strategies can trigger a strategy-
switching cost (Luwel et al., 2009).  
In summary, in Experiment 3.3, I investigated three predictions. Firstly, I predicted 
that task-switching costs should be significant when participants applied a task-switching 
strategy. Secondly, this experiment sought to replicate the strategy-switching cost. I 
predicted that, when participants were switching between strategies, they would be subject 
to strategy-switching costs. Finally, I attempted to replicate the results of Experiment 3.2. I 
predicted that when there is a sufficiently long preparation period (e.g., 500 ms CSI), the 
rule-based strategy, and the LUT approach should perform equally well.  
3.5.1 Method  
Participants 
Students from the University of Glasgow participated in this experiment (N = 16, female 
= 12; mean age = 23, SD = 1.71, range = 20-26 years). Each student received £3.  
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Timelines for Each Stage 
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         The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 3.2. Experiment 3.3 also 
had three stages, and each stage had a slightly different timeline. 
Stage 1 (the composite condition)     
 In Stage 1, on any given trial, a task cue and a target stimulus would be displayed 
together (composite condition). Participants received task-rule based instructions at the 
beginning. First, participants completed 20 training trials. After that, they completed two 
blocks of 100 trials each. The participants were given the same feedbacks as in Experiments 
3.1 and 3.2. 
Stage 2 (the training stage) 
         In this stage, participants were instructed that the task rule was not necessary, because 
they could obtain the correct response based on stimulus-response mapping (the LUT 
approach). This stage was the same as Stage 1 in Experiment 3.2. On any given trial, the 
target stimulus was displayed without a task cue. First, participants needed to complete a 20-
trial training block first before they performed in an additional 64 trial training block. The 
intention of Stage 2 was to help participants remember all stimulus-response mappings. The 
data from Stage 2 was not included in the data analysis. 
Stage 3 
         This was the main stage of the present experiment. At the beginning, participants 
were instructed that, in any given trial during Stage 3,two different situations would occur 
randomly. In the first situation (the No-cue condition), a No-cue signal would show up and 
stay on the screen for 500 ms, and after that the target stimulus would onset at the centre of 
the screen. Participants could then start to make a response. I  believed that participants 
would be more likely to apply the LUT approach in this situation. In the second situation 
(the Cued condition), a real task cue would show up and stay at the centre of the screen for 
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500ms, and after that the stimulus would show up on the centre of the task cue (see Figure 
3.7 for both situations). Participants needed to accomplish two 100-trial blocks on Stage 3. 
It was believed that participants would be more likely to apply the rule-based strategy in this 
situation. Therefore, if trial n - 1 and trial n have the same situation, then trial n is a strategy-
repeat trial. Otherwise, trial n is a strategy-switch trial.   
 
Figure 3.7. (a) In the Cued condition, a real task cue onset 500 ms before the stimulus onset. 




       The procedure of Experiment 3.3 was identical to the procedure of Experiment 1. 
There was a general instruction at the beginning of the experiment, and then there were 
further instructions at the beginning of each stage. Participants were required to complete all 
three stages in the same temporal order.     
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3.5.2 Results 
It was predicted that, in Stage 1, participants would show clear task-switching costs. 
In Stage 3, it was predicted that alternating between the Cued situation and No-cue situation 
would cause a longer RT or/and higher error rate than repeating the same situation. 
Moreover, it was predicted that participants would perform as well in the No-cue situation 
as in  the Cued situation. The second block was not included in the data analyses because it 
was mainly a practice stage to help participants remember the stimulus-response mapping. 
See Table 3.4 for the mean RTs and ERs for each condition. 
Table 3.4 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Stage 
Condition RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Stage1 Repeat 702 (168) 1.15% (1.2) 
Stage1 Switch  804 (223) 1.20% (2.4) 
 
Stage3 No-Cue 514 (52) 1.76% (1.9) 
Stage3 Cued 502 (71) 1.52% (1.1) 
   
Stage3 Straegy Repeat 503 (57) 1.27% (1.1) 
Stage3 Straregy Switch 512 (62) 1.87% (2.1) 
 
Stage 1: Task-switching Costs 
A paired t-test showed that on average in Stage 1, the switch trials were significantly 
slower than the repeat trials, (t (15) = 4.56, p =.0004; see Figure 3.8).The equivalent t-test 
on error rates was not statistically significant [t (15) = 1.37, p = .19]. 
No-cue Situation, Cued Situation and Stage 1 
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In addition, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with repeated measurments on RTs to 
compare differences amongst the overall RTs in Stage 1 (i.e., the rule-based strategy under 
composite condition), the RTs of the No-cue situation  in Stage 3 (i.e., the LUT condition) 
and the reaction times of the Cued situation from Stage 3 (i.e., the rule-based strategy under 
CSI condition). The result suggested that there is a significant difference [F (2, 30) = 37.15, 
p =.0001, η²p=.49]. The results of post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction suggested that the difference between Stage1 and the No-cue situation was 
significant (p = .001; see Figure 3.8), and the difference between Stage1 and the Cued 
situation was significant (p = .001). However, the difference between the No-cue situation 
and the Cued situation was non-significant (p = 0.89; see figure 3.8). An equivalent ANOVA 
was applied to examine differences between error rates. No statistically significant 
differences were found (see Figure 3.8). 
Stage 3: Strategy-switching Costs 
Paired t-tests showed that, in Stage 3, the strategy-switch trials and the strategy- 
repeat trials have no significant difference: RT: (t (15) = 1.72, p =.11); Error Rate: (t (15) = 
1.63, p =.12). 
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Figure 3.8. The bar graph indicates the mean reaction time for each condition (switch, 
repeat; No-Cue, Cued; strategy switch, strategy repeat). Error bars denote ±1 SEM. The red 
line shows the mean RT for Stage 1. 
  
 
3.5.3 Discussion     
Similarly to Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 the results of the present experiment indicated 
significant task-switching costs when participants received a rule-based instruction. In 
addition, in Stage 3, there was no statistically significant difference between the Cued-
situation and the No-cue situation. The results of Stage 3 replicated the results of Experiment 
3.2: when there was a sufficiently long preparation period, the rule-based strategy was as 
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good as the LUT approach.  
The present experiment cannot replicate the strategy-switching costs from Luwel et 
al. (2009). In their study, participants were required to determine the number of coloured 
blocks in a 10 × 10 grid. Participants applied two main strategies. Firstly, when there were 
few coloured blocks and many empty squares, participants typically used the addition 
strategy, in which the coloured blocks were added to determine the total numerosity. 
Secondly, when there were many coloured blocks and few empty squares, participants 
applied the subtraction strategy: the number of empty squares is subtracted from the total 
number of squares in the grid. As a consequence, in Luwel et al. (2009), participants could 
not prepare their strategy before the stimuli onset. In the present experiment, because the 
task cues and No-cue signal were presented 500 ms before the stimulus, participants may 
have selected a strategy in advance. Perhaps it is the preparation period that eliminates 
strategy-switching costs. 
3.6 General Discussion 
With only a few minor changes, the present study successfully replicates Dreisbach 
et al.’s (2006, 2007) major discovery. Using the LUT approach, participants can eliminate 
task-switching costs. Nevertheless, please remember that the error rate for task-switching 
costs in Experiment 3.2 Stage 3 approached statistical significance t (21) = 1.88, p = .075. 
In Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, I have generalised Dreisbach and colleagues’ (2006, 2007) 
results using two visual tasks instead of two linguistic tasks. Furthermore, the results of the 
present study suggest that regardless of the stimulus type (bivalent or univalent), as long as 
each task has a different stimulus-set, the LUT approach will eliminate task-switching costs 
in a task-switching paradigm. 
 Moreover, in line with Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007), my experiments show 
that participants can use the LUT approach to eliminate task-switching costs. Immediately 
 
        118 
after they have received the instructions for task rules, however, task-switching costs return, 
as was the case Experiment 3.1 Stage 3. In Stage 3 of Experiment 3.1, participants only 
received information about the task rules, without any explicit requirement to use a rule-
based strategy. In fact, the instructions specifically stated that participants were free to 
choose any strategy they wanted to use. Dreisbach et al. (2007) believed that their results 
confirmed that applying task rules was an automatic process. Here, I propose that it is also 
possible that participants just preferred to apply a rule-based strategy over the LUT 
approach. Given the fact that, in real life, each task might include an infinite number of 
stimuli, always using a rule-based strategy by default may be a straightforward way to solve 
any problem.  
3.6.1 The Composite and CSI Conditions 
Dreisbach et al. (2006) indicated that in a composite design experiment, switching 
between tasks requires longer reaction times than simply memorising all eight stimulus-
response mappings. I fully agree with their observation, but from the present study I 
conclude, that with sufficient preparation time, participants can perform task-switching as 
quickly as using the LUT approach. 
In the composite condition (e.g., Stage 1 of Experiment 3.2), even the repeat trials were 
slower than the LUT approach. I suspect that the delay in RT for the task-switching strategy 
reflects additional rule processing. Participants need to process the relevant task rules before 
they can determine the correct response. However, the  LUT approach associates the 
stimulus and the response directly. Therefore, it can be a simpler and quicker strategy 
(Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007). Nevertheless, such an additional rule processing is not a 
disadvantage under conditions with increased CSI. The results of the present study provide 
evidence that providing a sufficiently long CSI, the RTs for both strategies are equally quick.  
3.6.2 Task-switching Costs and Strategies 
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One of the most important features of the  Experiments from Chapters 2 and 3 is that 
when the instructions were manipulated, participants performed the task-switching 
experiments without having an explicit understanding of the task rules. The results of 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and the present study reveal two important differences. Firstly, in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, none of the participants applied the LUT approach: participants 
either applied the task-switching strategy, or developed novel rule-based strategies. 
However, in the present study, no meaningful novel strategy was reported by the participants 
after each experiment. All participants applied the LUT approach when the task-switching 
strategy was unavailable as for example in Experiment 3.1 Stages 1 and 2 and Experiment 
3.2 Stage 3. 
Secondly, even without explicit understanding of the tasks and task-sets, significant 
task-switching costs were observed in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. However, in Experiments 
3.1 and 3.2, the task-switching costs disappeared when the participants reported that they 
did not have an explicit understanding of the tasks. 
Features and Strategies 
In order to explain the difference mentioned above, we need to interpret the task-
switching paradigm from a slightly different angle. No matter what strategy participants 
applied during the experiment, they had to identify the stimulus and recall the relevant 
response key assigned to it. In this section, I will explain how the features of the stimulus 
may affect stimulus-response identification. 
Usually, studies only discuss the features of the stimuli that are related to tasks: the 
univalent stimuli only included the information (feature) for one task, but bivalent stimuli 
convey information for two tasks. However, a stimulus may also contain “irrelevant” 
information if the task-switching experiments apply separate stimulus-sets. For example, in 
the present study, the typical perspective would be that each stimulus carries both colour and 
shape information because the stimuli are bivalent. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, 
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it is noticeable that each stimulus may also include information beyond both tasks. For 
example, the number of geometrical shapes in a stimulus and the orientation of a stimulus 
are features that are independent of the task-relevant information. This gives each stimulus 
a unique feature that is unrelated to any task: non-task-relevant feature. In a task-switching 
experiment with separate stimulus-sets, there must be at least one additional feature in each 
stimulus. Otherwise, the stimuli in the colour task and the stimuli in the shape task would be 
identical, and the experiments would become shared stimulus-set experiments, as in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2.  
Since each non-task-relevant feature was unique in this study, the task-relevant 
features could be easily covered up by that non-task-relevant feature. For example, for the 
stimulus in Figure 3.9, participants could quickly apply the non-task-relevant feature and 
identify the stimulus: Mercedes-Benz == left. The colour feature of the stimulus (mainly 
black) and the shape feature of the stimulus (mainly a circle) is no longer important. From 
another perspective, in a separate stimulus-sets experiment, it is possible to associate the 
stimulus with the response with a single IF-THEN argument. As a consequence, the LUT 
approach is easy to apply: simply establish eight single IF-THEN arguments to form 
associations between non-task-relevant features and the correct response. 
Similarly, we can also explain why all participants applied the LUT approach in the 
univalent stimuli study (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007) in which eight German words were 
applied: four words for Task 1 and four for Task 2. Participants could simply associate the 
words with the response key. For example, one can apply the IF-THEN rule: if “bett” (bed) 
then press left, without even thinking about whether the word "bed" is an animal or not. The 
task-relevant feature is not important, and a single IF-THEN argument can solve the 
problem. 
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Figure 3.9. The eight stimuli and their task-relevant feature-response mappings (colour and 
shape features). Since the present study applied separate task stimulus-sets, only one task-
relevant feature-response mapping was shown during the experiment (highlighted in grey in 
the two columns on the left). The other associations are implied only. The column on the 
right lists possible non-task-relevant features with responses. Participants can make a correct 
response by employing the non-task-relevant features directly. The monikers lists in the right 
columns, like Mercedes and Solar Eclipse were picked up from post experiment oral reports. 
They are for illustrative purposes only, as each participant created unique monikers. 
 
 
In contrast, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 two tasks shared one stimulus-set. 
Therefore, non-task-relevant features were not available. In Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, each 
stimulus is a combination of the task cue and the target stimulus. Hence, to identify each 
cue-stimulus combination, participants had to process both the task-relevant features (i.e., 
the colour and the shape of a target stimuli) and the task cues. In other words, they needed 
to process three layers of information before they were able to deduce the correct response 
from a cue-stimulus combination. This is always true no matter which strategy the 
participants applied. 
 Moreover, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, the same task-relevant feature could be 
associated with different responses. For example, a white target stimulus could be associated 
with the left key or the right key. In addition, a hexagon could be associated with the right 
key or the left key. Also, even the same task cues can be associated with the left key or the 
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right key. As a consequence, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, obtaing the correct response with 
a single IF-THEN argument is impossible. Additional conjunction rules were required (see 
Figure 3.10). Therefore, the LUT approach is not practical in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. In 
this view, the different strategies I found in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 reflect the different sets 
of conjunctive rules that participants used to identify each cue-stimulus in order to give the 
correct response. 
 
Figure 3.10. The three boxes summarise three possible strategies identified in Experiment 
2.1. (a) The task-switching strategy. (b) The “Black and White” strategy. (c) The “Circle and 
Hexagon” strategy. All strategies require more than one IF-THEN argument in order to 
deduce the correct response key.  
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In short, I propose that, in the present study, the non-task-relevant feature of the 
stimuli allowed participants to deduce the correct response to a stimulus using a single IF-
THEN argument. In this context, the LUT approach is simpler and more straightforward to 
use. However, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, participants had to apply additional conjunction 
rules before they could associate the stimulus with the correct answer. Thus, applying a 
simple LUT approach would have been very difficult, if not impossible.  
Interference between Features 
In the previous section, I concluded that, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, participants 
have to process both task-relevant features before they can deduce the correct response. In 
this section, based on this conclusion, I attempt to explain the unexpected task-switching 
costs in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and the absence of task-switching costs in Experiments 3.1 
and 3.2. 
Although rarely mentioned explicitly by Allport and colleagues (Allport et al., 1994; 
Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 
2007; Koch & Allport, 2006), Woodward et al. (2003) proposed that the proactive 
interference account is based on task-relevant features. According to Woodward and 
colleagues (2003), the task performed on trial n - 1 (e.g., colour task) requires activating one 
feature-response mapping (e.g., white == left) while at the same time inhibiting or negatively 
priming another feature-response mapping (e.g., hexagon == right). If, however the inhibited 
or negatively primed mapping is useful on trial n, additional time is required to reactivate it, 
and this results in a switching cost. This interpretation implies that without processing both 
task-relevant features, there would be no interference.  
This could explain why participants in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 always showed task-
switching costs, even when they were not applying the task-switching strategy. In these 
experiments participants always process the task-relevant features. Therefore, it is 
unavoidable that they will receive proactive interference from the previous trial. In the 
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present chapter, when participants apply the LUT approach, the task-relevant features can 
be concealed by non-task-relevant features. Consequently, if participants do not apply the 
task-switching strategy, they may not experience interference either. Therefore, they can 
avoid both the task-set reconfiguration process and interference from the previous trial, so 
that task-switching costs are eliminated. The task-switching costs in terms of error rates in 
Experiment 3.2 Stage 3 approached statistical significance, t (21) = 1.88, p = .075. Perhaps, 
even with the non-task-relevant features, sometimes participants still process the task-
relevant features.   
This explanation assumes that the interference from the previou trial produces task-
switching costs, without any task-set or reconfiguration process. However, some proactive 
interference studies considered interference as a consequence of task-set (Waszak et al., 
2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). In order to confirm the hypothesis 
that interference can be independent of the task-set, I will demonstrate in Experiment 5.1 
that, even when tasks based on task-switching strategy no longer exist, the interference from 
stimuli alone can still produce task-switching costs. I propose a modified interference 
account in Chapter 5. 
3.6.3 Semantic Stimuli Can Hide Task-relevant Features 
Forrest et al. (2014) eliminated task-switching costs in their study. They also used a 
shared stimulus-set. In other words, as in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, both tasks shared the 
same task-sets. Based on my hypothesis from the previous section, even if Forrest et al. 
(2014) had managed to eliminate the task-set reconfiguration process, the interference would 
have still produced task-switching costs. However, this is not what happened in their 
Experiment 2. To fully explain Forrest et al.’s (2014) results, we need to consider another 
factor, the nature of semantic stimuli.  
Forrest et al. (2014) applied two numerical tasks: the odd/even task and the big/small 
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task, with numbers as stimuli. Therefore, the task-relevant information was semantic in 
nature: the parity and the magnitude of a number. However, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, the 
task-relevant features were visual colour and the shape of the stimulus. One possibility is 
that semantic information is less prominent/immediate than visual features. Therefore, not 
every participant in Forrest et al. (2014) may have processed the task-relevant information. 
Some participants may have identified the number as a single unit and obscured the task-
relevant information in the stimuli. Thus, those participants do not experienced  interference 
from task-relevant features. This may explain why some participants in Forrest et al., (2014) 
had no task-switching costs. Other participants may have experienced interference from 
task-relevant information. Hence, their result are not consistent. I will examine this 
explanation further in Chapter 4.  
3.6.4 Summary and Preview of Chapter 4  
In summary, based on the differences between Chapter 2 and the present study, I propose 
that eliminating the task-switching strategy alone does not rule out task-switching costs. 
Unless participants also avoid the interference that is triggered by task-relevant features, 
task-switching costs remain. Finally, I suggest that there are two ways to avoid the 
processing of task-relevant features and interference. Firstly, for separate stimulus-sets 
experiments such as Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, it is possible to use non-task-relevant features 
to form the stimulus-response mapping directly. Thus, no task-relevant features are involved. 
The results of Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 support this explanation. Secondly, for shared 
stimulus-set experiments, I hypothesised that, if the tasks were semantic, participants might 
be able to obscure the task-relevant features in stimuli. I will provide direct evidence in 
support of the second hypothesis in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Do Semantic Task-Relevant Features In Remove Task-Switching? 
Task-switching costs can be elusive. Dreisbach (2012) in her review article, 
questioned whether participants even need to apply a task-switching strategy in the first 
place. Why not just directly memorise all stimulus-response mappings (or, if the stimuli are 
bivalent, cue-stimulus-response mappings) thereby avoiding task-switching altogether? By 
doing so, task-switching costs should be eliminated. Given the fact that a conventional task-
switching paradigm only includes a very limited number of stimuli, this “Look-up table” 
(LUT) approach seems to be a likely contender. In fact, Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) 
demonstrated that, when the stimuli were univalent, participants who applied the LUT 
strategy were able to respond even more quickly than participants who applied a task-
switching strategy. 
Nevertheless, previous findings have suggested that such an approach does not work 
consistently if both tasks share the same stimulus-sets (Forrest et al., 2014; see also 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2). Using a shared stimulus-set design, even without explicitly 
realising the task rules and without switching between tasks, participants can still show 
reliable task-switching costs. However, Forrest et al., (2014) in their second experiment 
found no statistically significant task-switching costs, [F (1, 15) = 3.39, p = .086, 
η2G=.00372]. In Chapter 3, I hypothesised that, without task-switching, the corresponding 
task-set reconfiguration process can be eliminated. Nevertheless, participants cannot 
completely eliminate task-switching costs, because interference between task-relevant 
features can still produce task-switching costs.  
In Chapter 3, I suggested that there are two possible ways to eliminate the 
interference from task-relevant features. Firstly, if non-task-relevant features are available, 
one can avoid identifying the task-relevant features by corresponding the non-task-relevant 
features with the response directly. The results in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 provide clear 
evidence for this explanation. When participants in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 used the non-
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task-relevant features instead of the task-relevant features their task-switching costs 
disappeared.   
However, this method only worked for the separate stimulus-sets experiments. This 
is because, when both tasks share the same stimulus-set, participants will always need 
conjunctive rules to obtain the correct responses. Participants have to identify all task-
relevant features in order to apply those conjunctive rules in a shared stimulus-set design as 
in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2: participants cannot apply the LUT approach in a shared 
stimulus-set design, and therefore task-switching costs appear to be unavoidable. 
In Chapter 3, I hypothesised, that in a shared stimulus-set design, a possible 
exception in which task-switching costs may be avoidable is an experiment with semantic 
tasks (e.g., Forrest et al., 2014). This is because, when dealing with semantic tasks, the task-
relevant features are all semantic (e.g., the meaning of a word or the parity of a number). 
When the task-relevant features are semantic, it may be possible to obscure the task-relevant 
features in the stimuli. For example, if the stimulus following a task cue is the digit 8, then 
participants may associate a response key with this cue-number combination. Consequently, 
they may not realise the semantic task-relevant feature of the number (e.g., 8 is an even 
number or 8 is a number larger than 5). Thus, they should be immune to interference from 
task-relevant features. This suggests an alternative method with which to bypass task-
relevant features. In the following study, I sought to provide evidence for this strategy. 
4.1 Simplified and Traditional Chinese Numbers  
In the following two experiments, I invited Chinese and non-Chinese speakers and 
used numbers written in simplified and traditional Chinese characters as stimuli. Simplified 
Chinese characters is the standardised simplification of Traditional Chinese characters 
promulgated in the 1950s by the Chinese government. These contain the existing Simplified 
Chinese characters that are in use today, while Traditional Chinese characters, are used less 
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often nowadays. In the following experiments, “Chinese participants” are participants who 
can read and speak Chinese fluently and “non-Chinese participants” are participants who 
cannot read or speak Chinese at all. In the following sections I call these participants 
“Chinese” and “non-Chinese” participants, for short.  
4.2. Experiment 4.1  
The challenge in the present experiment was to create a shared stimulus-set in which 
some participants easily identified the task-relevant features, whereas for other participants 
identifying the task-relevant features was impossible. I used language proficiency to 
manipulate the identification of task-relevant features. The present experiment applied two 
standard numerical tasks: an odd/even task and a big/small task. Forrest et al. (2014) applied 
the same two tasks in their experiments. In the present experiment, the task stimuli (i.e., four 
numbers) and two task cues were written in simplified Chinese. Hence, it was only possible 
for participants who knew and understood written Chinese to identify the task-relevant 
features. I predicted that, similarly to participants in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, Chinese 
participants would show significant task-switching costs with or without the task-switching 
rules being made explicit.  
More importantly, for participants who do not understand Chinese, the task stimuli 
and task cues should be meaningless symbols. Consequently, non-Chinese participants 
should not be able to identify the task-relevant features in these stimuli (i.e., the magnitude 
or parity of a Chinese number). Unsurprisingly, rather than applying the task-switching 
strategy, they should use the LUT approach instead. In other words, they should match the 
Chinese symbols entirely by  shape and respond according to the LUT approach. They 
should not indicate any task-switching costs. 
Apart from task-switching costs, previous studies have suggested that, in the absence 
of task rules, humans (Forrest et al., 2014), monkeys (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Caselli & 
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Chelazzi, 2011) and pigeons (Meier et al., 2016) still consistently show congruency effects. 
Therefore, Experiment 4.1 also examined whether or not human participants exhibited 
congruency effects after controlling the task-switching strategy. 
In summary, Experiment 4.1 examined three hypotheses. Firstly, I predicted that 
Chinese participants would have significant task-switching costs, while non-Chinese 
participants would not. Secondly, I predicted that both Chinese and non-Chinese participants 
would show a congruency effect. Finally, I predicted that all non-Chinese participants should 
apply the LUT approach, but Chinese participants might apply both the LUT approach and 
the task switching strategy.    
4.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Fifteen Chinese and eighteen non-Chinese (N = 33, female = 24; mean age = 23, SD 
= 4.48) students from the University of Glasgow participated in Experiment 1. Each 
participant received £3 for their participation. The Chinese participants were all Chinese 
international students. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
All stimuli were presented at the centre of a BenQ computer monitor (24 inches). A 
Black Box Toolkit response pad was used to record participants' responses and reaction 
times. Participants also used a QWERTY keyboard to go through the instructions and to start 
the experiment. The four target stimuli were the numbers 4, 5, 6, 7 written in simplified 
Chinese characters: 四，五，六 and 七 respectively. Both tasks shared the same stimulus-set. 
The two task cues were also simplified Chinese characters: 质 (quality) == the cue for the 
odd/even task; 量 (quantity) == the cue for the big/small task. The size of each Chinese 
character was 16.93 mm × 16.93 mm. All stimuli were green (RGB: 0, 255, 0) on a black 
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screen (RGB: 0, 0, 0) to avoid eye strain. 
Task and Timeline 
In Experiment 4.1, each participant performed the odd/even task and the big/small 
task in a single trial. For the odd/even task, the participants needed to decide whether a 
number was an odd number or an even number (odd == press left key on the response pad; 
even == press right key on the response pad). For the big/small task, a participant needed to 
decide whether a number was smaller than 5.5 or bigger than 5.5 (small == press left key; 
big == press right key). Experiment 4.1 used a composite design. In each trial, the task cue 
and task stimuli appeared simultaneously on the screen. The number was presented at the 
bottom, and the task cue was presented at the top (see Figure 4.1b). Once the stimulus 
appeared, a response had to be made within 2.5 seconds or a timeout error occurred. The 
cue-stimulus combination disappeared immediately after a response was made. Otherwise, 
the cue and stimulus would stay on the screen until the maximum reaction time of 2.5 
seconds was reached. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 300 ms. 
Feedback 
If a correct response was given, the next trial would be initiated after the ITI. If an 
incorrect response was given, the text message "Mistake" would show up and stay on the 
screen for 3 seconds before disappearing. After that, the next trial would start immediately. 
If no response was given within 2.5 seconds, the text message "Timeout" would appear and 
stay on the screen for 3 seconds before disappearing. After that, the next trial would start 
immediately (see Figure 4.1).   
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Figure 4.1. On the left, the illustration of the timelines of Experiment 4.1. (b) All eight cue-
stimulus combinations in green and their correct response keys in cyan. The top part of each 




The participants were asked to sign a consent form and sit in front of the computer 
screen (viewing distance 40-60 cm). Before the experiment, both Chinese and non-Chinese 
participants received non-task rule-based instructions. These instructions listed all 
associations between the cue-stimulus combinations and response keys, and required 
participants to memorise these. For Chinese participants, the instructions were in Chinese, 
and for non-Chinese participants, the instructions were in English. The content of the 
instructions was exactly the same for all participants. The experiment consisted of one block 
with 20 training trials, followed by four experimental blocks with 75 trials, giving a total of 
300 experimental trials. Finally, each participant was asked to report the strategy they 
applied during the experiment. After the experiment, each participant received a payment of 
£3.   
4.2.2 Results 
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 There were five non-Chinese participants who had extremely high error rates 
(ranging from 39% to 49%) in the incongruence condition (this is not significantly different 
from pure random guessing). Their data was therefore excluded from the analyses (N non-
Chinese speaker = 18 – 5 = 13). The mean RTs and ERs with SDs for each condition and 
group are provided in Table 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.2. It was predicted that, for non-
Chinese participants, the task-switching costs should not be significant and the mean RTs of 
954 ms for repeat and 950 ms for switch trials confirm this (Table 4.1). However, for Chinese 
participants, the task-switching costs were substantial, with a difference of 96 ms (1038 ms 
- 942 ms) between the switch and repeat trials. It was predicted that both Chinese and non-
Chinese participants would show significant congruency effects.    
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Table 4.1 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition and Language Group 
  Chinese   Non-Chinese  
Condition/Group RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Repeat Congruent 927 (143) 4.53% (5.2) 823 (132) 6.6% (5.7) 
Repeat Incongruent 955 (169) 8.06% (6.8) 1109 (192)  28.7% (13.1) 
Switch Congruent 1029 (147) 5.34% (5.6) 838 (185) 6.9% (7.1) 
Switch Incongruent 1048 (120) 8.76% (5.7) 1076 (179) 25.7% (13.6) 
 
Repeat 942 (139) 6.32% (5.2) 954 (141) 18.6% (8.8) 
Switch 1038 (139) 7.03% (5.4) 950 (173) 16.3% (9.0) 
 
Congruent 990 (139) 4.94% (5.4) 832 (153) 6.9% (6.3) 
Incongruent 1006 (134) 8.36% (5.1) 1091 (182) 27.0% (12.6) 
 
Total 998(123) 6.66% (.052) 953 (159) 13.31% (6.5) 
 
Task-switching, Congruency and Language Group 
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted to compare the mean RTs 
between and within conditions. The two within-subjects factors were trial transition (switch, 
repeat) and congruency (congruent, incongruent). The between-subjects factor was language 
group (Chinese, Non-Chinese). The two within-subjects factors of trial transition [F (1, 26) 
= 10.49, p = .0033, η2p = .29] and congruency [F (1, 26) = 35.87, p = .0001, η2p = .58] were 
both statistically significant. However. the between-subjects factor of language group was 
not significant [F (1, 26) = .28, p = .598].  
The interaction between the trial transition and language group was significant [F (1, 
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26) = 12.8, p = .0013, η2p = .33]. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction suggested that that the task-switching effect amongst Chinese participants was 
significant (p = .0001). However, it was not significant amongst non-Chinese participants (p 
= .83). The interaction between the congruency effect and language group was also 
significant [F (1, 26) = 27.91, p = .0001, η2p = .52] (see next section for further analysis of 
this interaction). The interaction between switching and congruency [F (1, 26) = 1.37, p 
= .251] and the interaction amongst all three factors was not significant [F (1, 26) = .748, p 
= .395].  
An equivalent 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with mixed effects was conducted to compare the 
mean error rates amongst different conditions. Overall, the within-subjects factor of 
congruency was significant [F (1, 26) = 102.87, p = .0001, η2p = .80], and the between-
subjects factor of language group was also significant [F (1, 26) = 9.25, p = .00542, η2p 
= .26]. However, the within-subjects factor of trial transition was not significant [F (1, 26) 
=.428, p =.519].  
There was a significant interaction between congruency and language group [F (1, 
26) = 43.95, p = .0001, η2p = .62]. Other interactions were not significant (p > .05). The main 
results of the ANOVAs on RT and ER are illustrated in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. 
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Figure 4.2. (a) The line graph shows the mean RTs (top) and error rates (bottom) for each 
condition (switch, repeat; congruent [Con], incongruent [Inc]; Chinese speaker, non-Chinese 
speaker). The error bar indicates ±1 SEM. (b) The violin plots illustrate the RT distributions 
for the repeat and switch conditions. The jittered dots inside each bean represent the average 
RTs for each participant. The black box and horizontal bar at the centre represent the mean 
and 95% CI of the mean, respectively. (c) Violin plots illustrate the RT distributions in the 
congruent and incongruent conditions for each group. 
 
 
Congruency Effect and Language Group  
To examine the interaction between congruency and language group in detail, post-
hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) were applied. The results suggest that, for 
Chinese participants, the RT congruency effect was not statistically significant (p = .59) 
whereas for non-Chinese participants, the RT congruency effect was significant (p = .005). 
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Similarly, the ER congruency effect was not statistically significant for Chinese participants 
(p = .89). In contrast, for non-Chinese participants, the ER congruency effect was significant 
(p = .0001).  
The error-rates also indicated that the difference between Chinese and non-Chinese 
participants was not significant in the congruent condition (p = .94), but highly significant 
in the incongruent condition (p = .0001). The interactions are shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3. The line graph shows the RT and error-rate interaction between congruency 




Contrary to the prior prediction, nobody applied the LUT approach. All Chinese 
participants reported that they applied a task-switching strategy in the experiment. In 
contrast, all non-Chinese participants reported that they applied a “bottom first” (BF) 
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strategy. In any given trial, non-Chinese participants looked at the bottom part of the cue-
stimulus combination first (i.e., the Chinese numbers). If the bottom was 五 (5), they pressed 
the left key immediately. If the bottom was 六 (6), they pressed the right key immediately.  
For numbers 五 and 六, the top part of the combination (i.e., the task cue) was irrelevant 
because they were congruent stimuli and shared the same response key in both tasks. If the 
bottom was 四 or 七, the correct answer was determined by the top of the cue-stimulus 
combination: 四 + 量 = left, 四 + 质 = right; 七 + 量 = right, 七 + 质 = left (see Figure 4.4b).  
4.2.3 Discussion 
In line with the first hypothesis, using language proficiency as a task feature filter 
led to task-switching costs being eliminated entirely amongst non-Chinese participants, 
while the task-switching costs amongst Chinese participants remained significant. In 
disagreement with the initial hypothesis, none of the participants applied the LUT strategy. 
All Chinese participant applied a task-switching strategy. Furthermore, all non-Chinese 
participants applied a novel strategy called the BF strategy. Forrest et al. (2014) also reported 
a similar strategy. Nevertheless, they believed that participants’ self-reports were not 
reliable: “The ability to articulate a propositional rule does not mean that performance is 
being driven by it (p 1021).” Instead, they suggested that despite the self-reports, their 
participants had learned to perform the experiment based on associative learning without 
applying any rule-based strategy.  
Interestingly, only non-Chinese participants showed a significant congruency effect, 
whereas Chinese participants showed a much reduced congruency effect. Previous studies 
have consistently found statistically significant congruency effects (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 
2003; Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016). It is unclear whether the results of the present 
experiment reflect a Type II error or whether they reflect a unique behavioural pattern that 
only occurs when using Chinese numbers as stimuli. To the best of my knowledge Chinese 
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numbers have not been used as stimuli in task-switching studies. The absence of a 
congruency effect is investigated further in the next experiment.  
Strategy and Congruency Effect 
Based on the self-reports of the participants, non-Chinese participants tended to 
identify the bottom of the Chinese phrase first (i.e., the target stimulus number). This is 
called the BF strategy (Figure 4.4b). Besides the self-reports, the behavioural data of 
Experiment 4.1 also provides preliminary evidence in favour of the BF strategy. 
 
Figure 4.4. (a) An LUT strategy includes eight single IF-THEN arguments. A participant 
can give a correct response with a single IF-THEN argument. (b) A typical task-switching 
strategy includes two sets of conjunctive rules. Importantly a participant needs to perform 
two IF-THEN arguments in sequence to give the correct response. (c) The BF strategy in 
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Experiment 4.1. If the number 五 (5) or 六 (6) is shown, a participant only needs to execute 
a single IF-THEN argument as in the LUT approach. However, if the number 四 (4) or 七 (7) 
is shown the participant needs to execute two nested conjunctive rules similar to a task-
switching strategy.  
 
  
The results suggest that non-Chinese participants reacted significantly quicker in 
the congruent condition than in the incongruent condition (mean difference = 259 ms). 
However, for the Chinese participants, the difference between the congruent and incongruent 
conditions was not significant (mean difference = 17 ms). In fact, the non-Chineses 
participants’ reaction times in the congruent condition were actually 158 ms quicker than 
those of the Chinese participants, although this difference was not significant after the 
Bonferroni correction.  
Perhaps the BF strategy that the non-Chinese participants applied requires only one 
IF-THEN argument in the congruent condition. Once the non-Chinese participants had 
identified the bottom number (五 or 七), they could immediately figure out the correct 
response. The cue-first task-switching strategy requires participants to execute two nested 
IF-THEN arguments, because there is an additional conjunction rule. After identifying the 
task cue at the top, the Chinese participants (who applied the task-switching strategy) also 
needed to identify the number at the bottom. See Figure 4.4 for an illustration of both 
strategies. Indeed, the non-Chinese participant performed quicker than the Chinese 
participant in congruent trials because, they simply ignored the cue at the top, as suggested 
by participants’sself-report.  
Error Rate 
The results for error rate reveal a slightly different picture. In the congruent 
condition, the non-Chinese participant had a 6.9% error rate. When compared with the 
Chinese participants’ error rate in the same condition (4.9%), the difference was not 
statistically significant. However, in the incongruent condition, the non-Chinese participants 
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had a significantly higher error rate (27%) than the Chinese participants (8.3%). This is most 
likely due to the fact that the non-Chinese participants never tried to remember the Chinese 
characters. As many participants reported after the experiment, it is quite difficult for non-
Chinese participants to identify or discriminate between Chinese characters. However, all 
the non-Chinese participants performed significantly better than a chance level in both the 
repeat-incongruent and the switch-incongruent conditions. However, perhaps the BF 
strategy allowed non-Chinese participants to identify only one Chinese character (the bottom 
one; the number), in the congruent condition, so that familiarity with Chinese characters had 
a relatively small impact for non-Chinese participants.  
Limitations 
Experiment 4.1 had two possible disadvantages. Firstly, all the Chinese participants 
reported that they had applied the task-switching strategy. All Chinese participant reported 
that they were naive about task-switching effects before the experiment, but I suspect some 
of them had previously participated in another task-switching study conducted at the same 
institution. Therefore, it is difficult to replicate the results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and in 
Forrest et al. (2014): without an explicit understanding of the task rules, participants can still 
produce task-switching costs, as long as they can identify the task features.  
Secondly, the only evidence to support the application of the BF strategy is the 
congruency effect: participants who applied the BF strategy performed better in congruent 
trials than those who applied the task-switching strategy. A potential problem is that 
similarly designed studies consistently found a congruency effect, whereas in the present 
experiment, the Chinese participant (who applied the task-switching strategy) did not show 
a statistically significant congruency effect. Hence, the difference between the two language 
groups in terms of congruency effect may not support the BF strategy supposedly observed 
in the performance of the non-Chinese participants. In Experiment 4.2, I tried to avoid these 
two limitations. 
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4.3 Experiment 4.2 
Since all the Chinese participants from Experiment 4.1 reported that they applied the 
task-switching strategy, it is difficult to replicate the results from Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. 
That is, the task-switching costs remained significant when participants reported that they 
did not have an explicit understanding of the task-switching rule. To prevent the Chinese 
participants from applying the task-switching strategy, in Experiment 4.2, I applied 
traditional Chinese numbers as stimuli. Traditional Chinese numbers are mainly used in 
commercial or financial contexts (e.g., on neon lights for brands; on bank notes) and are used 
less frequently than the simplified Chinese numbers for everyday writing.  
4.3.1 The Preparation Effect and BF Strategy  
The behavioural results of Experiment 4.1 provide some evidence of the existence of 
the BF strategy. The non-Chinese participants who applied this strategy had a shorter RT in 
the congruent condition than the Chinese particpants who applied the task-switching 
strategy. I propose that this difference might reflect the fact that participants who apply the 
BF strategy take advantage of congruency. However, the results of Experiment 4.1 were 
inconclusive.  
In Experiment 4.2, I proposed a new method to test the existence of the BF strategy. 
I hypothesised that if the bottom part (the number) appeared first and if the top part (the cue) 
appeared after a short delay (i.e., if there was a Stimulus-Cue Interval [SCI]), participants' 
performances in the congruent trials would be further enhanced. This is because, when 
participants are using the BF strategy, the congruent number itself reveals the correct 
response, and participants can therefore give the correct response even before the task cue 
appears at the top.  
One problem is that, if participants consider the bottom part to be the “cue” and the 
top part to be the "target stimuli", then inserting an SCI also increases the RSI. Thus, it would 
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be inappropriate to make a comparison between the composite condition (RSI = ITI) and the 
SCI condition (RSI = ITI + SCI). The RSI difference might confound the strategy advantage. 
In order to avoid this problem, I also tested the participants' performances under a CSI 
condition (i.e., the cue appeared first and the target stimulus appeared after a delay; RSI = 
ITI + CSI). The idea was to set an SCI equal to CSI so that both conditions would have the 
same RSI.  
I predicted that applying the BF strategy would reduce the RT in congruent trials 
under the SCI condition, because the bottom part suggests the correct response as soon as 
the stimulus is displayed. In contrast, under the CSI condition, participants cannot give the 
correct response before the stimulus is presented. Hence, if the BF strategy is applied, 
participants should have shorter RTs in the SCI congruent condition than in the CSI 
congruent condition. For the incongruent condition, participants have to identify both the 
top and bottom part before they can give a correct response. Therefore, identifying the 
bottom part first may have little effect on reaction times in both the SCI and the CSI 
incongruent conditions.    
In short, for Experiment 4.2, I made three predictions. Firstly, if the BF strategy was 
applied, participants should have shorter RTs in the SCI congruent condition than in the CSI 
congruent condition. Secondly, I predicted that both the Chinese participants and the non-
Chinese participants would show a significant congruency effect. Thirdly, I predicted that 
the Chinese participants would have significant task-switching costs regardless of their 
awareness of the task-switching rules, while the non-Chinese participants would show no 
task-switching costs at all. 
4.3.2 Method 
Participants 
Fifteen Chinese participants (female = 10; mean age = 24, SD = 2.06) and fifteen 
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non-Chinese participants (female = 10; mean age = 23, SD = 3.79) from the University of 
Glasgow participated in Experiment 2. All the Chinese particpants were international 
students from China. This time, each participant received a payment of £4 for their 
participation.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
All stimuli were presented at the centre of a 21 inch Dell computer monitor. A Black 
Box Toolkit Response Pad linked to a Dell computer with Linux operating system was used 
to record the participants' responses and reaction times. The participants also used a 
QWERTY keyboard to go through the instructions and to start the experiment. The four 
target stimuli were the numbers 1, 2, 8, 9 written in Traditional Chinese characters as 壹，
贰，捌 and 玖 respectively. The two task cues were also Chinese characters: 质 (quality) == 
the cue for the odd/even task; and 量 (quantity) == the cue for the big/small task. The size of 
each Chinese character was 60 × 60 pixels. In order to reduce eye strain, all stimuli were 
displayed in green (RGB: 0, 255, 0) on a black background (RGB: 0, 0, 0). 
Task and Timeline 
In the present experiment, each participant performed two tasks that were similar 
to those in Experiment 4.1. The only difference was that, this time, 壹 (one) and 贰 (two) 
were the small numbers (press left key) while 捌 (eight) and 玖 (nine) were the big numbers 
(press right key); and 贰, 捌 were the even numbers (press left key) while 壹, 玖 were the odd 
numbers (press right key). The response mappings are listed in Figure 4.5b. Experiment 4.2 
had three experimental conditions. In each experimental condition the cue-stimulus 
sequence (timeline) was slightly changed. However, the task rules and feedback remained 
the same and the feedback was given as in Experiment 4.1 was given.  
Composite Condition 
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The timeline of the composite condition was equivalent to Experiment 4.1 (see 
Figure 4.5). This time, each participant was asked to complete one 36-trial training session 
and three 68-trial experimental sessions in the composite condition.  
CSI Condition 
In this condition, the CSI was applied. In each trial, the cue appeared first and 
remained on the screen. After a 500-ms delay, the stimulus appeared and formed a cue-
stimulus combination. After the stimulus appeared participants had to derive the correct 
response (see Figure 4.5 for the timeline). In this condition, each participant was asked to 
complete a 20-trial training block followed by three 68-trial experimental blocks.  
SCI Condition 
In this condition, the bottom part of the cue-stimulus combination (i.e., the Chinese 
number) was displayed first and stayed on the screen. After a 500 ms delay, the task cue 
appeared and formed a cue-stimulus combination. The participants had to derive the correct 
response after the task cue appeared (see Figure 4.5 for the timeline). In this condition, each 
participant was asked to complete a 20-trial training block followed by three 68-trial 
experimental blocks 
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Figure 4.5. The cue-stimulus sequences (timelines) of the three experimental conditions. (b) 
All eight cue-stimulus combinations in green and their correct response keys in cyan. The 





The experiment took place in a quiet and dark laboratory. The participants were 
asked to sign a consent form and sit in front of the computer screen at a viewing distance of 
between 40 - 60 cm. Before the experiment, both the Chinese participants and the non-
Chinese participants received LUT instructions, listing all cue-stimulus combinations and 
the corresponding response keys. Participants were asked to memorise these mappings. After 
that, the participants were asked to complete all three experimental conditions. Each 
participant completed the composite condition first. However, the order of the other two 
conditions was counterbalanced. After participants finished all three experimental conditions 
of the experiment, they were asked to report the strategy they applied in each condition. Each 
participant received a payment of £4.  
4.3.3 Results 
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Three predictions concerning the outcome of the experiment were made. Firstly, if 
the BF strategy was applied, participants should have shorter RTs in the SCI congruent 
condition than in the CSI congruent condition. Secondly, I predicted that both the Chinese 
and the non-Chinese participants should show a significant congruency effect. Thirdly, I 
predicted that the Chinese participants would exhibit significant task-switching costs 
regardless of their awareness of the task-switching rules, while the non-Chinese participants 
would show no task-switching costs at all. Before entering the data into an ANOVA, I ran a 
binomial test to check the error rate of each participant. The results suggested that many of 
the non-Chinese participants were unable to perform significantly better than chance in this 
experiment. Only nine of the 15 non-Chinese participants performed better than chance in 
both the CSI and the SCI conditions. Furthermore, only six non-Chinese participants 
performed better than random guessing in the composite condition. Therefore, as I had only 
a few observations in the unbalanced language groups, I tested the Chinese and non-Chinese 
participants separately. 
Non-Chinese Participants  
Composite Condition  
Two 2 × 2 ANOVAs with repeated measurements were conducted on the mean RTs 
and Error Rates within conditions. The two factors were the trial transition (switch, repeat) 
and the congruency effect (congruent, incongruent). Only six non-Chinese participants were 
included in the analysis, because they performed above chance level in the composite design 
(see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6).   
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Table 4.2.  
RT and Error Rate of Each Observation and Its Mean  
Repeat Switch 
Observations Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent  
ms % ms % ms % ms % 
1 578 3.25 978 14.3 588 2.04 1161 12.5 
2 1063 0 1319 10.8 1125 0 1256 3.92 
3 1132 5.26 1356 18.4 1162 2.38 1573 8.16 
4 571 0 997 31.4 555 0 997 28.5 
5 746 6.06 1602 17.5 649 2.63 1406 21.6 
6 731 3.03 920 29.6 692 27.0 964 31.4          
Mean 799 2.93 1195 20.4 795 1.62 1226 17.7 
  
                     Mean 
Condition RT (ms) Error Rate % 
Repeat 989 11.57 
Switch 1005 10.34 
Congruent 797 2.22 
Incongruent 1215 20.8 
 
For RT, the results of the ANOVA suggested that the factor of trial transition was 
not significant [F (1, 5) = .121, p =. 742]. However, the factor of congruency effect was 
highly significant [F (1, 5) = 20.19, p = .0064, η2p = .80]. The interaction between trial 
transition and congruency effect was not significant [F (1, 5) = .45, p =.532].   
For error rate, the factor of trial transition was again not significant [F (1, 5) = 3.524, p 
=.131] whereas the factor of congruency effect was highly significant [F (1, 5) = 17.75, p =. 
008, η2p = .78]. The interaction between trial transition and congruency effect was not 
significant [F (1, 5) = .35, p =.582]. 
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Figure 4.6. The line graphs illustrate the mean RTs (top) and ERs (bottom) in each trial 
condition (switch, repeat; congruent, incongruent). The open circles with numbers indicate 
each of the six observations. 
 
 
Comparing the CSI condition with the SCI condition 
Nine of the non-Chinese participants performed above chance level in both the CSI 
and the SCI condition. Their RT and error rates are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 
Mean (SD) of RT and Error Rate for Each Trial Condition in the CSI and SCI condition 
  CSI   SCI  
Condition/Group RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) RT ms (SD) Error Rate (SD) 
Repeat Congruent 590 (60) 2.12% (4.1) 229 (123) .594% (1.1)  
Repeat Incongruent 865 (248) 10.3% (5.7) 742 (222) 12.0% (10.8) 
Switch Congruent 592 (65) .570%  (1.7) 241 (110) .483% (.9) 
Switch Incongruent 846 (261) 9.74% (7.2) 723 (211) 12.7% (8.7) 
 
Repeat 729 (164) 6.22% (4.3) 478 (145) 6.21% (5.1) 
Switch 722 (161) 5.27% (4.0) 485 (149) 6.53% (4.6) 
 
Congruent 591 (63) 1.25% (2.9) 235 (114) .523% (.6) 
Incongruent 855 (255) 10.3% (5.9) 732 (214) 12.5% (9.7) 
 
Total 724 (162) 5.68% (.4.0) 484 (143) 6.45% (4.6) 
  
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to examine the mean RTs. 
The three factors were the trial transition (switch, repeat), the congruency effect (congruent, 
incongruent), and the cue-stimulus sequence (CSI, SCI). The factor of congruency effect [F 
(1, 8) = 37.88, p = .0002, η2p = .83] and the factor of cue-stimulus sequence were significant 
[F (1, 8) = 43.11, p =.0001, η2p = .84]. However, the factor of trial transition was not 
significant [F (1, 8) = 0.701, p = .427]. In addition, the interaction between trial transition 
and the congruency [F (1, 8) = 6.08. p =.039, η2p = .43] and the interaction between the 
congruency effect and cue-stimuli sequence were statistically significant [F (1, 8) = 75.28, 
p = .0001, η2p = .90]. No other interactions reached statistical significance (p > .05).  
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 An equivalent ANOVA was conducted to analyse the mean error rates (see Figure 
4.7). The factors of trial transition [F (1, 8) = 1.36, p =.277] and cue-stimulus sequence (CSI, 
SCI) [F (1, 8) = 0.21, p =.657] were not significant. The factor of congruency effect was 
significant [F (1, 8) = 28.07, p = .0007, η2p = .15]. No statistically significant interaction was 
found (p > .05).  
 
Figure 4.7. (a) The line graph shows the RT (top) and error rate (bottom) of each condition 
(switch, repeat; congruent [Con], incongruent [Inc]; CSI, SCI). The error bar denotes ±1 
SEM. b) The violin plots show RT distributions from the repeat and the switch conditions. 
A jittered dot inside each distribution represents the average RT for each participants. The 
black horizontal bar and the band in the central area represent the mean and 95% CI of the 
mean in that condition, respectively. The responses slower than 90% of the total in that 
condition are reflected by the dots above the top horizontal bar. The responses quicker than 
95% of the total in that condition are reflected by the dots below the bottom horizontal bar. 




Congruency and Switching Effect 
There was a small but significant interaction between congruency and trial transition 
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for RTs. This is because in the congruence condition, there were small task-switching costs 
(mean [switch trial] - mean [repeat trial] = 7 ms). However, the task-switching effect reversed under 
the incongruent condition (mean [switch trial] - mean [repeat trial] = -19 ms), meaning that the switch 
trials were quicker than the repeat trials but the differences were not significant (p > .05). 
Congruency Effect and Cue-stimulus Sequence 
 There was a statistically significant RT interaction between congruency and Cue-
stimulus sequence. The results of post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction suggest that, in the congruent trials, participants reacted significantly quicker in 
the SCI experimental condition than they did in the CSI experimental condition (mean 
difference = 355 ms; p = .0011). However, the difference between the CSI and SCI 
conditions for incongruent trials was not statistically significant (mean difference = 122 ms; 
p =.261). 
Chinese Participants 
All the Chinese participants were able to perform above-chance. A summary of 
their mean RTs and error rates is provided in Table 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
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Table 4.4 
Mean (SD) for RT ms and Error Rate (ER) of Each Trial Condition in the Composite, 
CSI and SCI Conditions 
 Composite CSI SCI 


























































































































Task-Switching, Congruency Effect and Cue-stimulus Sequence 
A 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVA with repeated measures was conducted on the RTs. The three 
factors were: trial transition (switch, repeat), congruency effect (congruent, incongruent) and 
cue-stimulus sequence (composite, CSI and SCI). The factors of congruency effect [F (1, 
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14) = 65.03, p = .0001, η2p = .82] and cue-stimulus sequence were statistically significant [F 
(2, 28) = 124.8, p = 0001, η2p = .89]. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni 
correction indicated that the differences amongst composite, CSI and SCI were all 
statistically significant (p < .0001).  
However, the factor of trial transition was not significant [F (1, 14) = 1.268, p =.279]. 
There was a significant interaction between the cue-stimulus sequence and the congruency 
effect [F (2, 28) = 4.83, p = .016, η2p = .34]; see later section for additional analyses. No 
other interactions were statistically significant (p > .5).  
An additional ANOVA with the same design was conducted on the error-rates. The 
factor of cue-stimulus sequence was significant [F (2, 28) = 15.29, p = .0001, η2p = .52]. 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction indicated that the difference 
between the composite condition and the CSI condition was statistically significant (p 
= .0018). Likewise, the difference between the composite condition and the SCI condition 
was statistically significant (p = .0002). However, the difference between the CSI condition 
and the SCI condition was not significant (p > .05).  
The factor of congruency effect [F (1, 14) = 52.14, p =.0001, η2p = .78] was 
significant. The factor trial transition [F (1, 14) = 0.674, p = .435] was not significant. There 
were no other significant interactions. Figure 4.8 provides an overview of the RT and error 
rate. 
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Figure 4.8. (a) The bar charts show the RT (top) and error rate (bottom) in each condition 
(switch, repeat; congruent [Con], incongruent [Inc]; composite, CSI, SCI). The error bars 
denotes SEM. (b) The violin plots illustrate the RT distributions in the repeat and switch 
conditions. The jittered dots inside each bean represent the average RTs of each participant. 
The black horizontal bar and the box around it represent the mean and 95% CI of the mean 
in each condition, respectively. Responses slower or quicker than 95% are represented by 
dots above and below the error bars. (c) Similar violin plots illustrate the RT distributions 
from congruent and incongruent conditions. 
 
 
Interaction between the Congruency and Cue-stimulus sequence 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Holm-Bonferroni correction were applied to 
further examine the RT interaction between the congruence effect and the cue-stimulus 
sequence. The Bonferroni correction is too conservative when comparing more than five 
different conditions. The Holm-Bonferroni correction can increase the statistical power 
(Holm, 1979). The results of the post-hoc comparisons are listed in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5. 
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The results of the post-hoc test suggested that participants had a significantly quicker 
RT in the SCI condition than in the CSI and the composite conditions. This factor of 
congruency effect was significant in all three cue-stimulus sequences. In addition, the 
congruent trials in the SCI condition were extremely fast (mean = 323 ms). As a consequence, 
the largest congruency effect was found in the SCI condition (mean incongruent trials - mean 
congruent trials = 289 ms), and the factor of congruency effect was smaller in the CSI 
condition (198 ms) and in the composite condition (221 ms). This finding explained the 
interaction between the congruency effect and the experimental condition (see Figure 4.9).  
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Figure 4.9. The bar graph shows the congruency effects for the composite, CSI and SCI 
conditions in blue, green and red, respectively. The largest congruency effect was found in 




All participants, Chinese and non-Chinese, reported that they had applied the BF 
strategy. None of the Chinese participants had noticed the association between the big/small 
and the odd/even tasks. In other words, none of the participants had applied the task-
switching strategy. 
4.3.4 Discussion 
In agreement with my predictions, participants had shorter RTs in the SCI congruent 
condition than in the CSI congruent condition when the BF strategy was applied. In line with 
my predictions, the non-Chinese participants showed no task-switching costs. However, for 
Chinese participants, Experiment 4.2 was not able to replicate the results of Forrest et al. 
(2014) and Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. In those experiments, the task-switching costs remained 
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significant although the participants indicated no explicit understanding of the task rules. In 
this experiment, without explicit understanding of the task rules, there were no task-
switching costs for the Chinese participants.  
In contrast to Experiment 4.1, the congruency effect was statistically significant for 
both language groups. Since none of the participants applied the task-switching strategy, we 
do not know whether or not this particular strategy eliminated the congruency effect amongst 
the Chinese participants in Experiment 4.1. In other words, one possibility is that the 
congruency effect is only eliminated when participants apply the task-switching strategy and 
the stimuli are Chinese numbers. The other possibility is that the results in Experiment 4.1 
simply reflect a Type II error. Thus, a larger study that applies Chinese numbers with 
participants applying the task-switching strategy is required.  
 Differences between Experimental Conditions (Cue-stimulus Sequences)  
Experiment 4.2 also found differences between all three experimental conditions. 
Firstly, the participants from both language groups performed better in the CSI and the SCI 
conditions than in the composite condition: they had shorter RTs and lower ERs. This 
difference may reflect a practice effect since all the participants were required to finish the 
composite condition first. When piloting the study, I tried to counterbalance all three 
conditions, but some of the non-Chinese participants failed to understand the CSI or SCI 
conditions when those two conditions came up first. Participants seemed to gain a better 
understanding of the experimental conditions if when were required to complete the 
composite condition first.  
One of the most important discoveries in Experiment 4.2 is the performance 
difference between the CSI and the SCI conditions. Firstly, for the congruent trials, all the 
participants were significantly quicker in the SCI condition than in the CSI condition. The 
difference between the CSI and SCI conditions in incongruent trials was different for the 
two language groups. For non-Chinese participants, the CSI-SCI difference in incongruent 
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trials was not statistically significant (mean difference = 122 ms; p =.261). For the Chinese 
participants, the difference was statistically significant (mean difference = 159 ms; p = .014). 
It is important to remember that only nine of the fifteen non-Chinese were able to perform 
above chance level in the CSI and SCI conditions. As a consequence, the sample size and 
power of this study was low. In the following section, I propose that the difference in 
performance in the SCI and CSI conditions may be due to the BF strategy.  
The BF Strategy and the Congruency Effect 
The idea of the BF strategy is that participants who followed this strategy treated the 
congruent and incongruent number stimuli differently. On the one hand, if a congruent 
number appeared, then a single IF-THEN rule was applied and a correct response was given. 
On the other hand, if an incongruent number appeared, the participant had to apply an 
additional conjunction rule (IF-THEN) before they could provide the correct response (see 
Experiment 4.1, Figure 4.4c). For example, if 贰 (2) appeared, participants had to apply the 
following conjunction rules: if 量  then press left key; if 质  then press right key. For 
participants who applied this strategy, a stimulus-cue interval was highly beneficial.     
The Congruent Trials 
Under the SCI condition, the congruent number appeared 500 ms before the task cue, 
so that participants could work out the correct response and wait. Once the top part appeared, 
they could then provide the response immediately. They could even start to carry out the 
response before the top part appeared (Figure 4.10). This may be the reason why some 
participants have mean RTs that are shorter than 200 ms in congruent trials of the SCI 
condition. This is illustrated in Figures 4.7c and 4.8c, in the SCI congruence conditions 
where a few RTs are lower than 200 ms. 
For humans, the time from stimulus onset to the initiation of a motor response occurs 
around 200 ms (e.g., Welford 1980). Usually, research would exclude trials with RTs that 
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are shorter than 200 ms in a reaction-time experiment, as it is beyond the average human 
response time and suggests that participants might have execute the response before they 
saw the target stimulus. In other words, the participants performed close to guessing. In the 
SCI congruent condition, however, it is perfectly reasonable for a participant to obtain and 
execute the correct response before the stimulus appears, because, in some trials, participants 
may even anticipate their own response delays and execute a response just before the task 
cue appears (see Figure 4.10c). Under the CSI congruent condition, the bottom part appears 
after the top part and participants cannot obtain the response in advance. As a consequence, 
the observed reaction times are longer (see Figure 4.10).  
 
Figure 4.10. Schematic illustration of how the BF strategy can explain the relatively shorter 
RT in congruent trials of the SCI condition compared with the CSI condition.  (a) This shows 
the response process under the CSI condition. (b) In the SCI condition, the response is 
prepared before the task cue appears. Therefore, the response is quicker than in the CSI 
condition. (c) In some trials, participants may even anticipate their own response delays and 
execute a response just before the task cue appears. This explains why, in some trials, the 
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Incongruent Trials   
All participants reported that they applied the BF strategy. The Chinese participants 
even reacted significantly quicker in the SCI incongruent condition than they did in the CSI 
incongruent condition. This is contradicts previous prediction. Unlike in the congruent trials, 
in an incongruent trial, no matter which part of the cue-stimulus combination appears first, 
a correct response cannot be obtained or fully prepared until both parts appears and, 
therefore, participants cannot deduce the correct response in advance. The remaining 
possibility is that although it is impossible to completely prepare a response in advance under 
the SCI incongruent condition, participants can still prepare the conjunction rule in advance. 
For example, in the SCI condition, if the incongruent number 贰 (2) shows up, there are only 
two possible variations: the top number is 量 or 质. In this case, it is relatively simple to 
prepare the two rules in advance:  
If 量 then press left;  
If 质 then press right. 
Instead, in the CSI incongruent condition, if the task cue 质 appears, as the upcoming 
number remains unknown, participants do not know which conjunction rule to prepare in 
advance. In fact, they do not even know whether or not it is necessary to apply the 
conjunction rule, since there is a 50% chance that a congruent number will show up. Thus, 
they have to wait for the Chinese number to appear. As a result, participants who apply the 
BF strategy can respond more quickly in the incongruent trials of the SCI condition than the 
CSI condition (see Figure 4.11).  
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Figure 4.11. Schematic illustration of how the BF strategy can explain the shorter RTs in 
SCI incongruent trials than in CSI incongruent trials. (a) shows the response process in the 
CSI condition, (b) shows the response process in the SCI condition. 
 
 
Task-Switching Strategy and the SCI condition  
In a CSI condition, Forrest et al. (2014) reported that participants who applied the 
task-switching strategy performed better than participants who claimed to have applied the 
BF strategy. A possible reason for this difference is that participants who applied the task-
switching strategy could start to apply the task rules after the task cue appeared, whereas 
participants who claimed to have applied the BF strategy had to wait until the stimulus 
number appeared. 
Based on the same logic, I propose that the participants who applied the task-
switching strategy should perform worse than the participants who applied the BF strategy 
in the SCI condition──at least, in the incongruent trials. This is because, in incongruent 
trials, participants who apply the task-switching strategy cannot prepare any task rules until 
the task cue appears, whereas those who apply the BF strategy can apply the relevant rules 
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in advance. In congruent trials, the difference in strategy may be small, because the 
participants who apply the task-switching strategy may eventually notice that an additional 
rule is unnecessary and that they can always deduce the correct response directly after a 
congruent number appears.   
One limitation of the present experiment is that no one applied the task-switching 
strategy, which means it is difficult to compare different strategies in the SCI condition of 
Experiment 4.2. An additional study that incorporates such a comparison may confirm or 
disprove the proposed strategy difference in the SCI condition. This is something that needs 
to be tested in the future. 
Disadvantages of Traditional Chinese Numbers and Suggestions for Future Research 
Because Traditional Chinese numbers are not very common in the Chinese language 
and are applied infrequently in everyday life, I hypothesised that using traditional Chinese 
numbers would prevent Chinese participants from applying the task-switching strategy. The 
results of Experiment 4.2 confirmed my hypothesis. Nevertheless, applying traditional 
Chinese numbers leads to two major disadvantages. Firstly, I underestimated the difficulty 
of memorising traditional Chinese numbers for non-Chinese participants. Traditional 
Chinese characters are more complicated than the Simplified Chinese versions. Therefore, 
many non-Chinese participants were unable to perform the experiment above chance level. 
Future studies need to include more training sessions before conducting the actual 
experiment.  
Secondly, I suspect that, because traditional Chinese numbers are rarely used in 
written language in daily life, even Chinese participants had difficulty to recognising them 
as numbers. Therefore, if participants could not establish the task-switching strategy, they 
also could not identify the task-relevant mathematical features (i.e., the magnitude or parity 
of a Chinese number). This may be the reason why that even the Chinese participants showed 
no task-switching costs at all.  
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In other words, participants in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, could not process or identify 
the task-relevant features when they did not apply the task-switching strategy. In contrast, I 
suggest that, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and in Forrest et al. (2014), participants were able 
to process or identify the task-relevant features even without applying the task-switching 
strategy. In future studies, I recommend using Simplified Chinese numbers as stimuli. 
However, it should be possible to use traditional Chinese numbers. To ensure Chinese 
participants can identify the mathematical features that are relevant to the task, researchers 
may require participants to complete some simple arithmetic problems using the same 
Traditional Chinese numbers before the experiment. After training, participants should be 
more aware of the task-relevant features in the stimuli. 
Is the BF Strategy a Rule-Based Strategy? 
As mentioned in the previous section, the reason why some participants can react 
within 200 ms in the SCI congruent condition is that they can start to obtain the correct 
answer before the task cue (top part) is displayed. If they could not identify the bottom part 
first, such a quick reaction time would be very unlikely if not impossible. Participants 
undoubtedly applied the BF strategy during experiments. The question is whether the BF 
strategy is a rule-based strategy that requires certain levels of executive control similar to 
the task-switching strategy. Forrest et al. (2014) suggested that, after controlling the task-
switching strategy, participants can only learn to perform the experiment by means of an 
associative learning process. In Experiment 4.2, the RTs in the incongruent trials provide 
evidence against this argument. I suggested that, in the SCI condition, not only do 
participants identify the bottom part of the cue-stimulus combination first, but they can also 
prepare the response according to the rules in advance, before the top part (task cue) appears. 
This is why Chinese participants, when applying the BF strategy, may respond significantly 
faster in incongruent trials in the SCI condition compared to the CSI condition. It is difficult 
to explain such an advance preparation effect without considering cognitive functions like 
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applying the task rules in advance. I suggest that the BF strategy is a rule-based strategy that 
requires cognitive control. 
4.4 General Discussion 
One of the major contributions of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 is that I have created a 
method that may consistently eliminate task-switching costs even for a shared stimulus-set. 
In my view, this is possible because, once participants have eliminated the task-switching 
rules, the semantic task features (i.e., the magnitude and the parity of a number) will be 
obscured in the Chinese number stimuli. As a result, participants can bypass both the task-
set reconfiguration process and the interference from task-relevant features, so that task-
switching costs should eventually disappear.  
So far, the results from Experiments 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2, suggest a 
consistent story. It is the interference from the previous trial alone that can produce task-
switching costs, even when the task-set reconfiguration process based on the task-switching 
strategy is controlled. The argument that proactive interference can produce task-switching 
costs is not a novel idea. Many studies have provided detailed demonstrations of this effect 
(Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003; 
Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). However, some previous studies have 
considered the interference to be a product of the task-sets (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & 
Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). Early studies posited that stimulus-based 
incompatibility (i.e., reversed stimulus-response mapping) was the source of the interference 
(Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Nevertheless, in these 
studies, all the participants received rule-based strategy and the stimulus-based inference 
still coexisted with task-sets. The present experiments propose that, even without 
participants realising the task-sets based on the task-switching strategy, interference can still 
impact participants’ responses. In the next chapter, I will further investigate this claim. 
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4.4.1 Novel Strategies and Task-set Reconfiguration 
Before discussing the interference account further in Chapter 5, I need to discuss two 
potential counterarguments. Firstly, at the end of Chapter 2, I proposed an alternative 
explanation. I hypothesised that, even if participants were not aware of the two tasks based 
on the task-switching strategy, due to their application of a novel strategy such as the “black 
and white” strategy or the “circle and hexagon” strategy, they still treated the four colour-
cue combinations and the other four shape-cue combinations as two different tasks. As a 
result, participants never truly eliminated the task-set reconfiguration process; rather, they 
simply created a novel task-set reconfiguration process.  
However, this argument cannot explain the results found by Forrest et al. (2014). In 
their study, participants have not reported any novel strategies like the “black and white” 
strategy. Nevertheless, they reported that, after controlling the task-switching strategy, 
sometimes the task-switching costs were statistically significant (see their Experiments 1 
and 3) and sometimes the task-switching costs were not significant (see their Experiment 2). 
The participants in Forrest et al. (2014) reported that they adopted a novel strategy that was 
similar to the BF strategy. Based on the results of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, we know that 
the BF strategy does not always produce task-switching costs. Although the novel task-set 
reconfiguration might explain the results of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, it cannot consistently 
explain all the results. So far, the interference account provides a better explanation. 
4.4.2 Task-set Reconfiguration: Limitations and Preview of Chapter 5 
The second counterargument we need to consider was advanced by Meier et al. 
(2016). They proposed that the use of the task-switching strategy and the corresponding task-
set reconfiguration process can never be entirely discounted when testing humans. The 
problem is that, although researchers induce their participants to complete the experiment 
without receiving a task-switching instruction, they can only hope that the participants do 
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not infer the task-switching strategy. They can offer no evidence to verify whether this does 
in fact occur. In order, to fully examine behaviour patterns without any possible task-set 
reconfiguration, Meier et al. (2016) employed pigeons, which have no higher executive 
control (e.g., Lea & Wills, 2008; Lea et al., 2009; Maes et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 2012; Wills et al., 2009). Since rule-based strategies require executive control, 
applying rules and switching between tasks is impossible for pigeons. They found that, 
unlike humans, pigeons can perform task-switching experiments without any task-switching 
costs. 
 Experiment 2.2 examined participants’ strategies with novel stimuli, and the results 
suggested that, in the experimental group without an explicit understanding of the task rules, 
the performance (error rate) with novel shape-task stimuli was not above chance level. In 
contrast, those participants who applied the task-switching strategy were able to respond to 
the novel shape-task stimuli significantly more accurately than they would have done by 
pure guesswork. In my view, the results of the novel stimuli trials indicate that, without an 
explicit understanding of the task rules, applying the task rules is almost impossible. 
Therefore, I further deduce that participants in the experimental group could not apply the 
task-switching strategy. 
Nevertheless, according to Meier and colleagues’ perspective (2016), the behavioural 
patterns with novel stimuli might only suggest that applying the task-switching strategy is 
less likely, but not impossible. For example, Meier et al., 2016 can assume that human 
participants can always apply task rules implicitly. A poor performance in novel stimuli trials 
might reflect the fact that dealing with novel stimuli requires an explicit understanding of 
task rules and that an implicit understanding is not enough.  
Meier and colleagues would perhaps argue that, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, all the 
participants applied the task-switching strategy either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore, the 
task-switching costs remained significant. Moreover, they could further argue that in 
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Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2, since the participants genuinely stopped using the task-
switching strategy at times, the task-switching costs eventually disappeared. In particular, 
perhaps the decisive evidence to support their perspective is in the results of the non-Chinese 
participants from Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. As applying the task-switching strategy was 
impossible for those participants, unsurprisingly, the task-switching costs disappeared in 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2.  
The results of Forrest et al. (2014) can be explained in the same way. Perhaps, in 
their second experiment, no (or only a few participants) figured out the task-switching 
strategy, even implicitly. Thus, the task-switching costs were not significant. Conversely, in 
their Experiments 1 and 3, all the participants figured out the task-switching strategy 
implicitly. Therefore, the switching effect remained significant. From Meier and colleagues' 
(2016) perspective, any factor besides task-set reconfiguration is unnecessary.  
However sophisticated such a counter argument appears, it is theoretically possible. 
This is because, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, I was unable to fully control the task-set 
reconfiguration process based on the task-switching strategy. Participants may have applied 
the task-switching strategy covertly. Moreover, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, I could not 
separate the interference from the task rules——if participants could not figure out the task 
rules, then it is very likely they could not identify the task-relevant features either. Hence, I 
could not objectively manipulate the interference. To provide conclusive evidence to prove 
my argument that——the interference of task features alone can produce task-switching 
costs, even without any task-set reconfiguration and without switching between tasks, I need 
to design an experiment that includes no tasks based on the task-switching strategy but the 
interference still exist. This is one of the intentions of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Binary Feature-response Mappings and Proactive Interference 
Based on the results of Experiments 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2, I propose that, as 
long as participants need to identify and process both task-relevant features before deducing 
a correct response, there will be interference between trials that produces task-switching 
costs. For example, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 participants were required to identify and 
process both colour features and shape features before deducing a correct response. 
 Moreover, I suggest that, even when participants do not apply a task-switching 
strategy, interference from the preceding trial can still create task-switching costs. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the problem, according to Meier et al. (2016), is that there is no 
objective control of the strategy that participants apply during the experiment. In a typical 
task-switching experiment, it can be argued that participants may apply the task rules or the 
task-switching strategy covertly (i.e., implicitly or unconsciously), so it is difficult to 
eliminate task-set reconfiguration processes. 
In the present study, I tried to overcome this problem by removing both tasks entirely.  
In consequence, participants could not apply the task-switching strategy. In particular, the 
present study applies the same stimulus-set and task cues as Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, without 
including the colour and shape tasks. Consequently, unlike in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, 
where I was left with no other option than to induce the participants not to apply a task-
switching strategy, here switching between the colour task and the shape task is not possible. 
This provides an opportunity to examine whether task-switching costs between the “colour” 
task and the “shape” task remain when I control the task-set reconfiguration process.  
Similarly to Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, there were eight possible cue-stimulus 
combinations in the present study. Four of these combinations had a “colour cue” while the 
other four combinations had a “shape cue”. However, because I rearranged the mappings 
between cue-stimulus combinations and responses these cues do not represent binary tasks. 
I measured “task-switching costs” even though there were no explicit tasks. In this chapter, 
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if trial n - 1 and trial n had different task cues, then trial n was defined as a switch trial. 
Conversely, if trial n - 1 and trial n had the same task cue, then trial n was defined as a 
repeat trial. I measured the RT and error-rate differences between the repeat and the switch 
trials. I reasoned that, as long as the participants had to identify and process both task-
relevant features (i.e., the colour and the shape of a stimulus) before obtaining the correct 
response, there would be interference between successive switch trials.  
The idea that feature-response mappings might affect reaction times is not new (e.g., 
Hommel, 1998, 2005). Hommel (1998) used a task that required two successive responses 
(R1 and R2) to two successive stimuli (S1 and S2). S1 and S2 varied randomly in form, 
colour, and location. In other words, they had multiple features. In addition, each feature was 
binary with only two levels. The responses were also binary, with only two possible keys: 
the left key or right key. At the start, a cue indicated the correct answer to the first response, 
R1. The participants were required to prepare R1, and to execute it as soon as S1 was 
presented, regardless of the stimulus included as of S1. One second later S2 was presented; 
and one feature of S2 (say, colour) determined the second response R2. Hence, R1 was 
executed in response to the mere onset of S1, whereas R2 was made in response to the 
relevant feature of S2. Hommel (1998) found that R2 was fastest when both the task-relevant 
stimuli features and the response were the same between the first and second stimulus-
response-events. In contrast, when the two stimulus-response-events matched only partially 
(e.g., the same response, but a different task-relevant stimulus feature), R2 was slow even 
compared to a complete mismatch of the two stimulus-response-events (e.g., different 
responses and different features).  
Furthermore, previous task-switching studies have suggested that proactive 
interference is essentially the competition between feature-response mappings. Woodward 
et al. (2003) suggested that the task performed on trial n - 1 (e.g., a colour task) requires 
participants to activate one feature-response mapping (e.g., white == left), while at the same 
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time to inhibit or negatively prime another feature-response mapping (e.g., hexagon == 
right). If, however the inhibited or negatively primed mapping is useful on trial n, additional 
time is required to reactivate it, and this results in a switching cost. Hence, as long as the 
participant had to identify both task-relevant features in order to make the correct response, 
there would be interference from the previous trial. This interference would delay the 
response time and trigger task-switching costs.  
5.1 Arrangement and Features 
 The major challenge of the present study was to eliminate the colour task and the 
shape task from Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 while still requiring participants to identify the 
task-relevant features. I believe identifying the task-relevant features is the source of the 
interference. Therefore, we may look at a typical task-switching experiment from a different 
perspective. The ultimate goal for a typical task-switching experiment is to deduce the 
assigned response key for each cue-stimulus combination. For example, in Experiments 2.1 
and 2.2 participants had to remember eight cue-stimulus combinations (e.g., c1, c2, c3…c8; 
see Figure 5.1a) and assign four combinations to the left key and the remaining four to the 
right key. 
Here is a simple combinatorial question: if we want to randomly assign eight 
combinations to two groups (i.e., the left key group and the right key group) so that each 
group has four combinations, how many different arrangements without repetition are 





There are 70 different arrangements, and the arrangement in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
is just one of them. Furthermore, each cue-stimulus combination from Experiments 2.1 and 
2.2 has three layers of information, and each layer has two levels: the cue (colour cue or 
shape cue), the colour (black or white), and the shape (circle or hexagon; see Figure 5.1b). 
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These are all binary, so that each cue-stimulus has three binary features.  
 
Figure 5.1. (a) All possible cue-stimulus combinations in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. I 
assigned an index (c1 to c8) to each combination. (b) Each combination has three layers of 
information, or three binary features: colour, shape and the task cue. 
 
 
It is important to mention that, amongst the 70 different arrangements, not all 
arrangements require the processing of all three features in the cue-stimulus to deduce the 
assigned response keys. For some arrangements, obtaining a correct response may only 
require a single feature. For example, if we assign four colour-cue combinations to the left 
key and four shape-cue combinations to the right key, then the correct answer solely depends 
on the cue type and the stimuli become irrelevant. Sometimes, an arrangement may require 
participants to process more than one feature to deduce the correct response. For example, 
Figure 5.2 shows an arrangement in which participants need to process two features before 
they can give the correct response. The correct response is determined by the cue and the 
shape of the stimuli, whereas the colour of the stimuli (black, white) is irrelevant. Since the 
circle and hexagon are associated with opposite response keys when the cue switches (see 
Figure 5.2), the task-set reconfiguration account would predict a task-switching cost. 
Arguably, every time the cue switches, the task-set needs to be reconfigured, because it has 
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reversed. Previous task-switching studies with a similar design consistently reported 
significant task-switching costs (e.g., Hsieh & Yu 2003; Hsieh & Liu, 2005; Barber & Carter, 
2005).  
 
Figure 5.2. For this arrangement, participants have to process two features: shape feature 
and task cue, before they can deduce the correct response. The colour feature is irrelevant. 
Arguably, every time the cue switches, the task-set needs to be reconfigured, because it has 




5.1.1 Three Features and the Task-switching Strategy 
For some arrangements, participants have to process all three cue-stimulus features 
before they can deduce the correct response. Figure 5.3 lists three different examples. For 
these three arrangements, identifying a particular combination of response mapping requires 
sets of conjunctive rules or IF-THEN statements that use colour, shape and the cue. 
Therefore, participants have to identify and process all three features to obtain correct 
responses. 
 Figure 5.3a illustrates the arrangement applied in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2. Under this 
particular arrangement, participants can apply the task-switching strategy and switch 
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between the colour task and the shape task. Amongst all 70 possible arrangements, only four 
arrangements suggest a task-switching strategy (see Figures 5.3a and 5.3b).  Meier and 
colleagues (2016) proposed that in the task-switching experiment participants may implicitly 
apply the task-switching strategy even when researchers take precautions to eliminate the 
task-switching strategy. If an experiment incorporates the two arrangements in Figure 5.3a 
and 5.3b, then both the interference account and the task-set reconfiguration account would 
predict that there will be significant task-switching costs. However, if we avoid these specific 
arrangements, then we may be able to eliminate the task-switching strategy completely. 
 
Figure 5.3. Three arrangements that require participants to process all three types of features 
to deduce the correct response. (a) and (b) allow participants to perform both the task-
switching strategy and the “black and white” (BW) strategy; (c), however only allows 
participants to apply the BW strategy.  
 
 
5.1.2 Three Types of Features and the BW Strategy 
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Figure 5.3c depicts another arrangement that requires participants to process all three 
types of features to deduce the correct response. Although applying the task-switching 
strategy is not possible, participants can apply a strategy similar to the novel strategies I 
identified in Experiment 2.2 (see Figures 4a and 4b).  
 
Figure 5.4.The principle of the BW strategy: three white stimuli correspond to the left key. 
Additionally, three black stimuli correspond to the right key. Only two exceptions need to 
be remembered. (a) The actual strategy participants used in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. (b) The 
strategy participants would potentially use under the arrangement in Figure 5.3c. The 
difference between (a) and (b) is highlighted by black triangles above the cue-stimulus. 
 
 
Arguably, when participants apply the BW strategy, they may still treat the four 
colour-cue combinations and four shape-cue combinations differently although the colour 
and the shape task no longer exist. In particular, if participants apply the BW strategy every 
time a colour cue shows up, they may apply the colour rule: white == left | black == right. 
However, because both exceptions involve the shape cue, every time the shape cue is 
presented, participants need to decide whether this combination is an exception or not. If it 
is an exception, the colour rule reverses; otherwise, the colour rule applies.  
 Still, every time the cue switches, there may be an extra reconfiguration process 
going on. That process might trigger a task-switching cost. I proposed this hypothesis at the 
end of Chapter 2 but in Chapter 4, I also suggested that this extra task-set reconfiguration 
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process is not a perfect explanation of all the results.  
 
5.1.3 A Special Arrangement 
In the last section, I introduced three different arrangements in which participants 
have to process all three features before they can give the correct response. If an experiment 
applies these arrangements, we cannot eliminate the possibility of task-set reconfiguration 
every time a cue switch occurs. However, the arrangement in Figure 5.5a is special. It is 
likely that participants develop a “Colour-Shape Cue” (CSC) strategy: only remembering 
two exceptions (see Figure 5.5b), but in general applying the colour cue == left and the shape 
cue == right. Because both exceptions involve the white hexagon, participants may treat the 
white hexagon differently from the other stimuli. Importantly, participants cannot use the 
BW strategy. One exception is based on a colour cue and another exception employs a shape 
cue. Consequently, even if the task-set reconfiguration process still exists, the following will 
be true: on average, a switch trial will not cause any additional task reconfiguration process 
compared to a repeat trial. As a consequence, task-set reconfiguration does not predict task-
switching costs in this arrangement. If there is any task-switching cost, it is very likely to be 
due to interference.   
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Figure 5.5. (a) The special arrangement in the present study. (b) Illustrates a hypothetical 
CSC strategy that participants are likely to adopt.   
 
 
5.2 Experiment 5.1 
In summary, in this experiment, I sought to eliminate the colour task and shape task 
by modifying the cue-stimulus arrangement in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. This setting allows 
the testing of whether task-switching costs can arise from interference between trials without 
invoking the task-set reconfiguration process. Although colour task and shape tasks no 
longer exist after I modified the cue-stimulus arrangement, for the sake of simplicity, if trial 
n - 1 and n had different task cues, I would still call trial n a switch trial. Also, if trial n - 1 
and n had the same task cue, trial n would still be a repeat trial. 
To demonstrate the effect of interference from previous trials, I tested the 
arrangement in Figure 5.5. There is always a task or a strategy to achieve a goal during a 
psychology experiment. Here, I tried to ensure that interference from the previous trial was 
not confounded by task-set reconfiguration. The arrangement described in Figure 5.5 
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suggests that, on average, a switch trial would not cause any more task-set reconfiguration 
than a repeat trial. Therefore, in the present experiment, any task-switching costs could not 
be due to the reconfiguration process.  
However, it was presumed that as long as participants needed to identify multiple 
features of the cue-stimulus combination (i.e., the colour, the shape), they would receive 
enough interference from the previous trial to produce task-switching costs. The 
arrangement in Figure 5.5 requires participants to identify three binary features (cue type, 
stimulus colour, and stimulus shape) before they can deduce the correct response. I predicted 
that participants in Experiment 5.1 would indicate significant task-switching costs. If 
participants showed any task-switching costs, these were very likely be the product of 
interference.  
Apart from task-switching costs, it was also suspected that participants might apply 
the CSC strategy (see Figure 5.5). Therefore, participants might treat the two exceptions 
differently from the other six “normal” cue-stimuli combinations. I predicted that, if 
participants applied the CSC strategy, they would respond differently regarding reaction 
time and error rate in the trials with exceptions than in the trials with the other normal cue-
stimuli combinations.  
5.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Thirteen (mean age = 25.1, SD = 2.76; female = 9) PhD students from the University 
of Glasgow participated voluntarily in Experiment 5.1.  
Apparatus and Stimuli 
All stimuli were presented centrally on a BenQ computer monitor (24 inches). A 
Black Box Toolkit response pad was used to record participants' responses. Participants also 
used a QWERTY keyboard during instructions and to start the experiment. Experiment 5.1 
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included eight cue-stimuli combinations. These stimuli were identical to the stimuli in 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 (see Figure 5.5).  
Procedure 
The participants were instructed to memorise all eight items (cue-stimulus 
combinations) and the corresponding response keys. In Figure 5.5a, the four items on the left 
were associated with the left key; and the four items on the right were associated with the 
right key. Once an item appeared, participants were asked to press the corresponding key. 
The timeline of Experiment 5.1 was straightforward. In each trial, once an item appeared, 
the participants had 2.5 seconds to respond. If the participants made a mistake, an error 
message would be displayed on the screen for three seconds before the next trial started. If 
a correct response was given, the next trial would start after a 300 ms inter-trial interval 
(ITI). 
The participants were asked to sign a consent form and sit in front of the computer 
screen (viewing distance 40 - 60 cm). Before the experiment, the participants were given 
instructions. They viewed a list of all cue-stimulus combinations and response keys and were 
asked to memorise these. The experiment had one 40-trial training block and five 100-trial 
experimental blocks. At the end of the experiment, each participant verbally reported the 
strategy they had used in the experimental blocks.   
5.2.2 Results 
 It was predicted that the participants would indicate significant task-switching costs. 
It was also predicted that participants would respond differently regarding reaction time and 
error rate in the trials with two exceptions than in the trials with the normal cue-stimuli 
combinations. The descriptive data of mean RTs and error rate are listed in Table 5.1 and 
visualised in Figure 5.6.  
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Table 5.1. 






Mean (ms) SD 
 
Mean SD 
Normal Repeat 904 230  2.28% 2.5 
Normal Switch 975 268  2.95% 2.1 
Exception Repeat 978 220  4.37% 4.6 
Exception Switch 1140 275  7.03% 5.0 
      
Repeat 923 221 
 
2.77% 2.8 




Normal 909 228  2.64% 2.0 
Exception 1047 230  5.82% 3.8 
 
 A 2 × 2 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to compare the mean 
RTs within conditions. The two factors were the trial transition (switching, repeating) and 
the cue-stimuli condition (normal, exceptional). The factor of trial transition [F (1, 12) = 
27.5, p = .0002, η²p = .70] and the factor of cue-stimuli condition were both significant [F 
(1, 12) = 8.17, p = .014, η²p = .41]. The interaction between the trial transition and the cue-
stimuli condition was also significant [F (1, 12) = 8.02, p = .015; η²p = .40]. The factor of 
trial transition was larger in the exceptional conditions than in the normal cue-stimuli 
condition. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni correction suggested that the 
factor of trial transition was significant in both the normal (p = .015) and the exceptional (p 
= .003) cue-stimuli conditions.  
An equivalent 2 × 2 ANOVA with repeated-measurements was conducted to 
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compare the error rates. The factor of cue-stimuli condition was significant [F (1, 12) = 
14.77, p = .0023 η²p = .55]. The factor of trial transition was not significant [F (1, 12) = 3.24, 
p = .096]. There was no significant interaction. In addition to the behavioural data, all 
participants reported that they applied a CSC strategy.  
 
Figure 5.6. (a) The line graph shows the RT (top) and Error Rate (bottom) of each condition 
(switch, repeat; normal, exception). The error bars indicate ±1 SEM. (b) The violin plots 
illustrate the RT distributions for the repeat and switch trials. The jittered dots inside the 
shaded area represent the average RTs of each participant. The black horizontal bar and the 
box around it represent the mean and 95% CI of the mean in each condition, respectively.  
Responses slower or quicker than 95% are indicated by dots above and below the error bars. 





There were statistically significant task-switching costs, even though the switch trials 
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did not trigger a task-set reconfiguration process and applycation of the task-switching 
strategy was impossible. In other words, the results suggest that, even without switching 
between a colour task and a shape task, we can still produce task-switching costs. My 
hypothesis is that task-switching costs in Experiment 5.1 are due to interferences of the 
features of the cue-stimulus combinations (colour, shape, and cue type) from the  
immediately preceding trial.  
In addition, participants had longer RTs, higher error rates and greater task-switching 
costs in the exceptional cue-stimuli condition than in the normal cue-stimuli condition. All 
participants reported that they applied a CSC strategy. Hence, the differences between the 
two exceptions and the normal cue-stimuli combinations might reflect the CSC strategy. 
Since 75% of the trials included the normal cue-stimuli combination, perhaps, when 
applying the CSC strategy, participants assumed the rules for the normal cue-stimuli as a 
default (colour cue == left; shape cue == right). The problem lies in the fact that the two 
exceptions imply a delay when they eventually occur because the wrong rules have been 
prepared for. 
It is worth mentioning that the task-switching costs I found in Experiment 5.1 may 
be confounded by the response-switching effect. The arrangement I used in this experiment 
produced an overlap between task-switching and response-switching. Therefore, 75% of the 
time when the “task” switches (i.e., the cue switches) the response key also switches (trial n 
- 1 and trial n have different response keys).  
Some previous studies have shown that switching between different responses can 
leads to response-switching costs (e.g., Bertelson, 1965; Eichelman, 1970; Notebaert & 
Soetens, 2003; Smith, Chase, & Smith, 1973). However, other studies did not find any 
response-switching costs (cf., Campbell & Proctor, 1993; Pashler & Baylis, 1991; Rabbitt, 
1968). Could it be that the task-switching costs in Experiment 5.1 were actually response-
switching costs? I suggest that it is not very possible.  
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Altmann (2011) suggested, that in task-switching experiments, the statistical support 
for any overall response-switching costs is very limited. Instead, there is usually only a 
response-switching by task-switching interaction. In particular, there are response-switching 
costs in the task-repeating condition, but in the task-switching condition, the response 
switching costs are somehow reversed——switching to a different response, in fact, reduces 
the reaction time in task-switching trials. The diverse explanations behind such interaction 
are beyond the scope of the present thesis (cf., Altmann, 2011 and Druey, 2014). However, 
the point is that there is not enough evidence to support any overall response-switching costs 
in task-switching experiments. To further illustrate this point, I conducted two paired t-tests 
to compare the mean RT of response-switching trials with the mean RT of response-
repeating trials in Experiment 2.1 [switch - repeat = 5 ms; t (39) = .31, p = .76] and 
Experiment 2.2 [switch - repeat = -13 ms; t (25) =1.31, p = .20]. There is no meaningful 
difference between the response-switching trials and the response-repeating trials at all. 
Remember, Experiments 2.1, 2.2 and 5.1 applied the same cue-stimuli combinations. 
Secondly, if the task-switching costs in Experiment 5.1 were caused by the response-
switching effect, then because task-switching trials account for only 75% of all response-
switching trials, the mean RT for the response-switching trials in Experiment 5.1 should be 
longer than the mean RT for the task-switching trials. However, a paired t-test suggested, 
that in Experiment 5.1, the mean RT of task-switching trials (1014 ms) was actually longer 
than the mean RT for the response-switching trials (984 ms), t (13) = 4.60, p =.0006). The 
response-switching effect is not a good alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 
5.1.    
5.3 Task Relevant Features and Task-switching Costs 
In Experiment 5.1, I demonstrated that, without any additional task-set 
reconfiguration process during switching, we can still produce task-switching costs with the 
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same cue-stimulus combinations as in a typical task-switching experiment. It was potentially 
the interference between features from the previous trial that triggered the task-switching 
costs in Experiment 5.1. However, to further confirm this hypothesis, it is necessary to 
address interference and to highlight that interference in a typical task-switching experiment, 
such as Experiments 2.1, 2.2 and Experiment 5.1, is caused by the same mechanism.  
5.3.1 Proactive Interference and Task-set Inertia 
In the following, I will address how one of the original task-switching accounts may 
explain all the results I have found so far. My explanation adopts the proactive interference 
account by Allport and colleagues (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & 
Allport, 2000; Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). 
Starting with their hypothesis, I will develop a method to estimate the amount of interference 
each trial received from the previous trial. 
Allport and colleagues (1994) originally proposed that when a given trial n - 1 
commences, the task-set (n - 1) is activated. If the next trial n is a repeat trial, then the new 
task-set (n) is very similar to the previous task-set (n - 1). However, if trial n is a switch trial, 
then a disparity between task-set (n) and task-set (n - 1) emerges. Therefore, in a switch trial, 
the current task-set is more incompatible with the previous task-set than in a repeat trial. 
Consequently, participants need to make additional effort to deal with priming and 
suppression (Allport et al., 1994), resulting in task-switching costs. Allport and colleagues 
called this incompatibility between two task-sets the “task-set inertia”. 
Three Layers of Interference 
For the present study, the term “task-set inertia” seems counterintuitive as one of this 
study’s major challenges is to eliminate the tasks and corresponding task-sets based on the 
task-switching strategy. However, the task-set inertia Allport and colleagues (1994) 
proposed is a passive cognitive process that requires no executive control. In fact, they 
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originally assumed that stimulus-response mapping triggers task-set inertia. Therefore, task-
set inertia is not a by-product of applying task rules or any task-set, rather, it is a direct 
consequence of processing the cue-stimuli combination. My interpretation here is that inertia 
is more closely related to “cue-stimulus inertia” than task-set inertia. Nevertheless, some 
studies suggested that interference might in fact arise from associations between the stimulus 
and task-set (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006).  
In Chapter 3, I discussed how participants need to process all three features (task cue, 
stimulus colour, and stimulus shape) from the stimulus before they can obtain the correct 
response. Therefore, I suggest that,  in each given trial of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, each cue-
stimulus combination could have triggered three layers of cue-stimulus inertia (or 
interference): cue interference, colour interference, and shape interference. Woodward and 
colleagues (2003) already proposed that feature-response mapping is at the core of proactive 
interference. Here, I suggest that the task cue can also be a feature that causes proactive 
interference.  
Interference and Feature-response Mapping 
Previous studies suggested that the mere co-occurrence of a stimulus and a response 
can create an automatic association between features (of the stimulus) and the response (e.g., 
Hommel 1998, 2004, 2005; Zmigrod & Hommel, 2013). Based on this idea, I will 
demonstrate that each layer has binary feature-response mappings. In Figure 5.7a, I use the 
cue-stimulus combinations from Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 as examples. In Experiments 2.1 
and 2.2, the combination c8 was assigned to the left key. Therefore, every time c8 was 
presented, participants had to press the left key. The combination c8 included three features: 
the shape cue, the white colour and the shape of the circle. Based on the idea of feature-
response integration (Hommel, 1998, 2005), I propose that, when the participants executed 
the correct response for c8 (i.e., pressed the left key), those features formed three mappings 
with the response: 
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shape cue == left 
white == left 
circle == left 
In addition, because in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 each features had only two levels 
(they were binary), I further hypothesise that when one level was associated with the left 
key, then the other level was automatically associated with the opposite key. Thus, c8 
actually triggered the following three binary feature-response mappings: 
shape cue == left | colour cue == right 
white == left | black == right 
circle == left | hexagon = right 
 
Similarly to the specific combination c8, all cue-stimulus combinations from 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 can trigger three binary feature-response mappings. In general, I 
propose that any task-cueing paradigm with a shared stimulus-set can trigger the three binary 
features-response mappings. For visual tasks (e.g., Experiments 2.1 and 2.2), the mappings 
were all visual, whereas for linguistic tasks (e.g., Experiments 4.1 and 4.2), the mappings 
involved some semantic representations. In short, building on the idea of task-set inertia, I 
propose that interference is actually based on three binary feature-response mappings.  
5.3.2 The Sum of Interferences 
 Proactive interference sometimes causes very little and sometimes large interference 
in subsequent trials. If this was not the case, then there would be no difference between 
repeat trials and switch trials on average. This section will demonstrate how interference 
may vary from trial to trial, and how to calculate the interference difference.  
 Let us assume that in trial n - 1, the combination c8 appears, and in trial n, one of 
the eight combinations appears randomly. Since different combinations trigger different 
feature-response mappings, trial n - 1 can affect trial n differently. As illustrated in Figure 
5.7b, in some trials all three feature-response mappings are compatible with the previous 
trial. In other trials one or two feature-response mappings are incompatible. Yet, in other 
trials all three pairs are incompatible. Notice that “incompatible” means that the feature-
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response mappings are reversed between trials. For example, if in trial n - 1, white == left | 
black == right, but in trial n, black == left | white == right, then we can say the colour-
response mappings are incompatible between the two trials. According to previous studies 
(e.g., Hommel, 1998, 2005), this feature-response incompatibility can delay the response.  
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Figure 5.7. Illustration of interference between trials. (a) If c8 is presented in trial n - 1, 
three pairs of feature–response mappings will be activated. (b) In trial n, there are eight 
different possibilities that can activate different feature–response mappings. (c) Depending 
on which combination appears in trial n, the proactive feature–response mappings from trial 
n -1 will cause different amounts of interference. (d) Very rarely (6.25%; see Appendix A) 
participants may experience three different interferences at the same time in trial n.    
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  For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that each incompatible feature-response 
mapping between trials contributes exactly one unit of interference. We can then estimate 
the amount of interference that participants may experience from the previous trial (ranging 
from one to three units; see Figure 5.7c and d). As there are eight possible cue-stimulus 
combinations, progressing from trial n - 1 to trial n will create 64 different possibilities: 32 
repeat trials in which trial n and trial n - 1 share the same cue and 32 switch trials in which 
the cue differs. By calculating the sum of the interference for the repeat and switch trials and 
dividing each by 32, we get the average interference for repeat trials and switch trials in 
arbitrary units. 
On average, each repeat trial will receive 1 unit of interference from the previous 
trial. On the other hand each switch trial will have an average of 1.5 units of interference 
(see Appendix A for details). The .5 difference may explain why interference alone can 
produce the task-switching costs in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, even when we rule out the task-
switching strategy and the task-set reconfiguration process task-switching strategy.  
Units of Interference in Experiment 5.1 
Here I applied this logic in order to quantify the interferences and explain switching 
costs. Firstly, I focused on Experiment 5.1. This experiment applied the same eight cue-
stimulus combinations as in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2. The only difference was the 
arrangement between cue-stimulus and response: the same combination could been assigned 
to the same or a different response key. Therefore, each cue-stimulus combination could 
have a binary feature-response mapping that was different to Experiment 2.1 and 2.2. For 
example, in Experiment 5.1 combination c8 was assigned to a right response. Thus, this 
could result in three alternative feature-response mappings: 
colour cue == left | shape cue == right 
black == left | white == right 
hexagon == left | circle == right 
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 In Experiment 5.1, shifting from trial n - 1 to trial n created 64 different possible 
interferences in 32 repeat and 32 switch trials. Applying the above logic, I calculated the 
average interference that participants experienced in the repeat trials and in the switch trials 
of Experiment 5.1 (see Appendix A for details). On average, participants experienced 1.0625 
units of interference in the repeat trials, but 1.68 units of interference in the switch trials. 
There is a difference of .62 units between the switch trials and the repeat trials. This 
demonstrates that a modified proactive interference account can explain the task-switching 
costs in Experiment 5.1.  
The Weak Interference in the Chinese Number Paradigm 
 In Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, the non-Chinese group did not know the semantic task-
relevant features of the Chinese numbers. For them the Chinese numbers were meaningless 
symbols. Consequently, these participants could only identify two features or two layers of 
information (the cue and the Chinese number) from each cue-stimulus combination. 
Furthermore, because the Chinese numbers had four levels (e.g., 五,六,七,八 for Experiment 
4.1 and  壹,贰,捌,玖 for Experiment 4.2), these numbers could not form any binary feature-
response mappings as in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2 and in Experiment 5.1. Hence, the only 
source of interference must have come from the binary cue-response mappings. In 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, the congruent numbers have the same response key in both tasks; 
the cue is irrelevant. Therefore, the “bottom first” strategy specially requires participants to 
identify the number and to ignore the cue, under congruency conditions. In an incongruent 
trial, both the cue and the stimulus determine the correct response. Hence, the cue-response 
mapping could only cause interference in very rare situations: when both trial n - 1 and trial 
n were incongruent trials with different cues. I suggest that there was not enough interference 
to create task-switching costs. In fact, cue-response mappings would not produce 
interference even if participants identified them in every trial. Applying the same calculation 
of interference to Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, I found that, on average, both repeat and switch 
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trials had about the same .5 unit of interference due to the cue-response mapping in the 
previous trial. The interference alone could not produce task-switching costs in Experiments 
4.1 and 4.2. 
Units of Interference and Non-task-relevant Features 
In some trials in Experiment 3.1 and 3.2, the non-task-relevant feature in each 
stimulus may have prevented participants from employing the task-relevant feature. When 
participants applied the LUT strategy, they did not need to identify the cue. Therefore, they 
may have activated only one feature-response mapping: the non-task-relevant feature-
response mapping. As the non-task-relevant feature had eight levels, it is difficult for 
participant to form a binary feature-response mapping. This may not have produced enough 
interference to create task-switching costs. 
Interference in the Dual-cue Paradigm 
 Forrest et al. (2014) applied the dual-cue task-switching paradigm in their 
experiments. Each task had two cues, and there was a total of four task cues. Therefore, in 
some trials the cue switched while the task remained the same (i.e., cue-switch trials). In this 
paradigm, task-switching costs were measured as the difference between the task-switching 
trials and the cue-switching trials. The difference between cue-switching trials and cue-
repeating trials is called the cue-switching cost (see Chapter 1, Section 1.8.1). 
Experiment 3 in Forrest et al. (2014) was a typical dual-cue task-switching paradigm. 
The four cues were: circle, triangle, square, and pentagon (see Figure 5.8). The two tasks 
were: the odd/even task and the big/small task. For the odd/even task, the participants were 
asked to decide whether a number was odd or even (odd == press left key; even == press 
right key). For the big/small task, a participant had to decide whether a number was smaller 
than 5.5 or bigger than 5.5 (small == press left key; big == press right key). Their results 
suggest that significant task-switching costs remained after controlling the task-switching 
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strategy. Therefore, we can examine whether the modified proactive-interference account 
would also predict task-switching costs in such a dual-cue paradigm. 
 
Figure 5.8. Cue-stimulus combination in Experiment 3, Forrest et al. (2014).  
  
 
Since there were four task cues and four stimuli, there was a total of 16 cue-stimulus 
combinations. Thus, trial n - 1 and trial n gave 256 different possible permutations between 
these cue-stimulus combinations. Figure 5.9 lists 16 possible examples. Since the cues have 
four levels, it is difficult to form binary cue-response mappings. I assume that the 
interference arose from two semantic binary feature-response mappings: the magnitude-
response mapping and the parity-response mapping. According to my calculations, on 
average, a cue-switch trial had .5 units of interference due to the previous trial. Furthermore, 
a task-switch trial had an average of 1 unit of interference due to the previous trial (see 
Appendix A). There was a .5 unit difference between the task-switching trials and the cue-
switching trials. Therefore, my modified interference account can explain the remaining 
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task-switching costs in Forrest et al. (2014).  
 
Figure 5.9. Calculate the interference from a typical dual-cue task-switching paradigm. 
 
 
 It is important to point out that, on average, a cue-repeat trial had 1 unit of 
interference. In other words, my modified interference account predicts, that after controlling 
the task-switching strategy, interference between different features can only produce task-
switching costs but not cue-switching costs. However, Forrest et al. (2014) did not report 
cue-switching costs. We do not know whether or not they found any cue-switching costs. 
Although there is no direct evidence to refute the modified proactive interference account 
any cue-switching costs would disprove this account. 
5.3.3 Summary 
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In summary, applying the same cue-stimulus combinations as in Experiments 2.1 and 
2.2 but with different arrangements, I controlled the task-set reconfiguration process but 
demonstrated switching costs nevertheless. Based on Allport and colleagues' proactive 
interference account (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; 
Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006), Woodward et al.’s 
(2003) interpretation of the feature-response mapping, and the studies of feature response 
integration (Hommel 1998, 2004, 2005) I propose a simple method to approximate the 
amount of interference in a single trial. I demonstrated that as long as the repeat trials had 
on average less interference than the switch trials, significant switching costs remained.  
 In Experiment 5.1, switch trials no longer triggered greater  task-set reconfiguration 
process than the repeat trials. I suggested that  the proactive interference alone produced the 
task-switching costs. Therefore, I have shown that proactive interference can be a source of 
switching costs independent of the task-set reconfiguration process. This account can explain 
task-switching costs, even when participants do not apply a task-switching strategy. Other 
possible explanations will be discussed in the final chapter.  
Specifically, I have demonstrated that interference is not always a by-product of a 
task (or task-set). In line with previous studies (Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; 
Wylie & Allport, 2000), I suggest that interference is the result of stimulus-response and 
feature-response mappings in general (Woodward et al., 2003; Hommel, 1998). In particular, 
I suggest that the cue also serves as a feature among different cue-stimulus combinations. 
Hence, each cue-stimulus-response mapping has three potential features. When a participant 
gives a response three binary feature-response mappings are active. Those mappings are 
either compatible or incompatible with the mappings formed in the previous trial. When the 
mappings are incompatible (reversed), they create interference. In a typical task-switching 
experiment with shared stimulus-sets, a switch trial has more incompatibilities, and therefore 
more interference, than a repeat trial.  
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5.3.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
There is a small problem in the present calculations. In order to make calculations of 
interference simpler, I assume that each feature incompatibility (i.e., the cue, the shape, and 
the colour) creates the same amount of interference (1 unit per feature). However, it seems 
very likely that the colour-response, shape-response, and cue-response mappings produce 
different amounts of interference. This is not a major problem, because if we only look at 
the difference between the switch and repeat trials, differences between the three types of 
feature-response mappings may balance each other out so that the difference between the 
two conditions remains the same. However, if researchers want to predict interference in 
single trials, then this would become a problem. For example, if trial n and trial m both had 
one unit of interference due to trial n - 1 and trial m - 1, respectively then the current method 
would assume that trial n and m receive the same amount of interference. However, if trial 
n received interference from a colour-response mapping, and trial m received interference 
from a shape-response mapping,the amounts of interference in trial n and trial m might be 
different. The calculation method is not specific enough yet to reflect this difference. 
Therefore, I describe an interference task-switching paradigm that should create equal 
amounts of interference, as a potential future study (see Figure 5.10). The results of this 
paradigm may further confirm or refute the modified proactive interference account. 
 
Figure 5.10. In a paradigm with balanced interferences, the three layers of information 
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(features) are the colour of the top, middle, and bottom bar. Each feature should produce the 
same amount of interference. (a) The cue-stimulus mappings. (b) The task rules. 
  
 
There are also two major disadvantages of the calculation method I described above. 
Firstly, modified interference assumes that, when the task-switching strategy is controlled, 
only binary feature-response mappings trigger interference. If a feature is not binary (e.g., 
the feature has four different levels), I assume the feature-response mapping does not trigger 
interference. This assumption needs further discussion. Nevertheless, such an assumption is 
not groundless. Task-switching experiments typically apply only one binary response-set: 
identical motor responses are used in each task (e.g., press the left key or the right key). This 
set-up allows participants to form binary feature-response mappings. In contrast, some 
experiments assign different response keys to each task. For instance, an experiment might 
require participants to press a right or left response key in the colour task and press an upper 
or lower response key in the shape task (e.g., Brass et al., 2003). As the response-set has four 
levels, participants can never form binary feature-response mappings in such an experiment. 
Previous studies have suggested that, without binary response-sets, task-switching costs are 
usually smaller (Brass et al., 2003; Yeung & Monsell, 2003; Meiran, 2005; but also see 
Mueller, Swainson & Jackson, 2007).  
It is reasonable to suggest that at least a certain amount of interference can be 
attributed to binary feature-response mappings. Future studies can examine this assumption 
by conducting a shared stimulus-set task-switching experiment using visual stimuli. If the 
experiment incorporates different response keys for each task, the modified interference 
account would predict no task-switching costs, once the task-switching strategy has been 
controlled, because there would be no binary feature-response mappings at all. Conversely, 
if we found any task-switching costs after controlling the task-switching strategy in such an 
experiment, my modified interference account would need to be modified further.    
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Secondly, it can be argued that I did not eliminate the task-set reconfiguration process 
in a genuine task-switching experiment. By changing the arrangement, I also modified the 
design of the paradigm altogether. Therefore, Experiment 5.1 would no longer qualify as a 
task-switching experiment. I assumed implicitly that the interference in Experiment 5.1 and 
the interference in a typical task-switching experiment would have the same source. I 
therefore proposed that the same calculations could predict the interference in both 
Experiment 5.1 and Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. However, since the paradigms differ, providing 
sufficient proof that both interferences have the same hidden mechanism is logically 
impossible. The ultimate solution is to develop a task-switching experiment in which some 
participants can identify the task and others cannot. However, all the participants have to 
identify the task-relevant features before obtaining the correct response. This is one of the 
goals of my future studies. 
5.3.5 Alternative Methods to Test the Interference Account 
Another potential methodology that can further test the interference account is EEG 
recording and more specifically, the study of event-related potentials (ERP). Previous ERP 
studies have provided evidence for both the task-set reconfiguration account and the 
interference account (for a recent review, see Karayanidis & Jamadar, 2014). Firstly, ERP 
studies consistently report a relative positive shift for switch trials compared with repeat 
trials (maximal over central and parietal scalp with peaks around 400–600 ms after the task 
cue appears). It is believed that this positive post-cue shift reflects an advance preparation 
process in task-switching──a process that the task-set reconfiguration account proposed 
(e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2003; Lavric, Mizon & Monsell, 2008). ERP studies have also 
shown the robust effects of task-switching after the stimuli appears. After the target stimuli 
appears, switch trials tend to show a larger N2 and smaller P3 than repeat trials and therefore 
show a broad centroparietal maximal negative waveform. These post-stimuli negative 
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waveforms have been associated with interference and carry-over of activities from the 
previous to the current trial (e.g., Hsieh & Yu, 2003; Hsieh & Chen, 2006; Karayanidis et 
al., 2003). Further ERP studies may be able to examine the idea that we can eliminate the 
task-set reconfiguration process while still preserving the interference. For example, if this 
idea is correct, by inducing participants to perform a CSI task-switching experiment without 
applying a task-switching strategy, the positive post-cue shift should be reduced or 
eliminated, whereas the post-stimuli negativity should be unaffected. 
 
Note 
This is the last experimental chapter. The link below provides demos of my 
experiments (including Experiments 2.1, 3.1, 4.2 and 5.1). Although the online demos are 
slightly different from the real experiments (e.g., fewer experimental trials, different 
response keys and feedback durations), the key characteristics such as the stimuli and 
timelines are identical. The online demos will be updated with each version of Psytoolkit: 
(http://www.psytoolkit.org/#_web_based_login). 
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Chapter 6: Can the LUT Approach Explain Animal Task-switching 
Behaviours? 
To understand why monkeys and pigeons can perform task-switching experiments 
without any task-switching costs (Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Avdagic, et al., 2013; Castro & 
Wasserman, 2016; Meier et al., 2016; but  see Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011), this thesis 
investigated under what conditions human participants mirror pigeons' and monkeys' task-
switching behaviour——performing task-switching experiments without showing any task-
switching costs. In particular, I focused on how human participants can complete a task-
switching experiment without switching between two tasks. This is because many previous 
studies have reasoned that animals do not switch between tasks in the first place (Dreisbach 
et al., 2006, 2007; Meier et al., 2016; Forrest et al., 2014). Instead, it was suggested that 
animals memorised all stimulus-response mappings, forming a LUT. Since the LUT does 
not require task-set reconfiguration processes that are required by the task-switching 
strategy, task-switching costs can be eliminated.  
However, for human participants, the LUT approach only works under certain 
conditions. Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 replicated the results of Dreisbach et al. (2006, 2007) 
and demonstrated that, as long as two separate stimulus-sets are used in a task-switching 
experiment, the LUT approach can always eliminate the task-switching costs. Alternatively, 
if the task-switching paradigm applies a shared stimulus-set, human participants cannot 
apply the LUT. Instead, participants seem to create novel strategies. For example, 
participants created the “black and white” strategy in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and the BF 
strategy in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. Moreover, task-switching costs remained significant 
(e.g., Chapter 2; Forrest et al., 2014) unless semantic tasks were used as in Experiments 4.1 
and 4.2.  
Previous animal studies, on the other hand, usually applied task-switching 
experiments with visual tasks and shared stimulus-sets (e.g., Stoet & Snyder, 2003; Caselli 
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& Chelazzi, 2011; Avdagic, et al., 2013; Meier et al., 2016; Castro & Wasserman, 2016). I 
conclude that the reason animals can remove task-switching costs is not due to the 
elimination of the task-set reconfiguration process or to the application of an LUT approach. 
At least, the LUT approach does not seem to be the full story. There may be additional factors 
that can be attributed to differences in cognition between humans and animals.  
One critical factor may be proactive interference. As suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, 
once the interference from the previous trial was removed and the task-set reconfiguration 
process was controlled, task-switching costs could be eliminated in humans. In the following 
sections, I will attempt to explain the behavioural differences between humans, pigeons and 
monkeys in task-switching experiments between humans based on the interference account. 
I will discuss pigeons and monkeys separately (Li, Li, Lages & Stoet, 2017). 
6.1 Task-Switching in Humans and Pigeons 
In this section, I will discuss two possible explanations for the difference in task-
switching behaviour between humans and pigeons. The first explanation is developed from 
Meier et al. (2016). The second explanation is developed from Castro and Wasserman 
(2016). Both explanations focus on the absence of interference.   
6.1.1 Missing Interference 
Meier et al. (2016) suggest that, unlike human participants, who can always identify 
the cue and the stimulus separately, pigeons may always encode the task cue, the stimulus, 
and even the location of the response key as one compound (i.e., a cue + stimulus + 
response). Therefore, they suggest that, based on Pearce’s generalisation rule (1987), 
humans would generate more than twice as much task-switching cost as pigeons, so that 
pigeons’ small task-switching costs become undetectable. I speculate another possibility is 
that, because pigeons encode all elements together, they do not identify the task-relevant 
features separately, as in Meier et al.’s (2016) experiment. In other words, just as the non-
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Chinese participants in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 could not identify the semantic task features 
in a Chinese number, pigeons did not identify the visual task feature in a visual stimulus. 
Thus, I propose that the pigeons in Meier et al. (2016) did not experience enough interference 
from the previous trial to produce task-switching costs. Furthermore, many studies have 
suggested that pigeons do not have a sophisticated executive control process (e.g., Lea & 
Wills, 2008; Lea et al., 2009; Maes et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Wills 
et al., 2009). Thus, the pigeons cannot have any task-set reconfiguration process either. In 
summary, since pigeons have neither proactive interference nor task-set reconfiguration 
processes, they do not generate task-switching costs.  
One disadvantage of this explanation is that I can only assume that pigeons did not 
identify the task-relevant features in the task-switching experiments. However, it is difficult 
to test this assumption. In addition, it was pointed out in a number of studies that birds have 
selective attention and the ability to categorise abstract information (cf. Soto and 
Wasserman, 2010; Soto & Wasserman, 2014; Castro and Wasserman, 2016). It is therefore 
possible that pigeons can actually identify the task-relevant features and experience 
interference from the previous trial in a similar way to humans. Nevertheless, this is a 
question that is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
6.1.2 Long ITIs 
 Castro and Wasserman (2016) argued that pigeons did not perform in their 
experiment without interruption. This is because, after obtaining a correct response, their 
pigeons had to turn around and peck the rewards. Monkeys did not have the same problem 
in related experiments. For example, Stoet and Snyder (2003) inserted a water tube inside 
the monkeys’ mouths, and the reward (water) was provided to them automatically. Avdagic 
et al. (2013) allowed their monkeys to pick up a piece of banana by hand once they 
successfully finished a trial. The reward processes were relatively short: less than four 
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seconds. 
However, pigeons’ pecking behaviour made the inter-trial interval (ITI) far longer 
than in the monkey and the human experiments. In Castro and Wasserman’s study (2016), 
the ITI was between eight and 12 seconds. In Meier et al. (2016), the ITI was between 15 
and 30 seconds. In comparison, human task-switching experiments always progress very 
rapidly. The usual ITI is often less than 1000 ms and studies with an ITI longer than ten 
seconds are very scarce. For human participants, only a small number of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) task-switching studies had such a long ITI (e.g., Barder & Carter, 
2005; Ravizza & Carter, 2008). Thus, Castro and Wasserman (2016) pointed out that settings 
and paradigms in pigeon studies may have been less conducive to producing task-switching 
costs. Pigeons may exhibit task-switching costs for shorter ITIs——an issue that needs to 
be tested in future experiments. I therefore propose that, even if pigeons experience 
interference from previous trials, this effect may have faded after a long ITI.  
However, in fMRI studies with long ITIs, human participants still showed significant 
task-switching costs (Barder & Carter, 2005; Ravizza & Carter, 2008). Since all participants 
received explicit task-switching instructions, the task-set reconfiguration process can explain 
these task-switching costs. If the ITI is more than ten seconds, and if we can rule out task-
switching strategy then even human participants may show no task-switching costs.  
6.1.3 Summary 
  I have proposed two potential explanations for the absence of task-switching costs 
in pigeons. The first explanation requires the additional assumption that pigeons do not 
process the task-relevant features in task-switching. The second explanation is relatively 
straightforward. I suggest that long ITIs in pigeon task-switching experiments may reduce, 
or even counteract, interference from the previous trial. 
Nevertheless, both explanations suggest that, unlike human participants, pigeons do 
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not experience interference from preceding trials, nor can they apply a task-set 
reconfiguration process. As a result, pigeons do not show any task-switching costs. So 
humans may mirror pigeons’ behavioural characteristics in task-switching experiments if    
the task-relevant features (the source of interference) in the stimuli are obscured (e.g., 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2).  
6.2 Task-switching in Humans and Monkeys 
In many studies, it was assumed that neither monkeys nor pigeons applied a human 
task-switching strategy in task-switching experiments (e.g., Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; 
Meier et al., 2016; Forrest et al., 2014). Instead, they assumed that animals applied the LUT 
approach. In fact, this is the assumption I put forward in Chapter 2. However, after carefully 
reviewing the literature, I think there is sufficient evidence that monkeys switch between 
tasks similarly to humans. For example, Stoet and Snyder (2003) introduced eleven novel 
stimuli, interspersed with the practiced stimuli, to monkey M2. M2 performed significantly 
better than the chance level (M2 was correct in 10 out of 11 novel trials), which indicates 
that this monkey had learned to categorise different task features from the stimuli. If this 
monkey had only relied on the LUT approach, then its performance should have been at 
chance level for the novel stimuli. Moreover, further studies have suggested that monkeys’ 
neurons in the posterior parietal cortex encode task-set information independently of 
stimulus features (Stoet & Snyder, 2004).  
Further evidence was provided by Avdagic et al. (2013). Since the researchers 
applied a simultaneous chain (SimChain) paradigm, a pure LUT account cannot fully explain 
the monkeys’ behaviour in their study, for two reasons. Firstly, in this paradigm, stimuli and 
responses vary considerably across trials, without repetition. However, the LUT approach 
only works when the experiment repeats a minimal amount of stimulus-response mappings. 
Secondly, as the SimChain paradigm makes a set of items appear simultaneously in each 
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trial, the monkeys have to make a set of responses in a particular order according to the task 
rule. The feedback (correct or mistake) would not be given until the last item had been 
responded to. Therefore, if the monkeys applied an associative learning process or the LUT 
approach, it would be difficult for them to realise which step went wrong, so they could not 
receive any meaningful reinforcement (Jensen et al. 2013). It is hard to perform a SimChain 
paradigm without applying task rules.   
The monkeys’ zero task-switching costs performances indeed raised a problem. They 
obviously applied the task-switching strategy. The task-switching strategy requires 
participants to react to the task-relevant feature, so monkeys almost certainly identified task-
relevant features, and they could also have received interference from the previous trial. The 
proactive interference accounts would also predict that the monkeys would have task-
switching costs. Nevertheless, despite the fact that they had to deal with both the task-set 
reconfiguration process and the interference from the previous trial, they had no task-
switching costs.  
I can provide some hypotheses based on the following two pieces of evidence. 
Firstly, Stoet and Snyder (2003) included a 650 ms CSI. Therefore, their monkeys could 
only eliminate residual task-switching costs. In addition to this, we know that the monkeys 
from Stoet and Snyder (2003) demonstrated slight, but significant, task-switching costs 
when the ITI was short (170 ms). However, when the ITI was long (345 ms), they had no 
task-switching costs. In contrast, Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) applied a 700-ms ITI and 
Avdagic et al. (2013) applied an ITI of four seconds. The experiments in this thesis always 
had an ITI of 300 ms.  
Secondly, according to proactive interference account, residual task-switching costs 
are the result of interference triggered by previous trials. Interference decays only slowly 
over time (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000). As a 
consequence, even if the task-set reconfiguration process has been completed, interference 
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between trials can still produce a task-switching cost.  
6.2.1 Weak Interference 
I will now outline the hypotheses for weak interference. I hypotheses that unlike in 
humans, the interference monkeys receive from the previous trial decays very quickly. This 
explains why monkeys showed task-switching costs even when the ITI was only 170 ms. 
Although interference decays quickly, an ITI of 170 ms is too short for the interference to 
fade away entirely. If the ITI is longer, interference for monkeys may fade away completely 
so that the task-set reconfiguration process alone produces the task-switching costs. Thus, 
given enough preparation, task-switching costs can be eliminated. The following sections 
will discuss whether or not this lack of proactive interference can explain the results of 
another two monkey studies. 
The SimChain Paradigm and Interference 
 Unlike Stoet and Snyder (2003), who applied a conventional task-cueing paradigm, 
Avdagic et al. (2013) used a SimChain paradigm to investigate monkeys’ task-switching 
behaviour. In every trial, several circles were displayed on a touch screen simultaneously. 
Each circle had two dimensions: brightness, ranging from black (RGB 0, 0, 0) to light grey 
(RGB 220, 220, 220); and radius or size, ranging from 10 pixels (0.15 cm) to 70 pixels (1.05 
cm). Three monkeys were required to touch the circles in a sequence that was determined by 
the task rules. For example, in the brightness task, the monkeys had to touch the circles in 
the order of their luminosity, i.e., the lightest first, followed by a slightly darker, until, 
finally: the darkest item. Similarly, in the radius task, monkeys had to press the circles in the 
order of their radius or size, from the smallest to the largest circle. The cue was the 
background colour (blue == brightness; red == radius). In the final experimental section, the 
monkeys in Avdagic and colleagues’ study had to touch six different circles in the correct 
order according to the task rules (see Figure 6.1).    
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Figure 6.1. Illustration of the SimChain paradigm from Avdagic et al., 2013. In every trial, 
the monkeys had to touch each item (circle) in the correct order (from 1 to 6) based on the 




The position, size, and brightness of each item was randomised in every trial, so that 
the same stimulus and response would not be repeated. As a consequence, applying the LUT 
approach was not an efficient approach. A certain degree of cognition and generalisation 
was required. Moreover, based on the modified interference account that I proposed in 
Chapter 5, SimChain paradigms do not produce the same interference as task-cueing 
paradigms. The reason for this is that, under a typical task-cueing paradigm, each feature 
from the cue-stimulus combination can only link with two possible responses, so that a 
binary feature-response mapping is formed (e.g., black==left; white==right). In contrast, in 
a SimChain paradigm, each trial has a unique response pattern so that binary feature-
response mappings cannot be formed.  
Some studies have considered that interference originates from stimulus-task-set 
associations rather than the feature (or stimulus)-response mappings (Waszak et al., 2003; 
Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006). In these studies, both tasks may share 
the same stimuli. Therefore, in switch trials when the previous stimulus is repeated and when 
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the task-set switched, the previous stimulus-task-set association can interfere with the 
current stimulus-task-set association, producing task-switching costs. In a SimChain 
experiment as suggested by Avdagic et al. (2013), however, neither response nor stimulus 
were repeated during the experiment, so that stimulus-task-set associations could not 
interfere with each other. Thus, there should have been no interference between task-sets.  
Here, I suggest that SimChain paradigms do not produce the interference produced 
in conventional task-cueing paradigms. For a participant, whether human or monkey, task-
switching costs can be eliminated if they can complete the task-set reconfiguration process 
quickly enough. The SimChian paradigm was originally developed to study animal learning 
processes (Terrace, 1984, 2005). These studies focussed on how animals can make a 
sequence of responses based on their understanding of abstract rules or concepts, rather than 
through a pure associative learning process (for a review, see Terrace, 2005). Compared with 
the task-cueing paradigm, the SimChain paradigm is rarely used in task-switching studies. 
In addition, Avdagic and colleagues (2013) did not use human participants as a control 
group; they only included three monkeys in their study. Therefore, we do not know whether 
or not human participants would demonstrate task-switching costs under this particular 
SimChain paradigm. It is possible that human participants might also have shown no task 
switching costs.  
In short, by applying the SimChain paradigm, the results by Avdagic et al. (2013) 
may not support the idea that monkeys can switch between two tasks better than humans for 
two reasons. Firstly, even if monkeys experience interference similarly to humans, the 
SimChain paradigm does not create interference as a typical task-cueing paradigm does. 
Therefore, performances under the SimChain paradigm and performances under task-cueing 
paradigms are difficult to compare. Secondly, no evidence was provided that humans would 
demonstrate task-switching costs if they performed under the same paradigm as the 
monkeys.   
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Poor Performance and Task-switching Costs 
In contrast to Stoet and Snyder (2003) and Avdagic et al. (2013), Caselli and Chelazzi 
(2011) found significant task-switching costs in monkeys. Unsurprisingly, researchers who 
favour the associative learning account often ignore this study. Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) 
applied a typical task-cueing paradigm which was very similar to that used by Stoet and 
Snyder (2003). Two monkeys (M1 and M2) and eight humans performed a colour task and 
an orientation task and switched between tasks in some trials. However, each task had four 
levels. For the colour task, green and yellow == left; red and blue == right. For the orientation 
tasks, the four levels were vertical, horizontal, and two orthogonal oblique orientations. The 
clockwise oblique and horizontal stimuli were linked to the left key; the counter-clockwise 
oblique and vertical stimuli were linked to the right key (see Figure 6.2).  
 
Figure 6.2. Illustration of task rules and task cues in the experiment by Caselli and Chelazzi 
(2011). Each task had four different levels.  
 
 
In order to explain the disagreement between Stoet and Snyder (2003) and Caselli & 
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Chelazzi (2011), Avdagic et al. (2013) suggested that the monkeys in Caselli and Chelazzi’s 
study were simply not well-trained enough. Stoet and Snyder’s (2003) monkeys received 
approximately 100,000 practice trials before the final experimental section with more than 
1,000 trials. In contrast, Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) did not report the number of training 
trials and only mentioned that subjects received “several training sessions”. Moreover, 
Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) had considerably higher error rates (M1 = 11.1%, M2 = 18.2%) 
than the monkeys in Stoet and Snyder (2003) (M1 = 4.7%, M2 = 6.9%). Indeed, it would 
seem that the monkeys in Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) were not as well-trained as the 
monkeys in Stoet and Snyder (2003).  
Nevertheless, Avdagic et al. (2013) did not explain why poor performance or less 
training would produce significantly more task-switching costs. It may be argued that in 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, non-Chinese participants performed worse than Chinese 
participants because they were not familiar with the Chinese numbers. Therefore, their error 
rates were higher than those of the Chinese participants. However, the non-Chinese 
participants showed no task-switching costs in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. Poor performance 
does not necessarily imply increased task-switching costs.  
Since both studies on monkeys included a preparation interval or CSI, I hypothesise 
that the task-switching costs might reflect that Caselli and Chelazzi’s (2011) monkeys were 
not able to fully reconfigure the task-set in advance during a CSI of 700 ms. There are two 
factors that might have caused incomplete preparations. Firstly, with the introduction of four 
levels in each task, the task-sets were more complex than those of Stoet and Snyder (2003). 
Secondly, as explained above, the monkeys in Caselli and Chelazzi (2011) might have 
received less training than those of Stoet and Snyder (2003). Therefore, since the task-set 
reconfiguration process may not have been completed during the CSI, monkeys’ task-
switching costs were larger in the study by Caselli and Chelazzi (2011).  
6.2.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
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I suggest that the monkeys’ outstanding task-switching behaviour was the result of 
their task-set reconfiguration process. Monkeys may have experienced only very small 
interference between trials. Hence, once the task-set reconfiguration was completed, task-
switching costs vanished. In the following section I discuss interference in general terms. It 
is possible that  interference arose from stimuli-response mapping (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; 
Allport & Wylie 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000), or  from binary feature-response mapping, 
according to my modified interference account in Chapter 5, or that interference was created 
by stimulus-task-set associations (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Koch & 
Allport, 2006). The main point is that these monkeys only received very limited interference 
from previous trials.  
In order to examine this hypothesis, it would be interesting to manipulate the CSI 
and ITI in a monkey task-switching experiment. Firstly, we could compare task-switching 
behaviour in monkeys between composite conditions (CSI = 0 ms) and CSI conditions (e.g., 
CSI = 650 ms) with fixed ITI (e.g., 350 ms). If my hypothesis holds true, monkeys could 
eliminate task-switching costs in some CSI conditions but not in composite conditions. In 
composite conditions, it is impossible for the monkeys to reconfigure the task-sets in 
advance. Furthermore,  task-switching costs in monkeys may  be significant  as soon as  we 
reduce the ITI from 350 ms to 100 ms. Although  interference may decay quickly in 
monkeys, according to the  results of Stoet and Snyder (2003), I suggest that  a  100-ms ITI 
is too short for interference to fade away completely.   
In short, I suggest that monkeys can only eliminate task-switching costs in the 650-
CSI-350-ITI condition, but not in the 0-CSI-350-ITI and 650-CSI-100-ITI conditions. In a 
0-CSI-350-ITI condition, the task-set reconfiguration process is likely to produce task-
switching costs. In a 650-CSI-100-ITI condition, it may be proactive interference.  
6.3 Humans, Pigeons, and Monkeys 
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 In summary, I propose that pigeons and monkeys eliminate task-switching costs in 
different ways (see also Figure 6.3). I propose that pigeons do not experience interference 
from the previous trial and that they cannot apply a rule-based strategy requiring executive 
control. As a result, they do not show any task-switching costs. Alternatively, I propose that 
task-switching costs in monkeys are primarily caused by task-set reconfiguration. Compared 
to proactive interference in humans, proactive interference in monkeys may decay more 
quickly, so that this has only a very limited impact. This difference in decay may reflect 
differences between species. As a consequence, if monkeys are well-trained and the 
preparation time is long enough, then they can complete the task-set reconfiguration process 
and residual task-switching costs will be eliminated. Task-switching costs in humans 
originate from at least two independent sources: the task-set reconfiguration process and the 
interference from the previous trial. Therefore, we can only eliminate human task-switching 
costs when both sources are controlled.    
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Figure 6.3. Diagram illustrating overlap of cognitive functions between humans, monkeys 
and pigeons. The black outer circle separates the three species. The concentric circle and 
coloured arches at the centre represent different cognitive functions in each species. Humans 
have two cognitive functions that can cause task-switching costs. Monkeys have one (i.e., 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
This final chapter focuses on two topics. Firstly, from Section 7.1 to section 7.5, I 
will discuss alternative accounts that can explain task-switching costs in the absence of the 
task-switching strategy. I will compare these with the modified interference account from 
Chapter 5. Secondly, in section 7.6, I will summarise the current understanding of task-
switching costs and outline some implications based on the results of the experiments in the 
present thesis. 
7.1 Interference and Task-switching Costs without Task-switching 
One important aim of this thesis is to explain the surprising observation of task-
switching costs when participants do not switch between two tasks. In this thesis, after I 
controlled the task-switching strategy and the task-set reconfiguration process, task-
switching costs sometimes disappeared (e.g., Experiments 4.1 and 4.2; Experiments 3.1 and 
3.2), but at other times, task-switching costs remained statistically significant (e.g., 
Experiments. 2.1 and 2.2). In Chapter 5, I proposed a modified interference account. This 
account suggested that the interference from the previous trial could be triggered by binary 
feature-response mappings and might create task-switching costs even without participants 
switching between tasks. Hence, I proposed that participants could not eliminate task-
switching costs unless they could eliminate both the task-set reconfiguration process and the 
interference from binary feature-response mappings.  
For example, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, semantic interference was prevented by the 
use of Chinese numbers, especially for the non-Chinese participants, who could only 
perceive these as meaningless symbols. As a consequence, there were not enough binary 
feature-response mappings to produce interference. Hence, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, 
without participants having an explicit understanding of the task-switching strategy, both the 
task-set reconfiguration and the semantic interference disappeared, and task-switching costs 
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eventually vanished, too. In contrast, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 applied visual tasks and visual 
interference was unavoidable, so task-switching costs remained significant even when 
participants did not switch between tasks.  
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the modified interference account can explain the 
results of Experiments 2.1 to 5.1 and the results of Forrest et al. (2014). However, previous 
studies have provided several different accounts. In the following section, I will discuss 
whether these accounts provide alternative explanations to the proactive interference 
account. I will discuss the Compound Retrieval account first.  
7.2. Compound Retrieval Account and Task-switching Costs 
The idea that human participants can complete a task-switching experiment without 
applying the task-switching strategy was first proposed by Logan and colleagues (Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Logan et al., 2007; Arrington & Logan, 2004; Schneider & Logan, 2005, 
2007; Logan & Schneider, 2006a, b; Logan & Schneider, 2010). In this series of studies, 
they proposed the compound retrieval account. This account suggests that participants might 
not apply the task-switching strategy. Instead, participants may apply a compound retrieval 
strategy: forming cue-stimulus compounds and retrieving the corresponding response for 
each compound from memory directly (episodically or semantically). In this case, task-
switching costs in fact reveal an extra cue-encoding process. In Chapter 1, I have discussed 
the compound retrieval account.  
Each of  the experiments in the present thesis had a fairly small stimulus-set. 
Therefore, according to Arrington and Logan (2004), participants would have applied the 
compound retrieval strategy at the episodic level. More importantly, these experiments had 
only one cue per task, so that cue-switching costs could not be separated from the task-
switching costs. The compound retrieval account predicts that, in Experiments 2.1 to 5.1, the 
task-switching costs will remain significant even when participants do not apply the task-
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switching strategy. The task-switching costs are caused by the cue-encoding disadvantage 
in switch trials. In other words, the tasl-switching costs are actually cue-switching costs.   
 Logan and colleagues’ compound retrieval account can explain the results of 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2: without participants having any understanding of the task rules, 
task-switching costs were still significant and reflected the cue-encoding process. However, 
in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2, the task-switching costs completely disappeared when the task-
switching strategy was controlled. Based on the compound retrieval account, one may argue 
that in Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 a separate stimulus-sets design was applied. Therefore, when 
participants applied the “Look-up table” (LUT) approach, the task cue could be ignored. In 
contrast, many dual-cue task-switching experiments applied shared stimulus-sets (e.g., 
Logan, & Bundesen, 2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Schmitz & Voss, 2014). 
A limitation of compound retrieval account is revealed by the Chinese number 
experiments in Chapter 4. Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 applied a shared stimulus-set design, just 
as in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. Based on the compound retrieval account, participants would 
have had to identify the cue before they could obtain the correct response. Hence, 
participants should have had task-switching costs that reflected the cue-encoding process. 
However, no such task-switching costs were observed in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. Therefore, 
the compound retrieval account is not compatible with the results of Experiments 4.1 and 
4.2.  
 In typical cue-switching studies, participants were explicitly required to switch 
between tasks, and all participants seemed to apply the task-switching strategy. As was 
demonstrated in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, there is no evidence of any cue-encoding process 
when participants do not apply the task-switching strategy. Therefore,  in contrast to Logan 
et al.’s (2003) original assumption, which suggested that task-switching costs only reflect 
cue-switching costs caused by the compound retrieval strategy, I propose that, if cue-
switching costs exist, they might be a by-product of the task-switching strategy.  
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Later studies have proven, with both behavioural data and with brain imaging that 
the cue-switching process exists independently of the task-switching process(for a review 
see Jost et al., 2013). In these studies, it was suggested that cue-switching costs originated 
from an active control process, rather than from the perceptual priming of the cue itself as 
originally proposed by Logan and colleagues (cf., Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schneider & 
Logan, 2005). For example, it was suggested in some studies that cue-switching costs reflect 
an activation of the task-set representations in working memory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; 
Grange & Houghton, 2009).  
I propose that there is a potential interplay between participants’ strategies and the 
cue-encoding process. Perhaps, when participants are applying the task-switching strategy, 
a task cue also gives them a certain amount of task-relevant information, as previous studies 
have suggested (e.g., Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Grange & Houghton, 2009). As a consequence, 
this cue-encoding process would require more cognitive effort, triggering cue-switching 
costs. Alternatively, when participants are applying novel strategies like the “bottom first” 
(BF) strategy, the task cue no longer represents a conventional task. As a result, the cue-
encoding process would be relatively simple causing no detectable cue-switching costs. 
7.3 Associative Learning and Task-switching 
Some studies (e.g., Forrest et al., 2014; Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007), especially the 
animal task-switching studies (e.g., Meier et al., 2016; Castro & Wasserman, 2016), have 
focussed on two different learning approaches. The first is an associative learning process: 
learning according to the outcome of each response, which allows subjects (humans or 
animals) to remember the links between stimuli and responses. The second is a cognitive 
learning process, governed by the executive control system. Using the latter learning process, 
subjects obtain the correct response by applying the task-switching strategy. They deduce 
correct the responses by applying task rules. Forrest et al. (2014) proposed that, in a 
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conventional task-switching experiment, human subjects may apply both of these learning 
approaches. However, after removing the task rule-based instructions, Forrest et al. (2014) 
suggested that humans only apply the associative learning process. They concluded that the 
remaining task-switching costs must be the result of the associative learning process.  
Before embarking on further discussion, one important difference between Forrest et 
al. (2014) and Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 needs to be addressed. It remains unknown whether 
or not the participants in Forrest et al. (2014) really performed the experiment in a purely 
associative manner. Nevertheless, based on the results of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, I propose 
that the novel BF strategy is not just a post-hoc oral report, but describes a genuine rule-
based strategy. Similarly to the task-switching strategy the BF strategy also requires a 
cognitive learning process. It seems unreasonable to assume that participants can only learn 
correct responses via associative learning, and to completely rule out the possibility of 
executive control.  
In order to compare the results of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 with previous studies (e.g., 
Forrest et al., 2014; Meier et al., 2016), we may assume that after controlling for task-
switching as a strategy, any remaining cognitive learning process produces no task-switching 
costs. Moreover, if there are any task-switching costs, we would assign them to associative 
learning. In the following, I will discuss two different associative learning accounts and how 
they can explain the existence and absence of task-switching costs after controlling for task-
switching.   
7.3.1 The Adaptively Parametrised Error Correcting System (APECS) Model 
 Forrest et al. (2014) analysed their data using the APECS model. APECS is a three-
layer backpropagation localist connectionist network (McLaren, Forrest & McLaren, 2012; 
Maclaren, 1993). Originally, the APECS model was developed to explain several associative 
learning effects including perceptual learning, latent inhibition, the Espinet Effect, and 
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Sequential Learning Problems (see McLaren, Forrest & McLaren, 2012). In the next section, 
I will introduce a classic example of the sequential learning effect (Barnes & Underwood, 
1959; McCloskey & Cohen, 1989; Ratcliff, 1990) in order to demonstrate the link between 
these learning effects and task-switching. 
Sequential Learning and Task-switching 
 Barnes and Underwood (1959) presented their participants with a list of meaningless 
“words” (e.g, “dax” and “teg”). Each meaningless “word” was then paired with a meaningful 
word: “regal”, “sleek”, etc. They called this list the “Regal List”. During the first 
experimental block, participants were asked to remember the one-to-one associations 
between the Nonsense List and the Regal List. The idea was that, if the participants saw 
“dax”, they needed to respond “regal”, and if they saw “teg”, they were asked to respond 
“sleek”, and so on. After training, the participants were able to successfully remember all 
the pairs (with 100% accuracy). In the second experimental block, the participants had to 
remember a further list of meaningful words: “keen”, “swift”, etc. They called this list the 
“Keen List”. Similarly, participants were asked to remember the associations between the 
Nonsense List and the Keen List (e.g., “dax” == “keen”; “teg” == “swift”). After training, 
the participants reached 90% accuracy.  
 In the final experimental block, when the participants were asked to recall the 
associations (or pairs) from Block 1 again, they were only able to recall 50% of the 
associations. This 50% decline in accuracy, together with the results of a control group 
suggested that it was not simply the passage of time that was responsible. Instead, if two 
different types of associations (i.e., the Nonsense List-Regal Lists link and the Nonsense 
List-Keen Lists link) are presented in alternating trials, the participants could quickly 
remember almost all the associations from both the Regal List and the Keen List.  
 The sequential learning problem shares some characteristics with task-switching. For 
example, consider the two lists as two different “tasks”. In the alternating trial condition, the 
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participant has to “switch” between the “Nonsense-Regal” task and the “Nonsense-Keen” 
task. Moreover, just as in the incongruent condition, the same stimuli were linked with 
different responses depending on the “task rules”. APECS can cope with the sequential 
learning problem (MacLaren 1993; McLaren, et al., 2012). 
Forrest et al. (2014) applied the same APECS method to model the results of a task-
switching paradigm. They found that the APECS associative learning network would 
perform worse in switch trials than in repeat trials. They applied dual-cue paradigms, and it 
was suggested that the task-switching costs might reflect a closer associative connection 
between cues that indicate the same task. If the same stimulus-response links in the artificial 
neuron network are repeatedly activated in the presence of certain task cues, this activation 
can strengthen the link between the cues themselves, resulting in an associative cue 
equivalence. This equivalence then selectively facilitates the retrieval of a stimulus-response 
link in trials with equivalent cues, i.e., task-repeat trials. Therefore, when participants do not 
switch between two tasks, the APECS associative learning account still predicts task-
switching costs. 
Disadvantages of APECS 
 APECS is not, however, compatible with the results in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. In 
these experiments, there was no evidence of any task-switching costs after controlling the 
task-switching strategy. One possible explanation is that the APECS model is only 
compatible with the dual-cue task-switching paradigm. In this paradigm, each task had two 
cues, and there was a total of four task cues. In contrast, Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 applied a 
single explicit task cue. The APECS model relies on the associations between cues 
representing the same task. If there is only one cue per task, the results might be different, 
because there would be no associations between two task cues that present the same task. 
For the APECS model, the problem is the pigeon studies (Castro & Wasserman 2016; Meier 
et al., 2016). Specifically, Meier and colleagues (2016) used a very similar experimental 
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setup to Forrest et al. (2014). Both experiments had four cues (two for each task), four target 
stimuli, and two response keys.  
It has been suggested that pigeons do not have executive control (e.g., Lea & Wills, 
2008; Lea et al., 2009; Maes et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2012; Wills et al., 
2009).Therefore, pigeons can only use associative learning to perform in a task-switching 
paradigm. If the APECS model is correct, the pigeons, like the human participants in Forrest 
et al.’s (2014) experiments, should demonstrate significant task-switching costs. However, 
no evidence of task-switching costs has been found in pigeons.  I conclude that the APECS 
model does not fit task-switching behaviour once we have ruled out the task-switching 
strategy or cognitive learning process.   
The following section discusses another account of associative learning: Pearce’s 
generalisation rule (1987). As Meier et al. (2016) suggested, Pearce’s generalisation rule can 
explain why Forrest et al. (2014) found significant task-switching costs in human 
participants, but none in  pigeons, using an equivalent task-switching paradigm (Meier et al., 
2016). 
7.3.2 Pearce’s Generalisation Rule 
Meier and colleagues (2016) proposed that pigeons (and other animals) learn to 
associate stimulus configurations with responses, and these mappings can be generalised to 
other stimulus configurations that share similar elements. They applied Pearce’s 
generalisation model to calculate the strength of generalisation. Pearce (1987) gives a simple 
rule for generalisation: G (Generalisation) = (NS × NS) / (TA × TB). In this equation: NS 
denotes the number of elements shared by stimulus configuration A and stimulus 
configuration B; TA is the total number of elements in A; and TB is the total number of 
elements in B. Also, Meier and colleagues assumed that, in any given trial, the pigeons 
identified three elements: the cue, the stimulus, and the response key (where the pigeon 
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should peck), and that these elements formed a compound stimulus. In the following 
example, I illustrate how this rule can be applied in a task-switching experiment. 
Suppose that in trial n - 1, task cue A and incongruent stimulus W appear and the 
correct response key is left (L). If a pigeon makes a correct response and receives a reward, 
the associative strength between the reward and the compound stimulus AWL is increased 
by amount 𝛿 of associative strength. If the baseline of associative strength equals V, then the 
current associative strength of compound AWL = V + 𝛿.  
In the subsequent trial n, cue B appears, but the stimulus is still W. Since W is an 
incongruent stimulus, the correct response is right (R), and L is the incorrect response. Now, 
the pigeon can choose between two compound stimuli: BWR (the correct one) and BWL 
(the incorrect one). We can assume the pigeon is more likely to pick the compound with 
more associative strength, rather than the compound with less associative strength. 
Furthermore, since compound AWL from trial n - 1, compound BWR, and compound BWL 
share common elements, the strength of association is generalised, according to Pearce’s 
rule. 
Compound BWR shares one common element with compound AWL. Applying the 
rule, we get:  V + [(1 × 1) / (3 × 3)] × 𝛿 = V + 1𝛿 /9. In other words, in trial n, compound 
BWR (correct) inherited 1/9 of the associative strength increment from the previous trial. 
Compound BWL (incorrect) shares two common elements with compound AWL. Applying 
the rule, we get V + [(2 × 2) / (3 × 3)] × 𝛿 = V + 4𝛿/9. Surprisingly, in trial n, the incorrect 
compound BWL has 4/9 of the associative strength increment from the previous trial, which 
is stronger than the correct compound with a difference of 𝛿/3 in associative strength. 
Therefore, the pigeon is more likely to choose the incorrect compound and make a mistake 
in trial n. Applying the same rule, we can measure the difference in associative strength 
between the correct compound stimulus and the incorrect compound stimulus in every trial.  
Pigeons and Humans 
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Meier and colleagues (2016) found that for pigeons, the average associative strength 
difference between correct and incorrect compounds was increased by .22 𝛿 in repeat trials 
compared to switch trials. Theoretically, pigeons were less likely to make a mistake in repeat 
trials than in switch trials. However, because 𝛿 is a relatively small increment, they suggested 
that a difference of .22𝛿 between the switch and the repeat trials may be below a threshold 
and therefore undetectable. However, they proposed that the human participants in Forrest 
et al. (2014) were not encoding all three components (i.e., cue, stimuli, and response) as one 
compound. Instead, the human participants were encoding these three components 
separately. This allowed the humans to develop a cue equivalence between two cues that 
represent the same task, as suggested in the APECS model. Applying these assumptions, 
Meier and colleagues (2016) suggested that it is possible for humans to generate a significant 
task-switching cost using Pearce’s generalisation rule (1987). They reported that for human 
participants, the average associative strength difference between correct and incorrect 
compounds is .50𝛿 in repeat trials compared to switch trials (the difference in associative 
strength is more than doubled that of pigeons). Consequently, for human participants (i.e., 
Forrest et al., 2014), there is a strong and detectable task-switching cost. However, Meier et 
al. (2016) did not report their calculations. Therefore, it is difficult to replicate how they 
derived .50𝛿 (see Meier et al., 2016; p. 173). 
Pearce’s Rule and the Results of Experiments 2.1, 2.2, 4.1 and 4.2  
Meier et al. (2016) applied a dual-cue task-switching paradigm. In all of the 
experiments in this thesis, I used a task-cueing paradigm. Hence, each task has one task cue. 
Meier et al. (2016) did not report how exactly they applied Pearce’s rule for human 
participants who encoded each element of the cue-stimulus compound separately. Hence, 
we do not know how Pearce’s rule predicts human task-switching behaviour if there is only 
one cue per task. Nevertheless, it would appear that, as long as human participants encode 
the cue, the stimulus, and the location of the response key separately, Pearce’s rule would 
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predict constant behavioural switch costs. Human participants either do or do not indicate a 
significant task-switching cost. As a consequence, Pearce’s rule is not a good model for 
explaining the difference between Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. In 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, task-switching costs remained significant despite the absence of 
the task-switching strategy. In contrast, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, task-switching costs 
vanished without the task-switching strategy. It is difficult to explain this difference using 
Pearce’s rule.   
7.4 Proactive Interference in Task-switching Experiments 
 In the previous sections, I have reviewed two alternative accounts in order to explain 
the behavioural patterns in task-switching experiments when participants do not apply the 
task-switching strategy. The results of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 challenge the compound 
retrieval account because it predicts task-switching costs in all our experiments, which is 
clearly not the case.  
The associative learning account, and especially Pearce’s (1987) generalisation 
account, as employed  by Meier et al. (2016), provides a better model fit, as it can explain 
most  of the current results. In particular, it can explain why pigeons have no task-switching 
costs, while human participants show task-switching costs in dual-cue task-switching 
experiments. However, Pearce's rule cannot explain the difference in task-switching costs 
between Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and between Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, where there were 
no task-switching costs at all. 
 Based on these results, I suggested that, the modified interference account I proposed 
in Chapter 5 is a possible contender. Nevertheless, this account also has some disadvantages 
and potential loopholes. For example, to further confirm this model, future studies need to 
show that binary feature-response mappings can cause interference whereas other non-
binary mappings cannot.  
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7.5 Limitations Due to Statistical Power 
 One major disadvantage of the present thesis is that the experiments have relatively 
low statistical power. In the present thesis, I sought to reduce task-switching costs. In other 
words, I predicted a significant difference in task-switching effects between conditions. The 
minimum probability acceptable for a Type 2 error is usually stated as .20, which is the 
probability of not rejecting a null hypothesis when it is in fact false. Accordingly, the power 
of the test is .80 [Power = 1 - Prob (Type 2 error)].  
 For a given alpha level and effect size, the power of the statistical test can be 
increased by a larger sample size. Hence, we can calculate the minimum requirement of the 
sample size in order to achieve a power of .80. For example, in Experiment 4.2, I sought to 
examine the task-switching effect (i.e., the factor of trial transition) in a 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
repeated measurements and within-between interactions. The two factors were trial 
transition and congruency. To reach a power of .80 (for a medium effect size f = 0.25 and 
alpha = 0.05), statistical power analysis (G*power version 3.1) suggested an optimal simple 
size of N = 24 participants. However, there were only 15 Chinese speakers and 6 non-
Chinese speakers in Experiment 4.2. Therefore, this experiment is potentially underpowered. 
In order to reach a power of .95, a sample of N=36 would be required. Experiment 4.1 and 
the experiments from Chapter 3 have similar problems. Altogether, due to the low statistical 
power of some experiments, the result that participants cannot fully eliminate task-switching 
cost unless they can eliminate both the task-set reconfiguration process and interference is 
not conclusive. To fully confirm this explanation, future replication studies with more 
participants are crucial. This is one of the goals for  my future studies.  
7.6 Task-switching Costs: Some Speculations and Implications 
 Two separate mechanisms of task-switching costs have been proposed in task-
switching studies: the task reconfiguration process (e.g., Monsell, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 
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2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), and  task interference (e.g., Allport 
et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Mayer & Keele, 2000; Schuch 
& Kochl, 2003). Later, studies proposed that in the task-cueing paradigm, at least some 
proportion of the task-switching cost may be the result of a cue-encoding process (Mayr & 
Kliegl, 2003; Grange & Houghton, 2009; Horoufchin et al., 2011; Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 
2014).  
 These three mechanisms have been established as the origins of task-switching 
costs. In many studies it was assumed that all three accounts were valid and that task-
switching costs are a combination of all three effects (Meiran, 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; 
Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Brown, Reynolds & Braver, 2007; Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). 
However, based on the results of Experiments 2.1 to 5.1, I propose some interaction between 
these three mechanisms. 
7.6.1 Relationships between Task-sets, Cue-encoding and Interference 
Firstly, since, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, I did not detect any cue encoding after 
controlling the task-switching strategy, I proposed that cue-encoding effects may be only a 
by-product of the task-set reconfiguration process. Secondly, based on the results of 
Experiment 5.1, I also proposed that interference from the previous trial can be independent 
of the task-set reconfiguration process. On its own, this interference can create task-
switching costs even when no explicit task-switching occurs. In my view this can happen 
because interferences are not always triggered by the task-set (Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak 
& Hommel, 2007; Koch & Allport, 2006; Koch et al., 2010), but can also be triggered by 
binary feature–response mappings, as suggested in previous studies (e.g., Woodward et al. 
2003; Hommel, 1998, 2005).  
Thirdly, despite the fact that interference and task reconfiguration can be two 
independent mechanisms, it is also possible that both mechanisms interact with each other. 
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If the interference and task-set reconfiguration processes are two parallel processes that can 
generate task-switching costs, then removing the task reconfiguration process should reduce 
the task-switching costs. In essence, this was reported by Forrest et al. (2014). In all three 
experiments, they found that, after removing task-switching as a viable strategy, task-
switching costs were significantly reduced. 
However, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, I found that after controlling the task-
switching strategy, task-switching costs were not reduced. One potential explanation is that 
the interference and the task-set reconfiguration process do not simply add up and form a 
summation of task-switching costs. Different degrees of interaction are possible. For 
example, we know that, under certain circumstances task-sets can block interference (for a 
review, see Dreisbach, 2012). Therefore, I suggest that, in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, when 
the participants applied the task-switching strategy, during reconfiguration, the task-sets 
eliminated some of the interference. Thus, the power of the interference was reduced. In 
contrast, when the participants applied novel strategies, without activating the task-sets, 
interference was increased. As a result, the experimental group and the control group showed 
similar amounts of task-switching cost. How exactly the interference and the task-set 
reconfiguration process interact is a question that may be pursued in follow-up research 
7.6.2 What are Task-switching Costs?  
 What do task-switching costs reflect in task-switching experiments? For the task-set 
reconfiguration process alone, the answer is straightforward. Previous studies have 
suggested that this process may reflect an executive control effort (Monsell, 2003; Monsell 
& Mizon, 2006; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 2000; Braver, 
2012). As discussed in Chapter 2, previous studies have concluded that participants with 
better executive control tend to have smaller task-switching costs (Cepeda, Cepeda & 
Kramer, 2000; Kramer, Cepeda & Cepeda, 2001; Rasmussen & Gillberg, 2001; Kray et al., 
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2012; Meiran, Gotler & Perlman, 2001; Kray, Li & Lindenberger 2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 
2000; Barenberg et al., 2015; Kamijo & Takeda, 2010).However, if the interference from 
task features can be completely independent of the executive control governed task-set 
reconfiguration process, then the results of these studies might gain a different interpretation. 
For example, instead of deficiencies of executive control, it is possible that participants show 
larger task-switching costs because they experience stronger interference from the previous 
trial. Hence, measuring the individual differences of proactive interference is a promising 
topic for future studies.  
7.6.3 A Unique Human Cognitive Function? 
 We have established an idea of what task-switching costs may reflect. The task-
switching costs in task-cueing paradigms may relate to a combined effect of task-set 
reconfiguration, cue-encoding, and proactive interference from the previous trial. In this 
section, I will attempt to discuss a slightly different question: why do we have task-switching 
costs?  
 Based on the differences between humans and monkeys Stoet and Snyder (2007, 
2009) proposed that unlike other animals, humans often need to focus on a single task. 
Therefore, we have may developed a unique cognitive function to prevent us from switching 
between tasks too easily——every time we switch to a new task, we have to make a 
cognitive effort. For monkeys, on the other hand, focusing on a single task is not so 
important. They have not developed such a cognitive function, and therefore can switch 
between tasks effortlessly. In other words, Stoet and Snyder (2007, 2009) suggested that 
human task-switching costs are not a disadvantage but rather a valuable cognitive effect that 
helps us to focus on the current task.  
I suggested that both monkeys and humans need an additional task-set 
reconfiguration process when switching to a new task. The difference between the two 
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species is the result of different interferences. For monkeys, the interference from previous 
actions decays very fast. However, for humans, the interference from previous actions is 
long-lasting. Thus, I have slightly revised Stoet and Snyder’s (2007, 2009) original 
explanation. I propose that, to help us to focus on one task, we have developed an additional 
cognitive function so that the information produced by previous actions remains strong and 
long-lasting. As a result, every time we switch to a new task, prior information is more likely 
to be incompatible, resulting in delayed reactions even when the preparation period is 
relatively long. It is also important to mention that, although the task-switching costs can be 
quite substantial in task-switching experiments, this may not have such a profound impact 
in daily life. After all, being forced to switch between two tasks, back and forth continuously 
and rapidly, is unlikely to occur in daily life. The price of having such an additional cognitive 
function to help us focus on one task is in fact quite low.  
7.7 Conclusion 
 In the present thesis, I have attempted to answer two questions. Firstly, I tried to 
explain the remaining task-switching costs when we rule out the task-switching strategy, I 
proposed a modified proactive interference account. Interference accounts in previous work 
have suggested that interference is the result of the relevant task-sets or stimulus-response 
mappings (e.g., Allport et al., 1994; Allport & Wylie, 1999; Wylie & Allport, 2000; Mayer 
& Keele, 2000; Schuch & Kochl, 2003; Waszak et al., 2003; Waszak & Hommel, 2007; 
Koch & Allport, 2006). However, the modified interference account suggests that 
interference can be triggered by binary feature-response mappings. In addition, I propose 
that proactive interference can be independent of task-set reconfiguration processes. As a 
result, even without explicitly switching between tasks, interference alone can produce 
significant task-switching costs.  
Secondly, I have provided a possible explanation for the observed differences 
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between task-switching costs in humans, pigeons, and monkeys. I have proposed that unlike 
pigeons and monkeys, humans have strong and long-lasting interference from previous trials 
in typical task-switching experiments. As a consequence, we consistently observe task-
switching costs in humans, whereas monkeys and pigeons can perform in task-switching 
experiments without showing any task-switching costs. In order to survive and to reproduce 
all animals, including humans, must adapt to a complex and ever-changing environment. 
Thus, there is a constant demand to switch between different tasks. However, it was 
suggested that humans, unlike most animals, also need to focus on a single task for a 
prolonged period of time (Stoet & Snyder 2007, 2009). I propose that human task-switching 
costs may reflect the trade-off between these two needs.   
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Appendix A  
It is shown how interference in each trial is calculated in Chapter 5. This includes 
interference in Experiment 5.1, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, and the hypothetical dual-cue task-
switching paradigm from Chapter 5.  
Abbreviations: 
CO==colour cue | SH==shape cue 
WH==White | BL==Black 
CI==Circle | HE==Hexagon 
For example, a colour cue with black circle is CO BL CI. 
Res = Response 
FRM = feature-response mapping 
L = Left; R = Right 
UoI = Unit of interference 
 
Conditions 
Gray cell = Switch Condition  
White cell = Repeat Condition 
 




n -1   Trial n    
 
Stimu
lus Res FRM Stimulus Res FRM UoI 
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
1 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
2 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
3 BL Left BL = L; WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
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WH=R 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
4 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
5 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
6 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
7 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
8 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
9 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
10 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
11 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
12 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
13 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
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14 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
15 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
16 BL Left 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
17 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
18 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
19 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
20 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
21 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
22 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
23 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
24 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
25 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
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26 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
27 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 0 
28 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 0 
29 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
30 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
31 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 CO  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
32 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 0 
33 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
34 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
35 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 1 
36 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
37 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
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 SH  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
38 WH Left WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 1 
39 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  SH=L;CO=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 0 
40 WH Left WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
41 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
42 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
43 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
44 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
45 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
46 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
47 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
48 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 HE  CI=L;HE=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
49 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
50 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
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 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
51 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
52 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
53 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
54 BL Right WH=L;BL=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
55 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
56 BL Right WH=L;BL=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  SH=L;CO=R 1 
57 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
58 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
59 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Right WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R SH  CO=L; SH=R 0 
60 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
61 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  HE=L;CI=R 0 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
62 WH Right BL = L; BL Left BL = L; WH=R 0 
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WH=R 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  CO=L; SH=R 0 
63 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Left WH=L;BL=R 1 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R CI  CI=L;HE=R 1 
        
 SH  CO=L; SH=R CO  SH=L;CO=R 1 
64 WH Right 
BL = L; 
WH=R WH Right BL = L; WH=R 0 
 CI  HE=L;CI=R HE  CI=L;HE=R 1 
 
In summary, all repeat conditions had a total of 34 units of interference. There were 
32 different repeat conditions; thus, on average, each repeat trial had 1.0625 units of 
interference from the previous trial. All switch trials received a total of 54 units of 
interference. On average, each switch trials had 1.68 units of interference. Switch – Repeat 
= .62 
Interference in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
 
 Trial n -1   Trial n   UoI 
No Stimulus Res FRM Stimulus Res FRM 1 or 0 
   SH=L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
1 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
2 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
3 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
4 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
5 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI= L; HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
6 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
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   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
7 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI= L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH=L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
8 SH WH CI L WH=L; BL = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI= L; HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
9 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
10 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
11 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
12 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
13 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
14 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
15 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
16 SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
17 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
18 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
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19 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
20 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
21 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
22 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
23 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
24 SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
25 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
26 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
27 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
28 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
29 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
30 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
31 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
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   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
32 SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
33 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   HE = L;CI = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
34 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L;HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
35 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
36 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   HE = L; CI = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
37 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
38 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
39 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
40 CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   HE = L;CI = R   CI = L;HE = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
41 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
42 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
43 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
44 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
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   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
45 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   SH = L; CO = R 1 
46 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
47 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   CO = L; SH = R   CO = L; SH = R 0 
48 CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   CI = L;HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
49 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L;CI = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
50 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
51 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
52 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   HE = L; CI = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
53 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
54 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
55 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L; HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
56 CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   CI = L; HE = R   CI = L;HE = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
57 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R CO WH HE L WH = L; BL = R 0 
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   HE = L; CI = R   HE = L;CI = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
58 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R CO WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L;HE = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
59 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R CO BL HE R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
60 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L; CI = R   HE = L; CI = R 0 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
61 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R SH WH CI L WH = L; BL = R 0 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   SH = L; CO = R 0 
62 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R SH BL CI L BL= L; WH = R 1 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
63 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R SH WH HE R BL = L; WH = R 1 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L; HE = R 1 
        
   SH = L; CO = R   CO = L; SH = R 1 
64 CO BL CI R WH = L; BL = R SH BL HE R WH = L;BL= R 0 
   HE = L; CI = R   CI = L;HE = R 1 
 
In summary, all repeat conditions had a total of 32 units of interference. There were 
32 different repeat conditions; thus, on average, each repeat trial had 1.0 unit of interference 
from the previous trial. All switch trials received a total of 48 units of interference. On 
average, each switch trials received 1.5 units of interference. Switch – Repeat = .5 
 
Interference in Dual-Cue Task-Switching Paradigm 
 
 Trial n -1    Trial n   UoI 
No Stimulus Res FRM Stimulus Res FRM  
1 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
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2 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
3 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
4 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
5 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
6 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
7 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
8 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
9 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
10 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
11 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
12 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
13 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
14 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
15 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
16 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
17 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
18 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
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19 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
20 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
21 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
22 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
23 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
24 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
25 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
26 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
27 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
28 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
29 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
30 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
31 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
32 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
33 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
34 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
35 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
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36 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
37 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
38 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
39 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
40 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
41 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
42 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
43 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
44 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
45 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
46 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
47 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
48 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
49 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
50 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
51 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
52 circle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
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53 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
54 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
55 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
56 circle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
57 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
58 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
59 circle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
60 circle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
61 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
62 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
63 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
64 circle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
65 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
66 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
67 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
68 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
69 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
 
        256 
70 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
71 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
72 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
73 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
74 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
75 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
76 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
77 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
78 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
79 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
80 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 1 Left odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
81 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
82 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
83 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
84 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
85 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
86 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
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87 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
88 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
89 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
90 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
91 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
92 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
93 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
94 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
95 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
96 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 4 Left even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
97 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
98 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
99 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
        
100 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
101 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
102 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 0 
        
103 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 0 
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104 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
105 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
106 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
107 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
108 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
109 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
110 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
111 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 1 
        
112 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 7 Right even=L;odd=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 
        
113 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
114 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
115 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
116 triangle  small=L;big=R circle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
117 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
118 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Left even=L;odd=R 1 
        
119 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Right even=L;odd=R 1 
        
120 triangle  small=L;big=R triangle  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
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121 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
122 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
123 triangle  small=L;big=R square  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
124 triangle  small=L;big=R square  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
125 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 1 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
126 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 4 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
        
127 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  big=L;small=R 1 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 7 Left odd=L;even=R 0 
        
128 triangle  small=L;big=R pentagon  small=L;big=R 0 
 8 Right odd=L;even=R 8 Right odd=L;even=R 0 
The rest half repeats. On average, each cue switch and cue repeat trial had .5 units of 
interference from the previous trial. In addition, each task switching trial had 1.0 unit of 
interference from the previous trial. The modified interference account would predict 
significant task-switching costs but no cue-switching costs.  
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Appendix B  
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 2.1 
 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (experimental, control) 
I used the default aov () function in R, the code for this is: 
Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Congruency* Group + Error (Subjects / (Transition* 
Congruency))) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 864286 864286 1.786 0.189 
Residuals 38 18392119 18392119   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 1279918 1279918 39.201 2.5e-07 *** 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 75831 75831 2.323 0.136 
Residuals 38 1240712 32650   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency  1 393302 393302 22.439 3.01e-05 *** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 32389 32389 1.848 0.182     
Residuals 38 666045 17528   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 2752 2752 0.271 0.606 
TT × Cong × Group 1 3057 3057 0.301 0.586 
Residuals 38 385965 10157   
 
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (experimental, control) 
         
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 0.2161 0.21609    10.21 0.00281 ** 
Residuals 38 0.8041 0.02116   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
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Trial Transition 1 0.00011 0.0001147 0.103 0.749 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 0.00167 0.0016697 1.506   0.227 
Residuals 38 0.04213 0.0011088                 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency  1 0.31298 0.31298  41.872 1.29e-07 *** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 0.05535 0.05535  7.404   0.00976 ** 
Residuals 38 0.28404 0.00747   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.00666 0.006664 4.600 0.0384* 
TT × Cong × Group 1 0.00268 0.002678    1.849 0.1819   
Residuals 38 0.05505 0.001449   
      
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 2.2 
 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (experimental, control) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 42688 42688 0.384 0.541 
Residuals 24 2664635 111026   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 234173 234173 42.216 1.02e-06 *** 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 14017 14017 2.527 0.125 
Residuals 24 133128 5547   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency  1 70744 70744 8.331 0.00812 ** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 1865 1865 0.220 0.64352 
Residuals 24 203795 8491   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 9071 9071 3.718 0.0657 
TT × Cong × Group 1 8325 8325 3.412 0.0771 
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Residuals 24 58550 2440   
 
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (experimental, control) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 0.06754 0.06754 6.711 0.016 * 
Residuals 24 0.24155 0.01006   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.01608 0.016076 7.845 0.00991 ** 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 0.00110 0.001095 0.535 0.47179   
Residuals 24 0.04918 0.002049   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 0.10259 0.10259 47.001 4.33e-07 *** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 0.00014 0.00014 0.064 0.802 
Residuals 24 0.05239 0.00218   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.000509 0.0005088 0.401 0.533 
TT × Cong × Group 1 0.000000 0.0000000 0.000 1.000 
Residuals 24 0.030464 0.0012693   
 
 
ER ~ Task Type (novel shape, novel colour) × Participant Group (experimental, control) 
Code: Test = aov (ER ~ Task* Group + Error (Subjects / Task)) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 0.6578   0.6578 73.7 8.86e-09 *** 
Residuals 24 0.2142 0.0089   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Task Type 1 0.3531   0.3531    19.55 0.000181 *** 
Task Type × Participant Group 1 0.1830   0.1830    10.13 0.004001 ** 




ANOVAs Results of Experiment 3.1 
 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Repeat, Switch) × Stage (Stage 2, Stage 3) 
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Code: Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Stage + Error (Subjects / (Transition* Stage))) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stage 1 847209 847209 19.52 0.000584 *** 
Residuals 14 607625 43402   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 58416 58416 19.78 0.000552 *** 
Residuals 14 41345 2953   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Stage 1 39396    39396    16.45 0.00118 ** 
Residuals 14 33528 2395   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Repeat, Switch) × Stage (Stage 2, Stage 3) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stage 1 0.000659 0.0006590 4.061 0.0635 
Residuals 14 0.002272 0.0001623      
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.000238 0.0002377 0.485 0.497 
Residuals 14 0.006859 0.0004899   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Stage 1 0.000514 0.0005140 2.248 0.156 
Residuals 14 0.003202 0.0002287   
 
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 3.2 
 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Repeat, Switch) × Stage (Stage1, Stage 2, Stage 3) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stage 2 3811600 1905800 58.36 1.38e-12 *** 
Residuals 40 1306163 32654   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
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Trial Transition 1 138552 138552 33.38 1.18e-05 *** 
Residuals 20 83021 4151     
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Stage 2 87474 43737 13.37 3.57e-05 *** 
Residuals 40 130826 3271   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Repeat, Switch) × Stage (Stage1, Stage 2, Stage 3) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stage 2 0.00108 0.0005411 0.256 0.776 
Residuals 40 0.08468 0.0021169   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.005213 0.005213 11.53 0.00287 ** 
Residuals 20 0.009041 0.000452   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Stage 2 0.001019 0.0005094 0.849 0.435 
Residuals 40 0.023990 0.0005997     
 
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 4.1 
 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (Chinese, non-Chinese) 
Code: Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Congruency* Group + Error (Subjects / (Transition* 
Congruency))) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 22056 22056 0.284 0.598 
Residuals 26 2016147 77544   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 64607 64607 10.49 0.00327 ** 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 78811 78811 12.80 0.00139 ** 
Residuals 26 160068 6156   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
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Congruency  1 505611 505611 35.87 2.53e-06 *** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 393459 393459 27.91 1.59e-05 *** 
Residuals 26 366518 14097   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 5224 5224 1.378 0.251 
TT × Cong × Group 1 2836 2836 0.748 0.395 
Residuals 26 98581 3792   
 
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × 
Participant Group (Chinese, non-Chinese) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Participant Group 1 0.1228 0.12280 9.251 0.00532 ** 
Residuals 26 0.3451 0.01327     
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.00064 0.000637 0.428 0.5190 
Trial Transition × Participant Group 1 0.00488 0.004878 3.276 0.0819 
Residuals 26 0.03872 0.001489   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency  1 0.22019 0.22019 102.87 1.58e-10 *** 
Congruency × Participant Group 1 0.09407 0.09407 43.95 4.95e-07 *** 
Residuals 26 0.05565 0.00214   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.00499 0.004986 2.906 0.1001   
TT × Cong × Group 1 0.00527 0.005271 3.072 0.0914 
Residuals 26 0.04461 0.001716   
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 4.2 
 
Non-Chinse speaker in Composite Condition: 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) 
Code: Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Congruency + Error (Subjects / (Transition* 
Congruency))) 
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 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 1166 1166 0.121 0.742 
Residuals 5 48085 9617   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 1027252 1027252 20.19 0.00644 ** 
Residuals 5 254405 50881   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 1817 1817 0.45 0.532 
Residuals 5 20162 4032   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent)  
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.002361 0.0023606 3.254 0.131 
Residuals 5 0.003627 0.0007255   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 0.16807 0.16807 17.75 0.00838 ** 
Residuals 5 0.04734 0.00947   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.000277 0.0002771 0.347 0.582 
Residuals 5 0.003995 0.0007990   
 
Non-Chinse speaker in CSI and SCI Conditions:  
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × Cue-
stimulus Sequence (CSI, SCI) 
Code: Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Congruency* Sequence + Error (Subjects / 
(Transition* Congruency* Sequence))) 
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 699 698.7 0.701 0.427 
Residuals 8 7971 996.   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
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Congruency 1 2614243 2614243 37.88 0.000273 *** 
Residuals 8 552093 69012   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 1032718 1032718 43.11 0.000176 *** 
Residuals 8 191631 23954   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 2970 2970.3 6.076 0.039 * 
Residuals 8 3911 488.9   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 111 111.0 0.211 0.658 
Residuals 8 4201 525.1   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cong × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 244815 244815 75.28 2.42e-05 *** 
Residuals 8 26016 3252   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cong × Sequence 1 171 170.8 0.36 0.565 
Residuals 8 3795 474.4   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × Cue-
stimulus Sequence (CSI, SCI) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.0002359 0.0002359   1.361 0.277 
Residuals 8 0.0013862 0.0001733   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 0.18889 0.18889 28.07 0.000731 *** 
Residuals 8 0.05385 0.00673   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 0.00106 0.001064 0.213 0.657 
Residuals 8 0.03992 0.004990   
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 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.000392 0.0003922 0.563 0.475 
Residuals 8 0.005576 0.0006970   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 0.000837 0.0008372 0.724 0.42 
Residuals 8 0.009255 0.0011569   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cong × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 1 0.00446 0.004459 0.881 0.375 
Residuals 8 0.04049 0.005062   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cong × Sequence 1 0.000003 0.0000027 0.003 0.959 
Residuals 8 0.007721 0.0009651      
 
Chinese Group 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × Cue-
stimulus Sequence (Com, CSI, SCI) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 3141 3141 1.268 0.279 
Residuals 14 34672 2477   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 2478997 2478997 65.02 1.25e-06 *** 
Residuals 14 533751 38125   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 7836133 3918066 124.8 1.13e-14 *** 
Residuals 28 878893 31389   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 960 960.2 0.513 0.486 
Residuals 14 26211 1872.2     
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
 
        269 
TT × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 292 146 0.039 0.961 
Residuals 28 103649 3702   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cong × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 57162 28581 4.83 0.0158 * 
Residuals 28 165695 5918   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cong × Sequence 2 6728 3364 2.254 0.124 
Residuals 28 41789 1492   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) × Cue-
stimulus Sequence (Com, CSI, SCI) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.000709 0.0007093 0.647 0.435 
Residuals 14 0.015345 0.0010961   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Congruency 1 0.5271 0.5271 52.14 4.42e-06 *** 
Residuals 14 0.1415 0.0101     
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 0.10461 0.05231 15.29 3.24e-05 *** 
Residuals 28 0.09577 0.00342   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition × Congruency 1 0.001968 0.001968   1.844 0.196 
Residuals 14 0.014942 0.001067   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 0.00372 0.001861 1.071 0.356 
Residuals 28 0.04862 0.001737   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Cong × Cue-Stimulus Sequence 2 0.01096 0.005481 2.358 0.113 
Residuals 28 0.06507 0.002324   
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 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Cong × Sequence 2 0.00786 0.003929 1.931 0.164 
Residuals 28 0.05698 0.002035   
 
ANOVAs Results of Experiment 5.1 
RT ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Stimuli Type (Normal, Exception)  
Code: Test = aov (RT ~ Transition* Stimuli + Error (Subjects / (Transition* Stimuli))) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 175563 175563 27.5 0.000206 *** 
Residuals 12 76599   6383   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stimuli Type 1 185083 185083 8.171 0.0144 * 
Residuals 12 271811 22651         
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Stimuli Type 1 27506 27506 8.024 0.0151 * 
Residuals 12 41134 3428   
 
ER ~ Trial Transition (Switch, Repeat) × Stimuli Type (Normal, Exception) 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Trial Transition 1 0.003608 0.003608 3.242 0.0969 
Residuals 12 0.013353 0.001113   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
Stimuli Type 1 0.01241 0.01241 14.77 0.00234 ** 
Residuals 12 0.01009 0.00084   
 
 DF Sum Sq Mean Sq F P 
TT × Stimuli Type 1 0.001275 0.0012746 1.531 0.24 
Residuals 12 0.009993 0.0008327   
 
 
